注释

第一篇　查理曼及其继承者

1　查理曼

1.Lex Ripuaria（Ripuarian Law），36.11.M.G. LL.，5.231.

2.A cow is equated to 1 solidus. The expression “3 solidi，” which we find in one of the manuscripts, is obviously false, since an ox is counted as 2 solidi and a mare as 3. In a capitulary of Louis the Pious of the year 829，a cow is indicated in one place as the equivalent of 2 solidi.

3.（Note to the second edition）. The economic base of the Carolingian military organization is, as shown in Vol.Il, a barter economy. Alfons Dopsch, in his Economic Development of the Carolingian Period（Wirtschaftsentwicklung der Karolingerzeit），especially Vol. III, para.12，has recently claimed to prove that the generally accepted concept of this barter economy is incorrect and that there existed along with it a very considerable money economy. Consequently, he claims, the contrast between antiquity and the Middle Ages in this respect and in general is very overemphasized. I cannot agree with him. I find, on the contrary, the conclusions of my studies on the changes in military organization to be a new confirmation of the accepted concept. The transition from the Roman legionary to the medieval knight is not conceivable without the shift of the ancient money economy into a barter economy. See my review of Dopsch in the Deutsche Politik，26（1921）：620.“Römertum und Germanentum.”

4.The plebs urband（urban dwellers）were not considered as completely free in the Merovingian period. Brunner, German Legal History（Deutsche Recbtsgeschicbte），1：253，says: “We cannot determine with certainty how the decrease in freedom was expressed in a legal sense.”There can be no doubt that it is a question of the difference between the worrior and the nonwarrior. That point is not clear in Brunner because he believes, like Roth, in a general military obligation. According to the capitulary M.G. Capitularia Reg. Franc.，ed. Boretius，1：145，the tenant farmers were counted among the unfree men.

5.God. Kurth, in “The Nationalities in Auvergne”（“Les Nationalités en Auvergne”），Bulletin de la Classe des Lettres de l’Académie belgique，11（1899）: 769 and 4（1900）：224，proves with respect to Auvergne that no Franks at all settled there. In that region, even the great families holding the position of count were Romanics. Of almost all of the few Germans who appear in Auvergne, it can be proven that they did not settle there, except perhaps for a very few West Goths.

6.Numerous references in Guilhiermoz, Essai sur l'origine de la noblesse francaise, p.490.

7.Ancien Coutumier d'Anjou, Cited by Guilhiermoz, p.366.

8.Nithard IV, Chap.2.

9.Already explained by Boretius, Contributions to the Critique of the Capitularies（Beiträge zur Capitularienkritik），p.128，as a simple repetition from previous documents.

10.Cited by Baldamus in Tbe Military Organization under the Later Carolingians（Das Heerwesen unter den späteren Karolingern），p.12.

11.Hinkmar of Reims writes in the document against his nephew, the bishop of Laon（870）:“De hoc quippe vitio superbiae descendit quod multi te apud plurimos dicunt de fortitudine et agilitate tui corporis gloriari et de praeliis, atque, ut nostratum lingua dicitur, de vassaticis frequenter ac libenter sermonem habere, et qualiter agers si laicus fuisses irreverenter referre.”（“Certainly it comes from this sin of pride that many among the masses tell you to boast of your body's strength and agility and of battles, and, as it is said in our language, to speak willingly and often with vassals and to reply disrespectfully, just as you would act if you had been a layman.”）I take this interesting extract of the document from Guilhiermoz, Essai sur l'origine de la noblesse française, p.438，where other examples of that special usage are also given.

12.Maitland, Domesday Book and Beyond，1891，p.511.

13.When it is reported in the Annales Bertin, for the year 869 that for the garrison of a newly erected fort Charles the Bald called up one gastalds（scaramannus: warrior without a fief）from every 100 hides of land and a wagon with two oxen from every 1，000 hides, this does not give us any specific number, since it was not known at the court how many hides there were in each county. Consequently, this is only a very approximate reference, like the levy by groups.

14.In his German and French Constitutional History（Deutsche und französische Verfassungsgeschichte），Ernst Mayer has no doubt recognized the contradiction in the source material, but the solution that he gives in Vol.I, p.123，is impossible. He claims that on the Rhine, in Bavaria, and in Gothic Southern France only the Germans took the field, whereas berween the Seine and the Loire the general military obligation applied also to the Romans. One can imagine how such a Roman militia would have shown up between the Franks and the Goths！

15.That also applies when, as we later find prescribed in the Weissenburg service law and elsewhere, the ministeriale was supposed to be provisioned by the curia after the crossing of the Alps. Baltzer, pp.69，73. Waitz 8：162.

16.A manuscript of the Theodon Capitulary of 805，Chap.5，contains the sentence: “et ut servi lancea non portent, et qui invents fuerit post bannum hasta frangatur in dorso ejus”（“and that the unfree should not carry lances, and a spear should be broken on the back of whoever was found doing so after the order”）. Waitz, Verfassungsgeschichte，1st ed.，4：454，interprets that to mean that the common soldiers who followed their lords to war were absolutely forbidden to carry the lance as their individual weapon. This interpretation is not acceptable. That chapter has to do with the bearing of weapons in peacetime（“in patria”: “in one's own country”）and with the suppression of feuds. Freemen were forbidden to carry arms（shield, lance, and armor）in peacetime, but no specific punishment was provided. In the case of serving men, this prohibition was backed by a threat of punishment.

17.The source passages are to be found in Prenzel, Contributions to the History of Military Organization under the Carolingians（Beiträge zur Geschichte der Kriegswesens unter den Karolingern），Leipzig dissertation，1887，p.34，and in Waitz, Deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte，4：455.

18.Multiple references are to be found in Guilhiermoz, p.245.

19.Annales Fuldenses（Annals of Fulda）for the year 894；Annales Altabenses（Annals of Niederalteich）for the year 1044：Thietmar，6：16.

20.Peez, in “The Travels of Charlemagne”（“Die Reisen Karls des Grossen”），Schmollers Jahrbücher fur Gesetzgebung，2（1891）：16，assembles all of Charlemagne’s travels and estimates that on the average he covered 1，100 miles each year of his reign. In the year 776 his travels amounted to almost 1，900 miles, and in 800 he covered almost 2，000 miles.

21.Imperial Courts in the Lippe, Rubr, and Diemel Areas（Reichshofe im Lippe-，Rubr-，und Diemelgebiet），1901. The Franks: Their System of Conquest and Settlement in the German Regions（Die Franken, ihr Eroberungsund Siedlungssystem im deutschen Volkslande），1904.

22.Brunner, Deutsche Rechtsgeschichte，2：57 ff.，where all the source passages are also cited.

23.Daniels, in Manual of German Imperial and National Legal History（Handbuch der deutschen Reichs-und Staatenrechtsgeschichte），1：424，463，has already correctly observed that under the Merovingians the entire population cannot possibly have taken the oath. But his basis from the sources, on the other hand, has been correctly rejected by Waitz, Deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte，2d ed，3：296. The entire argument, however, arose from the erroneous interpretation of the basic concept, that is, of the Frankish people. Daniels was entirely right in believing that only the warriors took the oath, but he was in error in believing that this warrior class was already a class of vassals at that time. Waitz was right in his belief that the entire people（Volk）took the oath but incorrect in identifying this “people” with the population. As a result of our determination that the sources of the period are referring to the warriors（Kriegsvolk）when they say “people”（Volk），the entire dispute has become baseless. From the formal, juridical, and source-based viewpoints, Waitz is right; but objectively, in that the warrior class of the Merovingian period was the precursor of the vassal class of Carolingian times, Daniels is right.

24.The oath in the Capitulare missorum（Capitulary of legates），M.G.，1.66 reads as follows in the corrected text（see Appendix 2 for Latin text）：

How that oath ought to have been sworn by bishops and abbots, or counts and vassal princes, also deputies, archdeacons and clerks.

3.Clerics, who do not seem to live completely like monks; and where they keep the rules of Saint Benedict according to his order, they should promise in word as much as in truth, and some of these the abbots especially should bring to our lord.

4.Then advocates, deputies, or whoever will have been elected as elders, and the whole mass of the people, twelve-year-old boys as well as old men, whoever had come to the assembly and are able to fulfill and observe the order of their lords, whetther peasants or men of bishops, abbesses, and counts or men of others, royal subtenants, tenants, clerics, and serfs, whoever as honored men hold benefices and services or were honored in vassalage since they are able to have the horses of their lord, arms, shield, lance, sword, and short sword, all should swear. And they should carry with them the names and number of these in a list, the counts likewise divided by single centenae [subdivisions of a county]，just as those who were born within a district and will have been peasants and those frome elsewhere who have been committed in vassalage.

Finally, warnings to those who want to escape the oath.

25.Contin. Fred.，Chap.135（Chronicarum quae dicuntur Fredegarii scholastici libri IV cum Continuationibus: Four books of Chronicles which are said to be by Fredegarius Scholasticus with continuations）.

26.Annales Lauresh.（Annals of Lorch）for the year 773. The duke of Benevento and all the Beneventans were also summoned to do their duty by messengers. Waitz 3：255.

27.Waitz 4：437.

28.Baltzer, p.48，believes that the bow was not mentioned as a weapon of war in Germany before the twelfth century. But that is not correct. The opposing pieces of evidence are assembled in Waitz, Verfassungsgeschichte 8：123. Widukind 3：28 tells of two outstanding warriors who were cut down by arrows in 953. In 3：54，Otto has the Slavs fired on with arrows. Bruno, Chap.61，mentions “sagittarii”（“archers”）. Continuatio Reginonis（Continuation of the Annals of Regino）for 962 has the Germans using marksmen（“sagittarii et fundibularii”：“archers and slingers”）in the siege of an Italian stronghold. Richard Richer has a similar account at the siege of Verdun in 984.

29.As cited in Waitz 4：458.

30.Capitulary of Diedenhofen of the year 805.M.G.，1.123.“De armatura in exercitu sicut iam antea in alio capitulare commendavimus, ita servetur, et insuper omnis homo de duodecim mansis bruneam habeat；

qui vero bruniam habens et earn secum non tullerit, omne beneficium cum brunia pariter perdat.”（“Concerning armament in the army let it thus be observed, just as we have already commanded before in another capitulary. In addition, every man with twelve holdings should have a mail tunic; indeed, whoever possesses a mail tunic and will not have brought it with him should lose his whole benefice together with his mail tunic.”）

31.Capitulary of Aachen.M.G.，1.171，Chap.9.

De hoste pergendi, ut comiti in suo comitatu per bannum unumquemque hominem per sexaginta solidos in hostem pergere bannire studeat, ut ad placitum denuntiatum ad ilium locum ubi iubetur veniant. Et ipse comis praevideat quomodo sint parati, id est lanceam, scutum et arcum cum duas cordas, sagittas duodecim. De his uterque habeant. Et episcopi, comites, abbates hos homines habeant qui hoc bene praevideant et ad diem denuntiati placiti veniant et ibi ostendant quomodo sint parati. Habeant loricas vel galeas et temporalem hostem, id est aestivo tempore.

Chap. 17. Quod nullus in hoste baculum habeat, sed arcum.

（When the army is on the march，[we order]that it should be the business of a count to proclaim by edict in his county that each man in lieu of 60 solidi should do military service, and that they should come to the assembly announced at that place where it is commanded. The count himself should have an eye to how they have been equipped, that is, lance, shield, a bow with two strings, and twelve arrows. Each of them should have these. Bishops, counts, and abbots should have these men who see to this well, and they should come on the day of the announced assembly and there they should show how they have been equipped. They should have breastplates, helmets, and an army for the season, that is in the summer time.

Chap. 17. That no one in the army should have a staff, but a bow.）

32.Gessler, The Cutting and Thrusting Weapons of the Carolingian Period（Die Trutzwaffen der Karolingerzeit），Basel，1908. See also in this connection Zeitschrift für historische Waffenkunde, Vol.V，2：63. According to Lindenschmidt, p.151，almost all the bows found in Merovingian graves are 7 feet long. Köhler，3：113，states 5 feet.

2　萨克森人的降伏

1.Nithard 4：2.Annales Bertin.for the year 841.

2.Rübel, The Franks: Their System of Conquest and Settlement（Die Franken, ihr Eroberungs-und Siedelungssystem），p.400，in accordance with the precedent set by Oppermann, Atlas of Low German Fortifications（Atlas niederdeutscher Befestigungen），believes that the large fort, Babilonie, the ruins of which have been preserved, is connected with the battle of Lübbecke in 775. The installation, like all Frankish relay courts, is divided into a smaller, better preserved part, the palatium（palace），and a larger one, the heribergum（army camp），the bivouac for the army. The heribergum of Babilonie has an area of 7½hectares. On the occasion of excavations in the autumn of 1905，however, scholars believe they have determined, on the basis of potsherds, that the stronghold was not a Frankish installation but a Saxon one.

3.At the northwest end of the Deister can be seen the remains of a Carolingian watchtower, the “Heisterburg，” the construction of which has also been connected with the campaign of 775. Nevertheless, it was not built until later. In the accounts of the rebellion by the Saxons in 776，the chronicles speak only of the conquest of Eresburg and the siege of Sigiburg. See Rübel, Die Franken, p.24，Note.

4.Rübel supposes that the method of the Franks, which called for marking off specific borders for the communities and thus drawing the wilderness areas which had formerly constituted the borders into the royal domains, also aroused the anger of the Saxon people.

5.The later German law books governing the vassalge system contain the regulation that the lord is to summon the vassal as much as six weeks before the beginning of the campaign.

6.Rübel, Royal Courts，（Reichshöfe），p.97，goes too far when he says: “In general, Charles customarily followed the courses of the streams in his campaigns and had his provisions moved up on the waterways.”We have direct evidence of this only for the campaign against the Avars in 791；for the diet at Paderborn in June 785，the provisions may have been moved up on the Lippe in advance. In 790，according to Einhard’s account, Charles moved by ship from Worms to Saltz on the Frankish Saale, where he had a palace, and followed the same route back, thus covering both times a large distance upstream. But many campaigns that we can trace were completely separate from the water routes.

7.“et dum ibi resideret multotiens scaras misit, et per semet ipsum iter peregit; Saxones, qui rebelles fuerunt, depraedavit et castra coepit et loca eorum munita intervenit et vias mundavit.”（“and while he was residing there, he often sent out his scarae and made a campaign on his own; he plundered the Saxons who were rebels, captured their camp, disrupted their fortified positions, and cleared the roads.”）The “vias mundavit” has previously—and also very recently, by Mühlbacher, German History under the Carolingians（Deutsche Geschichte unter den Karolingern），p.134—been translated as “cleared the routes，” which would therefore be understood as meaning cleared off guerrilla bands or robbers. But this interpretation hardly seems acceptable, since such bands were normally not on the routes but hidden in the countryside. Consequently, I have no doubt at all that Rübel in Royal Courts（Reichshöfe），p.95，is correct when he translates it as “constructed passable routes.”

8.“On the Origin of the City of Hanover”（“Ueber den Ursprung der Stadt Hannover”），Zeitschrift des historischen Vereins für Niedersachsen，1903.

3　加洛林帝国、诺曼人与匈牙利人

1.Regino, for the year 882：“innumera multitudo peditum ex agris et villis in unum agmen conglobata eos quasi pugnatura aggreditur. Sed Normanni cernentes ignobile vulgus non tantum inerme quantum disciplina militari nudatum tanta caeda presternum, ut bruta animalia, non homines mactari viderentur.”（“A countless number of men on foot from the countryside and the villages massed into one column approached them as if about to attack. But the Normans, seeing that it was a low-born crowd not so much unarmed as deprived of training, overthrew them with so great a slaughter that dumb animals, not men, seemed to be killed.”）

第二篇　鼎盛时期的封建国家

1　加洛林帝国覆灭后国家的形成

1.In “Les grandes families comtales à l’époque carlovingienne，”Revue historique，72（1900）：72，Poupardin has shown that the number of these families was rather small. Most of them traced their origins to Austrasia and were located in the most varied parts of the kingdom. They were closely interrelated. They often had properties in very different regions. That point was very important in the divisions into the various nations, since a person who had fallen into disfavor could easily move to another part of the kingdom. For this reason, the kings would not tolerate a person’s having fiefs simultaneously in various parts of the kingdom.

In “Social and Political Importance of the Control of Lands in the Early Middle Ages”（“Soziale und politische Bedeutung der Grundherrschaft im früheren Mittelalter”），Abhandlungen der historischen-philosophischen Klasse der Sächsischen Gesellschaft der Wissenschaft, Vol.22，Seeliger has successfully explained, in my opinion, that the significance of the privileges for the formation of the great lords’areas has been exaggerated. The important aspect of the public power always remained with the counties, and it was from them, and not from the great domains, that the later authorities of the nation sprang.

This point alone also explains why such small differences are to be seen between the Romanic and Germanic areas, a point that Seeliger did not raise. He also passed over the fundamental fact that the position of count became a fief and why this occurred, but these points can easily be added to his explanation to complete the basic concept. This is not the place to go into the special controversies that Seeliger’s studies have touched off.

2.In Mitteilungen des österreichischen Instituts，17（1896）: 165，Rodenberg quite correctly observes that Henry did not introduce anything completely new, but he holds fast to the idea that he did not just simply revive Carolingian arrangements. It would also be a false concept to say that he only “revived old arrangements.” In the first place, even a “simple renewal” always brings some changes of detail, and in the second place, the principal point is the great reinforcement of military power associated with the renewal, which was, of course, accompanied by very heavy new burdens（as, for example, the reorganization of the Prussian army by William I）. The accomplishment was therefore an important political deed.

3.In this connection, see also the excursus of Chapter II, Book III, below，“German Combat Methods on Foot and Horseback，” p.291.

4.Waitz, Heinrich I，3d ed.，p.101 and elsewhere.

5.Nitzsch, Geschichte des deutschen Volkes，1：306.

6.This point is not contradicted by the fact that the feudal lord held strictly to the obligation of his enfeoffed vassals to obey the summons for war. The law books also contain the strictest regulations on this point. But we already know from the Carolingian period that the strictness of the obligation did not mean that it always had to be accomplished in person. Rather, it could be satisfied with money, and for that very reason, and not because he would otherwise have had no men, the lord did not permit any modifications. The later supplements to the Roncaglian edicts of Frederick I required that the vassal provide a suitable substitute or pay half of the annual produce of his fief. Waitz，8：145. In the corresponding Saxon code, he had to pay only a tenth of his annual income, Lehnrechte，4：3. Auct.vet.，1：13. Deutschenspiegel Lehnrechte，11. Schwabenspiegel Lehnrechte，8. According to Rosenhagen, Zur Geschichte der Reichsheerfahrt, p.59.

7.Waitz，8：100.

8.Baltzer, p.23. Rosenhagen, p.18.

9.Annales Colonienses maximi. SS（Greatest Annals of Cologne. Historians in the M.G.series），17：843，now Chronica regia Coloniensis continuatio quarta（Royal Chronicles of Cologne, Fourth Continuation），p.265.“In campis Lici secus Augustam fere 6 milia militum in exercitu region sunt inventa.”（“In the area of Licum near Augusta almost 6，000 soldiers were found in the royal army.”）The only other example of a counting of troops that I have noted is from the fourteenth century: Christian Küchemeister, Neue Kasus Monst.St. Galli. Abbot Berthold（1244-1272）moved to the aid of the count of Hapsburg against the bishop of Basel with recruited knights and soldiers “and brought him more than 300 knights and soldiers, all of whom were counted at Säckingen above Brugg.”Historischer Verein von St. Gallen，1（1862）：19.

10.We now see as pointless the frequently discussed controversy as to whether only royal fiefs, or also fiefs granted by lords, or also allodia, carried obligations for military service under the king, and whether such obligations differed under varying conditions.（Weiland，“The Campaign of the Royal Army”[“Die Reichsheerfahrt”]，Forschungen zur deutschen Geschichte, Vol. VII；Baltzer, On the History of the German Military Organization[Zur Geschichte der Deutschen Kriegsverfassung]，Chap.1，para.3；Rosenhagen，“On the History of the Royal Army Campaign from Henry VI to Rudolf von Hapsburg”[“Zur Geschichte der Reichsheerfahrt von Heinrich VI.bis Rudolf von Habsburg”]，Leipzig dissertation，1885.）Anyone directly enfeoffed as a prince by the king was obliged to report with a troop of such strength as he himself determined and which he himself raised. It was up to him as to the extent to which he drew upon his fief and his allodia. Naturally, the king had no claim on the subvassals, but, on the basis of the royal levy, their lord ordered them to participate, or they were relieved of that responsibility through a contribution determined by custom and agreement. Allodial possessions within a county—a question that Heusler, Deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte, p.137，still believes will never be solved—were also taxed by the count in accordance with custom, on the basis of the royal levy. Naturally, nobody was free from the military burden except in cases of specific privileges. The king placed the same requirements on his royal ministeriales that the princes placed on theirs. The conditions of those freemen of the kingdom who were not princes, conditions originating in the thirteenth century, form a special case which we need not consider here.

From the contributions which the cities made for the army campaigns, there developed the city taxes which the emperors later demanded from the free cities. These taxes give positive testimony that it was not just the royal fiefs that were called on for service to the emperor, a point that would, of course, be taken for granted under any circumstances. See Rosenhagen, p.67，and Zeumer, German City Taxes in the Middle Ages（Deutsche Städtesteuern im Mittelalter）.

11.Hegel, Städteverfassungen，2：191.

12.The last point represents Waitz's opinion. Deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte，8：133.

13.Baltzer, On the History of the German Military System（Zur Geschichte des deutschen Kriegswesens），Chap.1，Sect.5，“The Strengths of the Contingents，” has already correctly recognized and given an excellent discussion of these conditions. I refer the reader to his work for the details and the cited passages. The only point on which I disagree is that Baltzer pictures the situation, as I have described it, as existing only from Henry IV on, and he believes that in earlier periods definite numbers, differing according to the situation, had been required, as in the order of Otto II. For my part, I date the feudal organization, which only exceptionally necessitated the use of such specific numerical requirements, as early as the period of Henry I and thereafter.

14.Jaffé，Bibl.，1：514.

15.Bibliography on this subject is to be found in Brunner, Principal Features of German Legal History（Grundzüge der deutschen Rechtsgeschichte），2d ed.，p. III, and Waitz, Verfassungsgeschichte, V，2d ed.，p.342.

Of particular importance in this connection are the Latin and German versions of the Laws for the Serving Men of the Archbishop of Cologne（Recht der Dienstmannen des Erzbischofs von Köln），ed.Frensdorff，1883，as well as the “constitutio de expeditione Romana”（“Ordinance concerning a Roman expedition”），although the latter, presumably a decree of Charlemagne, is fraudulent. According to Scheffer-Boichorst, Zeitschrift für Geschichte des Oberrheins，42（1888）：173，repeated in the collection On the History of the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries（Zur Geschichte des 12.und 13. Jahrhunderts），1897，this fraudulent document was composed around 1154 in the monastery of Reichenau in Swabia. The purpose was to specify, in the interest of the authorities, the obligations and rights of the ministeriales of the monastery, who were full of demands. Reprinted in M.G. LL，2.2.2. See also “Das Weissenburger Dienstrecht” in Giesebrecht, History of the German Imperial Period（Geschichte der deutschen Kaiserzeit），Vol.II, appendix.

16.Schöpflin, Alsatia diplomatica，1：226. Waitz, Deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte，8：156.

17.When Ladislaus of Bohemia levied his men in 1158 for the march to Italy, they were initially very dissatisfied, but when he explained that those who did not want to go would be allowed to stay at home, while those who went on the expedition had the prospect of rewards and honors, they all eagerly accepted the call.

18.It is stated in this way in the “Service Regulations of Vercelli of 1154”（“Dienstrecht von Vercelli vom Jahre 1154”），published by Scheffer-Boichorst, Zur Geschichte des 12.und 13. Jahrhunderts, p.21：“Illam securitatem, quam dominus fecerit regi secundum suum ordinem, illam securitatem debent facere vasalli super evangelio domino episcopo de expeditione Romana.”（“That guarantee which a lord will have made to the king, according to his own rank, vassals ought to make to their Christian lord bishop in regard to a Roman expedition.”）

19.On 7 November 1234，Pope Gregory IX required that a number of German princes should march to join him in the following March “te personaliter decenti militia comitatum, quae in expensis tuis per tres menses praeter tempus, quo veniet et recedet ... commoratur”（“you in person by the proper military service of the office of counts, which lasts at your expense for three months in addition to the time in which you will come and return ...”）. Huillard-Bréholles，4：513. In November 1247，Emperor Frederick ordered the Tuscan cities to send the knights their trimonthly pay. Huillard-Bréholles，6：576. A dubious document of Frederick’s, supposedly dating from May 1243，confirmed to a certain knight Matthäus Vulpilla the property granted to his family by King William in return for providing “unius militis equitis armati per tres menses continuo infra regnum, cum necesu erit”（“one armed horseman for three months in succession within the realm when it will be necessary”）. Huillard-Bréholles，6：939.

20.Guilhiermoz, Essai sur l'origine de la noblesse, p.276，believes that the forty-day service was first introduced by Henry II for Normandy and was then extended to the other possessions of the Plantagenets. In other French areas, he believes, there developed the legal custom for military service to be provided from the start at the expense of the lord.

21.With respect to these conditions, see Boutaric, Institutions militaires de la France avant les armées permanentes, p.126 ff. On p.233，Boutaric mentions a “coutume d’Albigeois”（“custom of the region of Albi”），from Martène, Thesaur.nov.anecdot.，1：834，according to which a vassal who did not bring along the prescribed number of men to the levy had to pay, as punishment for each missing warrior, double the amount of the man’s pay.

22.Waitz，8：162.

23.According to the so-called constitutio de expeditione Romana, M.G. LL.，2.2.2.

24.Boutaric, Institutions militaires de la France, has collected the passages on this subject on pp.191 ff. He says that complete lists of the feudal levies do not exist, but those that have survived show how small the obligations of the great vassals were. Under Philip Augustus, the duke of Brittany provided forty knights, Anjou forty, Flanders forty-two, the Boulonnais seven, Ponthieu sixteen, Saint Pol eight, Artois eighteen, Vermandois twenty-four, Picardy thirty, Parisis and Orléanais eightynine, and Touraine fifty-five.

From the time of Henry I（1152-1181），the counts of Champagne had lists made of their vassals, extracts from which have been passed down to us. Published in D'Arbois de Jubainville, Histoire des ducs et comtes de Champagne, Vol.II，1860.

The first of these lists shows a total of 2，030 knights（milites）. They provided the king with twelve bannerets.

Normandy had 581 knights in the service of the king and 1，500 in the service of the barons.

In 1294，Brittany had 166 knights（chevaliers，écuyers et archers），who were obligated to participate in the expedition. According to another source, there were 166 knights and 17 squires（écuyers）. Brittany was obligated to provide only 40 for the king.

2　莱希菲尔德会战

1.Mon.Germ. SS.，3.408.

2.Gerhardi, Vita S. Oudalrici（Life of Saint Oudalricus），SS.，4.377.

3.Flodoard, SS.，III.

4.Steichele, The Diocese of Augsburg（Das Bistum Augsburg），2（1864）：491，and L. Brunner, The Invasions of the Hungarians in Germany（Die Einfälle der Ungarn in Deutschland），1855，p.38.

5.Attempts have been made to reconcile Widukind's report that the Hungarians crossed the Lech and the fact that they were already on the left bank with the assumption that the battle, nevertheless, took place on the left bank. This explanation is based on the assumption that the reference to the Hungarians was only to those who attacked the Germans in the rear before the actual battle and that, consequently, only a part of them crossed the river, only to cross it for a second time near its mouth, thus falling on the Germans from the rear.A special example of this belief is to be found in Wyneken in his Studies on German History（Forschungen zur deutschen Geschichte），Vol.21，where he effectively corrects many of the errors made by others but in this case obviously falls from analysis into pure harmonistics. Widukind's meaning is clear, namely, that the entire Hungarian army crossed the river to do battle, and not simply a part of the army crossed for the purpose of an envelopment and then returned. If anyone wishes to eliminate Widukind's testimony to the effect that the Hungarians crossed the Lech before the battle（“Ungarii nihil cunctantes Lech fluvium transierunt”：“The Hungarians crossed the Lech River without any delay at all”）in order to be able to place the battle on the left bank, the only consistent possibility is to assume, as I have done above, that Widukind, who makes no mention of the siege, meant the first crossing.

6.Annales Palidenses（Annals of Pöhlde），SS.，16.60：“ad clivum, qui dicitur Gunzenle”（“toward the hill which is called Gunzenlee”）. Chronicon Eberspergense（Chronicle of Ebersberg），SS.，25.869：“Locus autem certaminis usque in hodiernum diem super fluvium Licum, id est Lech, latino eloquio nominatur Conciolegis, vulgares vero dicunt Gunzenlen.”（“The site of the battle, however, on the river Licum, that is the Lech, is called up to the present day by its Latin name Conciolegis; the common people in fact say Gunzenlen.”）Steichele, in Das Bistum Augsburg，2：491，reports that the hill no longer exists.

7.Widukind says that the king established his camp “in confiniis Augustanae urbis”（“on the borders of the city of Augsburg”）and that the other contingents joined him there.That, of course, does not mean that the assembly area was in or beside the area belonging to the city of Augsburg, but only that it was in the vicinity of Augsburg, where the battle later took place. The assembly had to take place north of the Danube so that none of the contingents would be individually exposed to an attack by the swift Hungarians. Only after all the contingents were assembled did they move across the river, ready for battle.

8.Annales Sangallenses majores（Annals of Saint Gall），Mon. Germ. SS.，1.79. To judge from the short report in these annals, it would not be impossible to conclude that the engagement between the Hungarians and the Bohemians and the capture of Lele took place in a completely different campaign, possibly on the Bohemian border. But we may clarify this point through a report from the Chronicon Eberspergense, SS.，20.12，which is admittedly 100 years later and very distorted but also contains the same name, Lel, of the Hungarian duke who was taken prisoner by the Ebersperg garrison while fleeing.

9.Thus reads the imperial order as it was relayed by Archbishop Hatti of Trier to the bishop of Toul in 817. See p.35，above.

3　亨利四世皇帝征战史

1.Both in M.G. SS.，V and in the school edition.

2.Carmen de bello Saxonico, M.G. SS.，XV.

3.According to Lambert and Bruno.

4.The Pöhlder Annals（M.G. SS.，XVI）report as follows on a battle they place in 1080：“Rursus inter Heinricum et Rodolfum bellum gestum est, ubi Rodolfus percepto clamore suos occubuisse putavit et fugit. At ubi eventum rei didicit, se scilicet propriam fugisse victoriam, magis vivere quam mori recusavit.”（“A battle was again waged between Henry and Rudolf, when Rudolf, after hearing a shout, thought his men had fallen and fled. But when he learned the outcome of the battle and that he obviously had fled his own victory, he was more reluctant to live than to die.”）This probably cannot refer to any other event than Melrichstadt.

5.Berthold expressly stated（M.G. SS.，V）that Henry assured his retinue that this would be the case.

6.Bruno says nothing about this. But it might be concluded from these points that the Pegau Chronicle had Henry marching up via Weida（south of Gera, on the upper Elster）. That is, of course, impossible in the light of Bruno's account. But since in any case Henry had also called up Bavaria, where he had a particularly large number of supporters, for the campaign, and these troops could presumably not march on any other route, the account in the Pegau Chronicle may be based on a positive legend that royal troops moved via Weida. Of course, it could also be that the village of Weida, situated on the battlefield, was the place referred to in this legend.

7.We cannot determine how close he came to Naumburg. Bruno's statements could be understood to mean that he made an attempt to take Naumburg by storm. But it is also possible that when he heard that the Saxons or their advance guard had already reached Naumburg, Henry crossed the Saale a day's march farther to the south. Perhaps only an engagement between reconnaissance forces took place before the town.

4　诺曼人征服盎格鲁-撒克逊人

1.Major Albany's work, Early Wars of Wessex，1913，has no scholarly value, according to the review by J. Liebermann in the Historische Zeitschrift, Vol.117，p.500.

2.Oman, History of the Art of War, to which I refer the reader for the cited provisions of the law, sees（p.109）the reason for opening up the class of thanes in the hope of inducing the peasants and burghers to provide themselves with good weapons and strengthen the military forces. I cannot agree with this idea. A well-to-do burgher or peasant who procures fine weapons does not thereby become a useful warrior, and in case of war he might only be inclined to hide his weapons and reject his newly won status. Such minor measures did not create men of a caliber to oppose the Vikings. Consequently, as we have seen above, the laws can only be interpreted in the opposite sense, namely, that the former warrior status of the thanes had already disappeared and there remained only a civilian-social status into which the more prominent peasants and burghers tried to be admitted.

3.Stubbs，1：262，cites a source in Canterbury to the effect that there were no milites in England before the time of King William.

4.See Freeman, Vol.III, Appendix H. H.，p.741，for a listing of all the various estimates of the army strengths.

5.Compare the study on the changes in tactics in the preceding volume, Book IV, Chap.2，p.408，with the statements of Aristotle and Frederick the Great.

5　诺曼人在英格兰的军事组织

1.“Lord” is an Anglo-Saxon word and means literally “bread-giver.”The title “baron” came into England with the Conquest. It means the same thing as homo，“vassal，” and originally applied to all those directly enfeoffed by the king, but it gradually became limited to the most important men among them, the most eminent of whom were given the title of “earl.”

2.The number of servitia debita that were provided by men not settled on the land, and the number of those who were settled, above and beyond the number of servitia debita, were therefore almost in balance, so that the number 5，000 appears in both cases. See p.179.

3.Pollock and Maitland, The History of the English Law before the Time of Edward I，2d ed.，1898，1：236.

4.In the battle Lincoln（1141），in which King Stephen was captured, he had a few earls on his side, who no doubt bore important names but had only a few men with them. One source, Gervasius of Canterbury, calls them “ficti et factiosi comites”（“false and factious earls”）. They had no other connection with the counties whose titles they bore except that a third of the income from those counties was paid to them（Oman, p.393）. Consequently, it was probably less a question of bad will than a lack of resources that prevented them from providing the king better support.

5.Stubbs, Constitutional History，2d ed.，1：434.

6.Robert de Monte, for the year 1159，cited in Stubbs, p.588.

7.Dialogus de scaccario（Dialogue concerning the Exchequer），written in 1178-1179. Cited in Stubbs, p.588.

8.Section 51.“Et statim ... amovebimus de regno omnes aliegenas milites, balistarios, servientes, stipendiaries, qui venerint cum equis et armis ad nocumentum regni.”（“And immediately ... we shall remove from the kingdom all foreign soldiers, crossbowmen, sergeants and mercenaries who will have come with horses and arms for the harm of the kingdom.”）

9.Morris, The Welsh Wars of Edward I, p.185，passim.

10.Pollock and Maitland，1：233，point out that the forty-day rule could hardly ever have had legal force but always remained only a theory. John of England once required eighty days.Recently, Guilhiermoz, Essai sur l'origine de la noblesse française, convincingly stated that it was Henry II of England who introduced the forty-day rule.

11.Robert de Monte, cited in Stubbs, Constitutional History，1：455.

12.Pollock and Maitland, p.234.

13.Stubbs, Constitutional History，1：590.

14.Gneist, Englische Verfassungsgeschichte, p.289，note（according to a manuscript in the Cotton Library）.

15.Pollock and Maitland，2：252.

16.Pollock and Maitland，1：246.

17.The shift from personal service to money payments was, as Pol-lock and Maitland，1：255，suppose, the origin of the otherwise inexplicable reduction of the roster. In 1277，the clergy, who had had to provide 784 knights in 1166，acknowledged having hardly 100. The great earls did likewise. But the compensation for the individual knights was increased correspondingly.Morris, of course, explains this reduction differently in The Welsh Wars of King Edward I. On p.45 f.，he states that the reduction in the number of those to be provided was compensation for the extension of the period of service by several times the usual forty-day standard.

18.Cunningham, The Growth of English Industry and Commerce，3d ed.，1：196.

19.In 1294，the clergy provided one-half, the earls, barons, and knights one-tenth, and the cities one-sixth.

In 1295，the clergy provided one-tenth, the nobles one-eleventh, and the cities one-seventh.

In 1307，one-fifteenth was provided; that amounted to 40，000 pounds for all of England.

20.Stubbs, Select Charters, p.255（from Roger of Hoveden）.

21.Constitutional History of England，1：573.

6意大利的诺曼人国家

1.Lupus Protospatharius, Mon. Germ. SS.，5.52，gives the strength for Olivento as 3，000. Gaufredus Malaterra, in his History of Sicily（Geschichte Siciliens），Muratori, SS.，5.533 ff.，gives 500. William of Apulia, in his epic poem which he dedicated to Robert Guiscard's son（Mon. Germ. SS.，9-239 ff.），gives the number as 1，200. The reported strength for the battle of Cannae is given in the Annals of Barri, Mon. Germ.，5.51 ff. All these points are taken from von Heinemann, History of the Normans in Lower Italy（Geschichte der Normannen in Unteritalien），p.359.

2.von Heinemann, History of the Normans, p.113.

3.von Heinemann, p.207.

4.von Heinemann, p.311.

5.von Heinemann, p.325.

6.von Heinemann, pp.330，333.

7.Ryccardus de San Germano, M.G. SS.，19.369，anno 1233. P.376：“vocat ad se ... omnes barones et milites infeudatos”（“he calls to himself ... all barons and enfeoffed knights”）.

8.Ryccardus de San Germano, M.G. SS.，19.348: “statuens ut singuli feudatarii darent de unoquoque feudo octo uncias auri et de singulis octo feudis militem unum in proximo futuro mense Maii”（“decreeing that all vassals should give from each fief 8 ounces of gold and from every eight fiefs one knight in the next month of May”）.

7　拜占庭

1.We would be able to state this characteristic definitely if the Strategikon that has been passed down under his name was actually written by him. However, this is very doubtful. See pp.193，198，below.

2.Zachariä von Lingenthal, History of Greco-Roman Law（Geschichte des griechisch-römischen Rechts），3d ed.，p.271，para.63.

3.Les exploits de Digénis Akritas. Epopée byzantine du Xieme siècle, publiée par G. Sathas et E. Legrand. Paris，1875.

4.Zachariä von Lingenthal, Geschichte des griechisch-römischen Rechts，3d ed.，p.265.

5.Carl Neumann, World Position of the Byzantine Empire（Welts-tellung des byzantinischen Reichs），p.58.

6.Zachariä von Lingenthal, p.273，Note 916.

7.Zachariä von Lingenthal, p.273. Neumann, p.56，states that the threefold increase can be explained by the increased requirement for military preparations and performance. But such an increase can hardly have taken place; for a long time already, military service had meant service on horseback. But Neumann immediately adds that the increase indicated the intention of giving up the restoration of small landholdings as unsuccessful and unnecessary. This may well be correct.

8.Constantine Porphyrogenitus, De administrando imperio（On Ruling the Empire），Chap.5 2. Joh. Meursii opera（Works of John Meursius），6：1110. For other evidence, see Carl Neumann, Die Weltstellung des byzantinischen Reiches vor den Kreuzzügen，1894，pp.68 and 69-Note, for example, from Constantine IX: “He paid large fees for soldiers.”* Cedrenus，2：608.

9.Excerpta Johannis Scylitzae Curopalatae（Excerpts of John Scylitzes Curopalates），SS. Byzantini（Bonn）. Cedrenus，2：662.

10.“Inexperienced in war, without horses, almost without arms and naked, and not even having daily supplies, they underwent many desperate straits and returned to their own land without glory.”*

11.Neumann, pp.60，68. Gustave Schlumberger, Nicéphore Phocas, Paris，1890，pp.532-533. Krumbacher, Geschichte der byzantinischen Literatur, p.985.

12.Neumann, p.67，presumes that the west, more thickly inhabited by barbarians, lagged behind the east culturally and was therefore incapable of paying taxes in currency.

13.Jähns, Geschichte der Kriegswissenschaften，1：170.

14.Book IV, Chap.4，Ed. Bonn, p.134.

15.Taken from the listing in Hammer, Geschichte des Osmanischen Reichs，1：552，674，which includes, however, a few cases that are not completely confirmed.

8　阿拉伯人

1.In the Cultural History of the Orient under the Caliphs（Culturgeschichte des Orients unter den Chalifen），by Alfred von Kremer（Vienna，1875），there is a chapter on the military system（pp.203-255）in which the source reports are assembled quite completely but without analysis and without any military-objective understanding. I have not drawn anything from this work.

2.August Müller, Geschichte des Islam，1：31.

3.Wellhausen，“Die religiös-politischen Oppositionsparteien im alten Islam，”Abhandlungen der Königlichen Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen. Phil. Hist. Kl.，New Series，5.2.10.

4.Edited and translated by F. Wüstenfeld in the Abhandlungen der Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen, Vol.26（1880）. This work consists in part of a translation and revision of Aelian’s Tactics and must therefore, of course, be used with caution.

5.Müller，1：164.

6.Weil, Geschichte der Chalifen，1：30.

7.Weil，1：60.

8.Müller, p.238.

9.Müller, p.243.

10.Müller，1：252，note.

11.Müller，1：222.

12.Of course, not in one move. The events took place in the following sequence: in 641 the Arabs conquered Egypt; in 643 or 644 they took Tripoli. In 648-649 Moawija, as governor of Syria, built a fleet. The governor of Egypt did likewise. In 647-648 the latter, with 20，000 men, conquered Carthage but then left the country again. In the following decades, frequent raids were made from Tripoli into Tunis. In 683 the Arabs suffered a defeat, lost Tripoli, and were thrown back to Barca. In 696 Hassan arrived with 40，000 men and stormed Carthage. After a few reverses, when a Greek fleet was in action, the subjugation of the entire area up to the ocean was completed between 706 and 709. The Berbers joined Islam.

13.Cited by Wüstenfeld, p.24. See also p.27，where the temptation to break out of ranks in battle is expressly opposed with an indication for the necessary obedience.

14.Weil，1：42.

9　十字军东征综述

1.“Army Strengths in the Crusades”（“Die Heereszahlen in den Kreuzzügen”），Berlin dissertation，1907（Georg Nauck, publisher）. This work studies particularly the Third and Fourth Crusades.

2.Opera St.Bernhardi（Works of St. Bernard），ed. Mabillon，1：549. From the translation in Wilcken, Kreuzzüge，2：555.

3.The principal source for the knightly orders is found in the statutes with their later supplements, the various editions of which and all the related subject matter have been completely clarified only in the last few decades. See Schnürer, The Original Regulations of the Knights Templars（Die ursprüngliche Templerregel）.（In the Studien und Darstellungen auf dem Gebiet der Geschichte, edited by Grauert，3：1-2）. Freiburg，1903. The Regulations of the Templars（La Règie du Temple），Paris，1886，contains a critical editing by E.de Curzon. With this edition as a base, the reading of this work has been made available to a broad public in the most praiseworthy way by a translation in the book Die Templerregel, translated from the Old French and accompanied by explanatory notes by Dr. R. Körner, Jena，1902. As an appendix to his Cultural History of the Crusades（Kulturgeschichte der Kreuzzüge），Prutz reprinted the Regulations of the Order of St. John, in Latin. The Regulations of the Teutonic Order, with all the Supplementary Laws and Customs（Die Regel des deutschen Ordens, mit alien nachträglichen Gesetzen und Gewohnheiten）was published in exemplary fashion in the five texts in which it has been retained（Latin, French, Dutch, German, and Low German）by Perlbach, Halle，1890.

第三篇　中世纪盛期

1　骑士种姓

1.See Richard Schroeder, Zeitschrift für Rechtsgeschichte, Germanische Abteilung，24.347，“The Old Saxon People’s Nobility and the Landowner Theory”（“Der altsächsische Volksadel und die grundherrliche Theorie”）.

2.Richer, for the years 930 and 888. SS.，3.584. Bonitho, Jaffé 2：639.

3.Wipo, Chap.4.

4.Bruno, Chap.88. Cosmas II, Chap.25，for the year 1087. A document of Emperor Lothair of the year 1134 distinguished between “ordo equestris major et minor”（“greater and lesser equestrian rank”），cited by Schröder, Deutsche Rechtsgeschichte, p.430；“milites tam majors quam minores”（“greater as well as lesser knights”），Gesta Consulum Andegavensium（Deeds of the Counts of Anjou），ed. Bouquet，10.254；“milites plebei”（“soldiers of the people”）in Raymond of Agiles, Recueil des histoires des Croisades，3：274.

5.This is correctly expressed by Waitz，5：439，where still more examples are cited（also p.398，Note 4）. When he adds, however, that it cannot be said with certainty with which meanings the expressions were used, I can see no basis for this doubt. Legal meanings, everybody agrees, are not intended; the factual, social relationships that are meant, however, are entirely clear. Source citations are also to be found in Köhler, Ritterzeit，3：20.

6.Cited by Harnack, Militia Christi（Service of Christ），p.84，note: “ut plurimi ex ipsis adderentur ad fidem domini nostri Jesu Christi derelicto militiae cingulo”（“that most of them should be added to the faith of our Lord Jesus Christ after the belt of military service has been given up”）.

7.Gesta Cons. Andegavensium, ed. Bouquet, Recueil，10：254. It is recounted that the inhabitants of a castle under attack “cingulis militaribus accincti armisque protecti ad pugnam se more militum castrensium paraverunt”（“girded with military belts and protected by arms, they prepared themselves for battle like the knights of a castle”）and made a sortie. The knight's belt plays a role in this incident, in that it creates the deceptive appearance that knights are coming and attacking.

The purple or scarlet cloak which is often mentioned（Abbo repeatedly; Ruotger, vita Brunonis, Chap. 30，vita Heinrici IV, Chap.8; Chronicle of Monte Casino for the Year 1137）I am not willing to count, as does Baltzer, p.5，as a specific part of the knightly garb, since it is expressly stated that, when the knights are too poor, they must be satisfied with the cloak in its natural color.（Vita Heinrici IV, Chap 8.）We also read（Guiart，2.698 cited in Alwin Schultz，2：313，Note 3）that the knights on taking the cross, renounce any elegance in their clothing and put on simple, dark garments. They were not willing, however, to lay aside a symbol of their rank, but only the elegant attire.

8.At any rate, that is what one finds often recounted in modern works, although I have not been able to find the original source therefor, and in works on legal history nothing on such an order is to be found, no more so than in the special works on Louis VI. Daniel, History of the French Militia（Histoire de la Milice Française），1724. Boutaric, French Military Institutions（Institutions militaires de la France），1863. Boutaric, The Feudal System. Review of historic questions（Le regime féodal. Revue des questions historiques），Vol.XVIII，1875. Glasson, History of the Law and Institutions of France（Histoire du droit et des institutions de la France），1891. A. Luchaire, Manual of French Institutions, period of the direct line of Capetians（Manuel des institutions franchises, période des Capétiens directs），1892. Luchaire, History of the Monarchical Institutions of France（Histoire des institutions monarchiques de la France），Tome III（also under the title Studies on the Acts of Louis VII[Etudes sur les actes de Louis VII]，1885）. Luchaire, Louis VI, Annales de sa vie，1890.

9.“De filiis quoque sacerdotum dyaconorum ac rusticorum statuimus, ne cingulum militare aliquatenus assumat, et qui jam assumserunt, per judicem provintiae a militia pellantur.”（“We also decree concerning the sons of priests, deacons, and peasants that they should not assume the knightly belt to any extent, and those who have already assumed it should be banished from military service by the judge of the province.”）LL，2. 185.

In the dispensation statement under Frederick II, we read: “nostris constitutionibus caveatur, quod milites fieri nequeant, qui de genere militari non nascuntur.”（“Let it be decreed by our ordinances that those who are not born of a knightly family should not be able to become knights.”）

10.Gesta Friderici II，13：“inferioris conditionis juvenes, vel quoslibet contemptibilium etiam mechanicarum artium opifices, quos caeterae gentes ab honestioribus et liberioribus studiis tanquam pestem propellunt, ad militiae cingulum vel dignitatum gradus assumere non dedignantur.”（“They do not think that young men of the lower class and craftsmen of the contemptible, even mechanical arts, whom other nations banish like the plague from the more honorable and freer pursuits, are worthy to assume the belt of military service and the ranks of offices.”）

According to Daniel, De la Milice Française, p.33，in the Ligurinus, Gunther, on the other hand, has the emperor act in this way: “Utque suis omnem depellere finibus hostem posset（possit），et armorum patriam virtute tueri Quoslibet ex humili vulgo, quod Gallia foedum Judicat, accingi gladio concedit equestri.”（“And so that he might be able to repel all of the enemy from his territory and to guard the country by strength of arms, he granted that all of the low populace, which France judges hideous, to be girded with a knight’s sword.”）

Had the Ligurinus itself not been preserved, this passage would appear completely puzzling to us—and so it should serve us（especially old historians and classical philologists）as a warning as to how seriously and how easily one can be led into error by a second-hand source. Daniel, for example, whose work in other respects is quite thorough, slipped up for once here and ascribed to the emperor what Gunther actually has the Italians doing（Book II, verse 151 ff.）；here too, then, he simply adheres to his source. The “Gallia” in his verses, in keeping with the well-known linguistic usage of the Middle Ages, includes Germany also.

11.Curzon, Rules of the Templars（La règle du temple），Chaps.337，431，586.

12.Vetus auctor de beneficiis，1.4：“rustici et mercatores et omnes qui non sunt ex homine militari ex parti patris et avi jure careant beneficiali.”（The old author on benefices，1.4：“peasants, merchants, and all who are not the sons of a knight by their father and grandfather should abstain from the beneficial oath.”）

13.Concerning the original meaning, see Waitz，8：117.

14.Schröder, Deutsche Rechtsgeschichte, p.430，believes the distinction between knights（as a result of the dubbing ceremony）and squires（Knappen）had come into force only since the thirteenth century but had never actually attained a legal significance.

This line of thought is too specifically juridical. The dubbing, as such, did not have, it is true, a directly legal effect, but only as the result of such an act could the distinction become fixed which finally led to the formation of the petty nobility.

15.M.G.LL，2.103.10：“Si miles adversus militem pro pace violate aut aliqua capitali causa duellum committere voluerit, facultas pugnandi ei non concedatur, nisi probare possit, quod antiquitus ipse cum parentibus suis natione legitimus miles existat.”（“If a knight will have wanted to fight a duel against a knight because of a breached peace or any capital offense, the opportunity of fighting should not be granted to him unless he should be able to show that from ancient times he with his parents is by birth a knight of legal status.”）

16.The Bamberg Service Law, at the end of the eleventh century, specifies that a ministerial whom the bishop does not invest with a fief may enter the service of another but may not allow himself to be bound by a fief “cui vult militet, non beneficiarie, sed libere.”（“Let him serve for whom he desires, not as a man enfeoffed but as a freeman.”）Such a provision already indicates an extensive weakening of the concept of the unfree condition.

17.The finer distinctions and developments in the various generations and regions are passed over here. Zallinger, in Ministeriales and Knights（Ministeriales und Milites），1878，believes, for example, he has proven that in the regions under the Bavarian law the ministeriales or serving men（Dienstmannen）had in the thirteenth century assumed a special position clearly above the common milites and no longer regarded the latter as of equal birth. Only the monarchy and the princes were allowed to have such outstanding, though unfree, serving men（Dienstmannen）. This latter group later became completely intermingled with the free nobility in the status of lords or property holders.

18.For example, by Guilhiermoz. Against him, E. Mayer, in Zeitschrift für Rechtsgeschichte, Germanische Abteilung，23（1902）：310. In connection with this controversy, I invite the reader’s attention to Chap.435 of the statutes of the Knights Templars: “One does not ask a knight if he is servant or slave of no man, for since he says that he is a knight by birth, of a legal marriage, if he is truthful, he is by his very nature free.”In Germany this condition could not have been met.

19.Even if it should be correct, as Böheim in Manual of Weapons（Handbuch der Waffenkunde），p.12，claims, that around the year 1400 there took place a lightening of the protective equipment, nevertheless that would only have been a momentary trough in the constantly rising tide. But the fact itself is doubtful and in any case not yet fully established. Böheim himself says shortly thereafter, p.14，that at the start of the fifteenth century the protective arms were strengthened.

20.Baltzer is quite correct about this, on p.52 ff. If in the meantime an enumeration by helmets（galea）also appears, that follows the same direction as the general development but does not directly bring it on. The account mentioned by Baltzer on p.56，to the effect that knights, in order to fight more easily, had taken off their armor, is explained correctly by Köhler as being not for the purpose of fighting but for the pursuit. Even so, I would prefer to regard this account not as a historic fact, but as “trimming.”The first use of “dextrariis coopertis”（“covered war-horses”）was found by Köhler（3.2.44）in the year 1238.

21.Giraldus Cambrensis, Expugnatio Hibernica（The Conquest of Ireland），Opera 5.395.“Cum ilia nimirum armatura multiplici sellisque recurvis et altis difficile descenditur, difficilius ascenditur, difficillime cum opus est pedibus itur.”（“Certainly with that multiple armor and a high curved saddle it was difficult to dismount, more difficult to mount, and most difficult to go on foot when necessary.”）The author died about 1220.

22.Köhler，3.2.81. From the statutes of the knightly orders it is clear that, wherever it is a question of knights with several horses “equitaturis”），this means those horses which the knight himself rides—just as, today, the cavalry officer has several mounts—and not, for example, those horses which he provides for his followers. See Curzon, La règie du temple, Chap.77，p.94. Statutes of the Knights Hospitalers, Chaps.59 and 60；in Prutz, Cultural History of the Crusades（Kulturgeschichte der Kreuzzüge），p.601. Statutes of the Teutonic Knights, Perlbach, p.98.

23.Baltzer, p.59. According to Köhler，3.2.77，Viollet-le-Duc is said to have claimed that protective covering was not placed on knights’steeds until the end of the thirteenth century.

24.Waitz，8：123，says correctly: “Of course, there was never a complete lack of foot soldiers, only that they were employed mostly in defensive situations ... or in a war where everybody who could bear arms was used, whereas they participated only exceptionally in army expeditions.”

25.Ennen and Eckertz, Sources for the History of the City of Cologne（Quellen zur Geschichte der Stadt Köln），4.488.560.

26.Roth, Dignity of the Knight（Ritterwürde），p.98. Suger, too, in the description of the battle of Brémule in 1119，uses the expression that King Henry “milites armatos ut fortius committant, pedites deponit.”（“He placed the foot soldiers in reserve so that the armored knights might engage more bravely.”）The Gesta Francorum（Deeds of the Franks），Chap.6，on the battle of Dorylaeum in 1097：“Pedites prudenter et citius extendunt tentoria, milites eunt viriliter obviam iis.”（“The foot soldiers skillfully and rather quickly cocked their crossbows and the knights courageously attacked them”[the Turks]）. Fulcher, p.393：“milites sciebant effici pedites.”（“The knights knew how to become dismounted combatants”），（1098）. Likewise, in the report on the battle of Ascalon in 1099:“quinque milia militum et quindecim milia peditum”（“5，000 knights and 15，000 foot”）. Gervasius Dorobernesis, Chronica de rebus anglicis（Gervasius of Canterbury, Chronicles of English History）for the year 1138:“milites et pedites”（“knights and foot troops”）. Also Gesta Consulum Andegavensium（Deeds of the Counts of Anjou），Recueil des Histoires des Gaules（Collection of Histories of the Gauls），11.265. Pope Innocent IV to Cardinal Reiner in 1243（Huill. Bréholles，6.131）：“cum pro defensione civitatis militia minus necessaria videatur, pedites autem utiliores esse noscantur.”（“Whereas a band of knights is less necessary for the defense of a city, foot soldiers are known, however, to be more useful.”）

27.Zallinger, Ministeriales und Milites, p.4：“The expression miles is used in the original sources in the most varied senses and serves alternatively in the course of time as the normal indication of individual knightly classes, according to whether the importance of the knightly way of life or of knightly birth might appear as particularly characteristic or determining for a class. Thus, it is frequently found in an earlier period with the sense of a free vassal, whereas later it is used predominantly for the unfree knight. Furthermore, by miles is meant particularly the man who has already been knighted, in contrast to the squire who is simply of knightly birth.”

Waitz，5：436，gives a series of citations from which it can be concluded that in the older period the ministeriales and the unfree warriors in general, as well as the free ones, were designated as milites. He then continues: “The royal chancellery distinguishes between miles and serviens，” but he does not touch on the decisive question as to how long this distinction had been in effect, whether any contrary examples are to be found, and on how broad a basis or how long this usage was also observed in the chronicles.

Köhler, Vol.I, Section IX, claims that in Spain and Italy the light horsemen also were called milites over an extended period, whereas in France and Germany from the twelfth century on the expression miles had the exclusive meaning of knight.

Fulcher, Historia Hierosolymitana（History of the Jerusalem Campaign），2：31（Mignet. 155，p.886），recounts concerning the battle of Ramleh: “Milites nostri erant quingenti exceptis illis qui militari nomine non censebantur tamen equitantes. Pedites vero nostri non amplius quam duo milia aestimabantur.”（“Our knights were 500，except those who were not counted of knightly rank but ride horses. Our foot in fact was estimated at not more than 2，000.”）

Frederick II had promised the pope to maintain 1，000 milites in Palestine for two years at his own expense, and he sent Hermann von Salza, the grand master, to Germany to recruit them. In his letter of 6 December 1227 appears: “Misimus magistrum domus Theutonicorum pro militibus solidandis, sed in optione sua potentem, viros eligere strenuous et pro meritis personarum ad suam prudentiam stipendia polliceri.”（“We sent the master of the house of the Germans to hire knights, but having the power in his choice to select strong men and to promise pay at his discretion according to the merits of the individuals”）It is difficult to imagine that Hermann, in carrying out this mission, limited himself strictly to men who had already been knighted or that he knighted the recruits who had not yet been so elevated. Rather, it must be assumed that he took, even for heavy mounted service, qualified soldiers. The word miles, therefore, is not to be taken here in its strictest sense.

28.The quotations are in Waitz，5：400，Note 5.

Guilhiermoz, p. 429，Note 41 says: “We know that in the Merovingian and Carolingian periods the high officers of the palace, including those who had the most unwarlike responsibilities, were given military commands in time of war，” and he presents evidence thereof. It is more correct to express this idea, as we have done, in the opposite way: not that possessors of peacetime positions received military command positions, but that warriors were placed even in the most peace-oriented posts, except those held by ecclesiastics.

29.Gustav Roethe, German Heroes（Deutsches Heldentum），address given in Berlin，1906. G. Schade, publisher.

30.Köhler，3.2.123，seems to me to present this correctly.

31.Köhler，3：91，speaks of an order of Louis IX prohibiting the squire（écuyer）from wearing body armor, hood, or arm bands. For this point, he relies on Daniel, Milice française，1：394，where nothing of this sort is to be found. It appears that he meant the passage in Vol.I, p.286，where Daniel, on the basis of a treatment by Ducange, cites a ceremonial tourney from the period of Louis IX, wherein the squires were supposed to wear no trousers of mail, no covering of mail over the bacinet, and no “bracheres”（I believe that by this word he means brassards or sleeves of mail.）—Consequently, this has to do only with tournaments. In war, the idea of decreasing artificially the effectiveness of the armor because of class jealousy would simply appear to be too absurd.

Köhler，3.2.67，is also in error when he concludes（citing Niedner and Alwin Schulz），from the Partenopter of Konrad of Würzburg, v.5225 ff.，that the squire was not allowed to wear the sword on a sword belt, but like a merchant on his saddle, since his lady had begged him not to buckle it on: “ê sie, daz viel reine wîp ze ritter in gemachete”（“before she, the very pure lady, made him a knight”）.

32.Chronicon Hanoniese（Chronicle of Hainaut），M.G.，21.552，says of a count of Hainaut that he joined the king of France “cum 110 militibus electis et 80 servientibus equitibus loricatis in propriis expensis venit et ibi et in reditu in propriis expensis semper fuit.”（“He came there with 110 selected knights and eighty sergeants as armored horsemen at his own expense and on his return it was always at his own expense.”）

Köhler’s citation，3.2.39，from Gislebert SS.，21.520 is incorrect. The same Gislebert reports on p.522 that Baldwin of Hainaut in 1172 came to the assistance of his uncle Henry of Luxembourg “in 340 militibus et totidem servientibus lauricatis et 1，500 clientibus peditibus electis”（“in 340 knights and just as many armored sergeants and 1，500 selected men-at-arms on foot”）.

33.We even find cases where men of knightly birth disdained receiving the ceremonial knighting and had to be forced to it by their lords. Count Baldwin of Flanders announced in 1200 that the son of a knight who had not become a knight by age twenty-five was to be regarded as a peasant. In France, in 1293，it was required, under penalty of punishment, by the twenty-fourth year of those noblemen（“nobiles saltern ex parte patris”：“nobles at least on their father’s side”）who had 200 pounds of income from their property，160 of it as inheritance. Guilhiermoz, pp.231，477. In Zurich this was required by the thirtieth year. Cited in Köhler，3.2.65. In the thirteenth century, the English kings made a fiscal measure of it.

34.Köhler，3.2.6 and 3.2.135，claims that the city knights did not count in the warrior class because they did not belong to a vassal group, were not vassals or ministeriales. That is conceptually false; one can be a warrior without being an enfeoffed vassal.

35.Roth, Ritterwürde, p.197. Strangely enough, the raising to the nobility did not come about in France until the end of the thirteenth century. In 1271 Philip III raised a goldsmith to the nobility. Warnkönig and Stein, French Political and Legal History（Französische Staats-und Rechtsgeschichte），1：250. Daniel, Milice franchise，1：74.

36.The last quotations are from von Wedel, Germany's Knighthood（Deutschlands Ritterschaft）.

37.Otto von Freisingen, Deeds of Frederick II（Taten Friedrichs II.），Chap.18：“At ille, cum se plebejum diceret, in eodemque ordine velle remanere, sufficere sibi conditionem suam.”（“But he, since he said he was a commoner and wanted to remain in the same rank, and his own class was enough for him ...”）In the Ligurinus，2.580，the story is recounted in the following way:

Strator erat de plebe quidem nec nomine multum

Vulgato, modica in castris mercede merebat.

（There was a common groom, to be sure not a man of well-known name, And he worked for small wages in the castle.）

Frederick wants to give him（v. 610）

titulos et nomen equestre

Armaque, cornipedesque feros, cultusque nitentes.

（titles and knightly name And arms, wild horses, and beautiful clothes.）

38.According to Guilhiermoz, Essai sur l'origine de la noblesse française, p.372. As a precursor of this formula, Guilhiermoz cites a letter from Pope Zacharias in the year 747 to the mayor of the palace and later king, Pepin, in which he says: “Laymen and warriors have as their calling the defense of the land, priests the giving of counsel and praying.”The pope does not mention the people, the common mass, at all. They form, in the sources of that day, the unwarlike, unarmed species（“imbelle, inerme vulgus”），which the warriors are to protect like cattle from the wolves.

39.Rust，“The Training of the Knight in the Old French Epic”（“Die Erziehung des Ritters in der altfranzösischen Epik”），Berlin dissertaion，1888，adds nothing new.

40.Eodem anno（1178）rex Angliae pater transfretavit de Normannia in Angliam，&apud Wodestocke fecit Gaufridum filium suum, Comitem Britanniae, militem: qui statim post susceptionem militaris officii transfretavit de Anglia in Normanniam, et in confinibus Franciae&Normanniae militaribus exercitiis operam praestans gaudebat se bonis militibus aequiparari. Et eo magis ac magis probitatis suae gloriam quaesivit, quo fratres suos, Henricum videlicet regem，&Richardum Comitem Pictavis in armis militaribus plus fiorere cognovit. Et erat his mens una, videlicet, plus caeteris posse in armis: scientes, quod ars bellandi, si non praeluditur, cum fuerit necessaria non habetur. Nec potest athlete magnos spiritus ad certamen afferre, qui nunquam suggilatus est. Ille qui sanguinem suum vidit; cuius denies crepuerunt sub pugno; ille qui supplantatus aduersarium toto tulit corpore, nec proiecit animum proiectus; qui quotiens cecidit, contumacior surrexit, cum magna spe descendit ad pugnam. Multum enim adiicit sibi virtus lacessita; fugitiva gloria est mens subiecta terrori. Sine culpa vincitur oneris immensitate, qui ad portandam sarcinam etsi impar, tamen devotus occurrit. Bene solvuntur sudoris praemia, ubi sunt templa Victoriae.

Hoveden, ed. Stubbs，2：166. According to Stubbs, the maxims are all from Seneca.

41.See Rabanus Maurus below in the chapter “Theory，”Book IV.

42.The preceding citations are from von Wedel, Deutschlands Ritterschaft, and Alwin Schultz, The Courtly Life（Das höfische Leben），1：170.

43.Cited in Guilhiermoz, Essai sur l'origine de la noblesse française, p.433，Note 60.

44.Roth von Schreckenstein, The Knightly Dignity and the Knightly Class（Ritterwürde und Ritterstand），p.167，as taken from Ennodius.

45.Nithard，3：6.

46.Alwin Schultz, Das höfische Leben，2：108.

47.There are two thorough and fruitful source studies on tour-naments: F. Niedner, The German Tournament in the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries（Das deutsche Turnier im 12.und 13.Jahrhundert），Berlin，1881，and Becker, Armed Games（Waffenspiele），Düren Program，1887.

48.24 July 1230.Huill. Bréholles，3：202. Only fragments of this document have survived.

49.Konstanzer Chronik. Mone, Collected Sources（Quelle-nsammlung），1：310.

50.Roth von Schreckenstein, Ritterstand, p.661.

51.Rahewin, III, Chap.19.

52.Otto Morena, p.622.1160 on the Adda. In 1161，before Milan, the duke of Bohemia and the landgrave of Thuringia on one occasion refused obedience to the emperor and left him to move alone into battle.

53.Cited in Guilhiermoz, p.358.

54.In the Templars'statutes it was expressly forbidden for a knight to strike servants who were in service through piety（Chap.51）. It was permissible to strike a slave（esclaf）with one's stirrup leather when it was deserved, but it was forbidden to injure or maim him or place him in neck irons without higher authority（Chap.336）.

55.According to Rahewin, Book III. See Eisner, The Army Regulations of Frederick I of the Year 1158（Das Heergesetz Friedrichs I.vom Jahre 1158），Program of the Matthias Gymnasium in Breslau，1882.

56.Hälschner, Prussian Punitive Law（Preussisches Strafrecht），3：212.

57.Continuatio Reginonis（Continuation of Regino）for the year 920：“Multi enim illis temporibus, etiam nobiles, latrociniis insudabant.”（“In those times many in fact, even the nobles, engaged in robbery.”）Further citations are to be found in Baldamus, The Military System under the later Carolingians（Das Heerwesen unter den späteren Karolingern），p.18 ff.

58.See my review of this book in the Zeitschrift für Preussische Geschichte und Landeskunde，17：702.

59.M.G. SS.，222.

60.From this account it can also be seen how transitory and uncertain the meaning of the word “miles” still was at that time. In the first instance, where it is a question of the bishop’s contenting himself with a few “militibus”，it is obvious that “knights” are meant. Later, where the author wants to distinguish between knights and the common levy of troops conducting the siege, he calls the former “armati”—“heavily armed ones”—and the latter “milites gregarii.”Since they were often more than 1，000 strong, it is impossible that they could all have been professional warriors. Apparently, the bishop had his own military organization reinforced by the militia（Landsturm），the most useful peasants and peasants’sons. The same situation has already been reported to us, in fact, concerning the Burgundian King Gundobad and the king of the Goths, Totila（Vol.II, p.391）.

2　骑士制度的军事特征

1.Bell.Hispan.，Chap.15.

2.This is what the count of Artois called out before the battle of Courtrai（1302）（Spiegel historial, IV, Chap.25）：

Thus spoke Artois quite haughtily:

I am glad that they are formed thus；

We are on horseback, and they on foot.

A hundred horse and a thousand men

Are all the same.

3.Thucydides，5.57.2. Xenophon, Hellenica，7.5.23. Harp-okration. Perhaps also Polybius，11.21. Indirectly associated with this is the dismounting of horsemen in the fight. See the preceding excursus and Vol.I, p.538.

4.Potius equos quam homines offendatis, feriatis et cum gladii cuspide non cum acie ita quod equis hostium vestris ictibus succumbentibus, nostrorum peditum promta manus sessores equorum taliter prostratos ad terram et prae armorum gravidine lentos liberius excipiet et trucidet. Reguletor et aliter in primo conflictu probitas vestra. Singuli militis singulos juxta se pedites habeant, aut duo quilibet, si valeat, etiamsi non possit habere alios, quam ribaldos. Hos enim tam pro conficiendis equis hostilium, tam pro conterendis iis qui excutientur ab equis, experientia pugnae valde necessarios et utiles esse probat. Muratori SS（L.A. Muratori, Writers of Italian History），8.823.（You should hit the horses rather than the men, and you should strike with the tip of your sword, not with the edge, so that while the horses of the enemy are falling under your blows, the ready band of our foot soldiers may more freely catch the riders of the horses and kill them, thus lying on the ground and slow by the weight of their armor. Otherwise let your fitness be directed on the first clash. Every knight should have a foot soldier beside him, or two if he can, even if he should not be able to have other than grooms. In fact, experience of battle strongly proves that they are necessary and useful for destroying the horses of the enemy as well as killing those who will be shaken off by their horses.）

5.Dusburg Capitulary，104（99）. SS. Rer. Pruss.，Vol.I.

6.Expugnatio Hibernica. Opera V.（Rerum Britannicarum Medii Aevi Scriptores）（The Conquest of Ireland. Works V.[Writers of British History of the Middle Ages]），p.395. I have already cited a passage from this work above.

Novi vero, quamquam in terra sua milites egregii fuerint, et armis instructissimi, Gallica tamen militia multum ab Hibernica, sicut et a Kambrica distare dinoscitur. Ibi namque plana petuntur, hie aspera; ibi campestria hic silvestria; ibi arma honori, hic oneri; ibi stabilitate vincitur hic agilitate; ibi capiuntur milites, hic decapitantur; ibi redimuntur, hic perimuntur.（As in truth I know, although knights were outstanding in their own land and most learned in arms, French military service, however, is known to differ greatly from the Irish as well as the Welsh. And in fact there level areas are sought, here rough; there open fields, here forests; there armor is an honor, here a burden; there they conquer by steadfastness, here by nimbleness; there knights are captured, here they are decapitated; there they are ransomed, here they are killed.）

Sicut igitur ubi militares acies de piano conveniunt, gravis ilia et multiplex armatura, tam linea scilicet quam ferrea, milites egregrie munit et ornat, sic ubi solum in arcto confligitur, seu loco silvestri seu palulustri, ubi pedites potius quam equites locum habent, longe levis armatura praestantior. Contra inermes namque viros, quibus semper in primo fere impetu vel parta est statim vel perdita victoria, expeditiora satis arma suffìciunt; ubi fugitivam et agilem per arcta vel aspera gentem sola necesse est gravi quadam et armata mediocriter agilitate confundi.（Therefore, just as when knightly units assemble on a plain, that heavy multiple armor, obviously linen as well as iron, offers the knights outstanding protection and decorates them, so where they fight only in a confined area, a forest or a swamp, where the foot soldiers rather than the horsemen have che advantage, light armament is by far preferable. In fact, against unarmored men, by whom almost always in the first attack victory is immediately gained or lost, lighter equipment suffices. When they fight a swift and nimble nation in a confined or rough terrain, it is necessary that some heavily armed and moderately armed be confounded by their quickness.）

Cum ilia nimirum armature multiplici, sellisque recurvis et aids, difficile descenditur, difficilius ascenditur, difficillime, cum opus est, pedibus itur.（Of course, with that multiple armor and high curved saddles it is difficult to dismount, more difficult to mount, and most difficult to proceed on foot when necessary.）

In omni igitur expeditione, sive Hibernica sive Kambrica gens in Kambriae marchia nutrita, gens hostilibus partium illarum conflictibus exercitata, competentissima; puta formatis a convict moribus, audax et expedita, cum alea; Martis exegerit, nunc equis habilis, nunc pedibus agilis inventa; cibo potuque non delicata, tarn Cerere quam Baccho, causis urgentibus, abstinere parata. Talibus Hibernia viris initium habuit expugnationis talibus quoque consummabilis finem habitura conquisitionis. Ut igitur “Singula quaeque locum teneant sortita decenter，”

contra graves et armatos, solumque virium robore, et armorum ope confisos, de piano dimicare, victoriamque vi obtinere contendentes, armatis quoque viris et viribus opus hic esse procul dubio protestamur. Contra leves autem et agiles, et aspera pedentes, levis armaturae viri taliumque praesertina exercitati congressibus adhibendi.（Therefore in every campaign, whether the nation is Irish or Welsh, reared on the borderland of Wales, the nation is practiced and most capable in the hostile conflicts of this area, pure by the habits formed from its way of life, bold and ready with risk, found expert with horses at one time and quick on foot at another as the conflict demands, not fastidious in food and drink, and prepared to abstain from bread as well as wine when affairs are pressing. With such men Ireland faced the beginning of the campaign and complete with such men Ireland was going to face the end of the conquest. Therefore, so that “all things properly allotted may have their place，”

we declare without hesitation that against heavily armored men relying only on the strength of force and the aid of arms, and hastening to fight on a plain and to gain victory by force, there is also need here of armored men and strength.Against light-armed men and quick men, however, traversing rough terrain, lightarmed men trained in the effectiveness of such matters must be used for battle.）

In Hibernicis autem conflictibus et hoc summopefe curandum, ut semper arcarii militaribus turmis mixtim adjiciantur. Quatinus et lapidum, quorum ictibus graves et armatos cominus oppetere solent, et indemnes agilitatis beneficio, crebris accedere vicibus et acscedere, e diverso sagittis injuria propulsetur.（In Irish battles, however, you must greatly see to it that archers should be added in mixed fashion to knightly units since by benefit of their quickness they can safely attack and retreat repeatedly, and they may inflict injury with stones, by the blows of which they are accustomed to attack the heavily armored, and in a different manner with arrows.）

7.Gewohnheiten, Chap.61. Perlbach, p.116.

8.Gislebert, Chron. Han. M.G. SS.，21.522，describes a fight between Count Baldwin of Hainaut and the duke of Burgundy（1172）. Baldwin armed his “armigeri et garciones”（“squires and grooms”）so that they could defend themselves as foot soldiers. Delpech，1：306，understands that for this purpose he had them dismount. This point has been rejected by Köhler，3：2：83.There is no indication that they were mounted. And even if they should have been mounted, it was perhaps correct, as we have seen, to have them fight on foot. The passage reads as follows:

Cum comes Hanonienis in parte sua quinque terre sue milites secum haberet, et ex adversa parte eum duce Burgundie Henrico quamplures in superbia nimia, servientibus peditibus stipati, advenirent, comes Hanoniensis vivido ac prudente animo assumpto de armigeris suis et garcionibus clientes pedites ordinavit et eos quibus potuit armis quasi ad defensionem contra multos preparavit militibusque multis ex adversa parte constitutis viriliter restitit et eos expugnavit.（When the count of Hainaut on his side had five knights of his domain with him and on the enemy side a great many in excessive arrogance accompanied by sergeants as foot soldiers came against him with Henry the duke of Burgundy, the count of Hainaut, quickly hitting upon a sensible idea, ranged his squires and grooms as men-at-arms on foot and equipped them for defense against the many with what arms he could. After the many knights of the hostile party had been deployed, he resisted them bravely and defeated them.）

9.It is noteworthy in several respects that Vegetius（2.17 and 3.14）attributes this passive-defensive role to the infantry. He cannot have derived this from the classical Roman authors, for, of course, it was precisely through its offensive, its closed attack, that the ancient legion was most effective. If Vegetius explains this in the opposite manner, then he has taken that from his own contemporary period, and that is again proof that the true Roman method of warfare no longer existed in his time and that warfare then already had the character of the Middle Ages. This point has already been correctly observed by Jähns, Geschichte der Kriegswissenschaften，1：186. It has, of course, been known for a long time that Vegetius had no sensitivity for the various periods. It would be a work of the highest value if someone succeeded, through a very careful analysis, in differentiating the various elements of his work from one another. But will that ever be possible?

10.In another passage, Chap.XVIII, para.69，it is recommended, on the contrary, that the horsemen be placed behind the foot soldiers when opposing the Turks. It is not clear how that is intended.

11.The passage in Gesta Roberti Wiscardi（Deeds of Robert Guiscard），I, v.260 ff.，which is interesting in a number of respects, reads as follows:

Artmati pedites dextrum laevumque monentur

Circumstare latus, aliquod sociantur equestres

Firmior ut peditum plebs sit comitantibus illis.

His interdicunt omnino recedere campo

Ut recipi valeant, si forte fugentur as hoste.

（The armed foot soldiers are instructed to surround the right and left flanks, and some horsemen are joined to them so that the mass of the foot soldiers may be stronger with their support. He absolutely forbids them to retreat from the field so that they can be rescued, if they should be put to flight by the enemy.）

12.“Tribus aciebus antepositis manus pedestris, ut has protegat et ab his protegatur, retro sistitur.”（“The band of foot soldiers stood in the rear with a triple battle line drawn up before it to protect them and to be protected by them.”）In the edition by Prutz, Source Contributions to the History of the Crusades（Quellenbeiträge zur Geschichte der Kreuzzüge），1：44.

Radulf, Gesta Tancredi（Deeds of Tancred），Chap. 32（Recueil des Historiens des Croisades. Occidentaux: Collection of the Historians of the Crusades. Occidentals，3：629）reports of the fleeing Turks: “nec fuga gyrum senserunt, adeo fugere est sperare salutem.”（“Nor in their flight did they even think of turning, to such an extent to flee is to hope for safety.”）According to the account, this refers to horsemen whom we cannot imagine as forming a tight group. That can perhaps be explained by the fact that the poet in his holy inspiration inadvertently attributed to the horsemen a picture from the actions of the fighters on foot.

13.William the Briton, Philippis, Book XI, verses 605-612（Duchesne，5：238）:

In peditum vallo totiens impune receptus

Nulla parte Comes metuebat ab hoste noceri

Hastatos etenim pedites invadere nostri

Horrebant equites, dum pugnant ensibus ipsi:

Atque armis brevibus, illos vero hasta cutellis

Longior et gladiis, et inextricabilis ordo

Circuitu triplici murorum ductus ad instar

Caute dispositos non permittebat adiri.

（After retreating safely so often to his rampart of foot soldiers, in no way did the count fear to be hurt by the enemy. And in fact our knights dread to attack foot soldiers with spears, while they themselves fight with swords. They have short weapons; the others indeed have a spear longer than knives or swords. And their unbreakable formation drawn up in a triple circuit like walls did not permit those cautiously disposed to come near.）

14.At least, I would like to translate paragraph 86 in this manner.（“Ison de to metõpon tës parataxeõs autõn poiountai kai pyknon en tais machais”:“They make the front of their battle line even and closely ordered.”）

15.Liudprandus, Antapodosis，2.31.

16.Perlbach, p.117.

17.Hartung, The Ancient German Days of the Nibelungenlied and the Gudrun（Die deutschen Altertümer des Nibelungenliedes und der Kudrum），p.505，compares Gudrun，647.2，1403.1，and 1451.1 with Nibelungenlied，203 and 204.2210.

18.See Berthold on the Saxons in the battle on the Unstrut，1075; Ekkehard, p.223，on a battle in the Crusade of 1096; and the defeat of King Baldwin of Jerusalem at Ramleh in 1102，as described by Fulcher.

19.Hartung, p.503，and Lexis'and Grimm's dictionaries give only a very few passages for these words.

20.Otto von Freising，1.32：“Dux ... secus quam disciplina militaris et ordo exposuit, non pedetemptim incedens sed praecipitanter advolans in hostem ruit suis gregatim adventantibus et dirupto legionum ordine confuse venientibus.”（“The duke ... otherwise than as knightly training and rank lays down, charged, not proceeding cautiously but flying headlong at the enemy with his men advancing like a herd of cattle and coming in disorder after the formation of the units had been disrupted.”）

Baldric, Historia Jerosolimitana（Recueil des Historiens des Croisades. Historiens Occidentaux），4.95: “Sagittarios et pedites suos ordinaverunt et ipsis praemissis pedetemptim ut mos est Francorum, pergebant.”（“They drew up their archers and foot soldiers and with themselves in the lead they proceeded cautiously, as is the custom of the Franks.”）

Heelu, verse 4898 ff.，describes the approach ride in the battle of Worringen as follows: “As the opponents were moving up against each other, they went about this matter so calmly, at a leisurely pace, coming from the two sides as if they were men riding along with their brides in front of them in the saddle.”

Guiart, too, in his account of the battle of Mons-en-Pévèle, verse 11494（cited by Köhler，2：269），says that each unit rode up slowly and in closed formation—“Each group moves along at a slow pace, advancing together as in a square.”

21.Emperor Leo says, para.80 ff.，the Franks do not form up on horseback or on foot by regiments or squadrons with specific strengths, but by families and groups of companions（“not in a determined size and formation, either sections or divisions as the Romans, but according to tribes and by kinship and attachment to each other, many times even by sworn agreement”*）.

Waitz, Deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte，8：179，believes that individual source passages indicate an organization by thousands, so that every thousand men formed a special unit, and that would undoubtedly mean a thousand horsemen, even if perhaps not always or not completely heavily armed horsemen. Such a group was, according to Waitz, designated as a “legio，” and this name also applied to the tactical unit formed for battle.

That is a false concept. A thousand horsemen form such a powerful force that they cannot be designated as a tactical unit, and such a formation with fixed numbers is not consistent with the nature of feudal contingents under their feudal lords. Emperor Leo had a more accurate conception of it. Widukind’s strength figure for the battle on the Lechfeld, insofar as the number 1，000 is concerned, is merely a number, and the expression “legion” is a scholarly embellishment.

Among the Normans, we find a faint trace of an organization in groups of ten warriors. It is reported that Tancred of Hauteville had ten knights under him at the court of the count of Normandy（“in curia comitis decern milites sub se habens servivit”）. Gottfried Malaterra, Migne, CXLIX，1121. Furthermore, the knightly services which William the Conqueror required of his most important vassals were always divisible by five or ten.

The Knights Templars were grouped in “squadrons”（“eschielle”）whenever they took to the field（Regulations, Chap.161）. I have never been able to determine how strong an “eschielle” was.

In the Crusade, Emperor Frederick I divided his army into units of fifty. How strange such an organization, which seems to us natural and indispensable, was to a medieval army is best indicated by the special attention Ansbert gives to this measure in his report（Fontes rerum Austriacarum, Abteilung I, Scriptores: Sources of Austrian History, Section I, Historians，5.34）：

Interea serenissimus imperator ut fidelis et prudens familiae domini dispensator de statu sanctissimae crucis exercitus in dies sollicitus, praefecit eidem pentarchos seu quinquagenos magistros militum, ut videlicet universi in suis societatibus per quinquagenarios divisi singulis regerentur magistris, sivi in bellicis negotiis, sive in dispensationum controversiis salvo iure marschalli aulae imperialis. Sexaginta quoque meliores ac prudentiores de exercitu delegit, quorum consilio et arbitrio cuncta exercitus negotia perficerentur, qui tamen postea solertioris cautelae dispensation et certi causa mysterii pauciori numero designati sedecim de sexaginta sunt effecti.（Meanwhile the most serene emperor, as the loyal and wise steward of the royal house and anxious every day about the state of the crusade, placed pentarchs or fifty masters of the soldiers in charge of it, clearly so that all divided in their companies by the commanders of fifty might be governed by a master both in military affairs and in disputes over orders by the reserved right of a marshal of the imperial court. He also selected sixty better and more prudent men of the army by whose counsel and judgment all affairs of the army might be accomplished. But afterwards, by an ordinance of rather clever caution and by reason of a definite plan, they were assigned by a smaller number and were made sixteen from the sixty.）

22.Edited by Karl Hegel, Chronicles of the German Cities（Chroniken der deutschen Städte），Vol.II，1864.

23.As shown on p.485. According to the report on p.203，there were only 400.

24.According to Albrecht's letter, City Chronicles，2.495，there were 450“riding horses” and “about 50‘Drabanten'.”

25.Köhler，2：695，drew from Dlugoss, Hist. Polon，11.240，edition of 1711（incorrectly, of course）the fact that the Poles rode up in this formation at the battle of Tannenberg.

But in his Military History of Bavaria（Kriegsgeschichte von Bayern），Würdinger, who used Archivalien as a reference, reported, at the battle of Hiltersried in 1433，where Duke John of Neumarkt or Neunburg defeated the Hussites, exactly the same formation of the knights as at Pillenreuth, giving their names. The banners were placed in the third rank. According to a study that District Assessor Reimer in Neunburg sent me, however, there was no report of a wedge formation. The knights apparently were stationed on foot at the point of an assault column that attacked the Hussite wagon stronghold.

The formation with a point is prescribed as a regulation, so to speak, in Elector Albrecht Achilles'instructions to his son John for the campaign against the duke of Sagan, the so-called Preparation of 1477. Quoted in Jähns’Manual of the History of Military Science（Handbuch von Geschichte der Kriegswissenschaften），p.979 ff.，and Kriegsgeschichte, Document of the Supreme General Staff，1884，Book 3. In the formation prescribed here, the banners were placed in the eleventh, fourteenth, or nineteenth rank.

26.Themes for Instruction in Tactics in the Royal Military Schools（Leitfaden für den Unterricht in der Taktik der königlichen Kriegsschulen），2d ed.，1890，p.45. Drill Regulations for Cavalry（Exerzier-Reglement für die Kavallerie），（1895），No.319-331.

27.The “point” did not occur before the fifteenth century.

Each group moves along at a slow pace，

Advancing together as in a square，

says Guiart, verse 11494，in his description of Mons-en-Pévèle（1304），cited by Köhler in his 2：269. The first example of the point is perhaps the formation of the troops of the Dauphiné“en pointe” in the battle of Mons-en-Vimeux in 1421，cited in Köhler，2：226，note. Recommendations for the formation with a point in documents of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries are to be found in Jähns，1：328，738，and 740. At the end of the fifteenth century, under Maximilian, the formation was surely squared off again. Leonhard Fronsperger speaks of the “pointed” battle formation as an obsolete one（Köhler，3：2：251）. We already find a formation of horsemen in a wedge or rhomboid in antiquity mentioned in Aelian, Chap.18，and Asclepiodotus, Chap.7. Among the reasons for this, which are probably theoretical fantasies, at least in part, it is also stated that control and wheeling actions are easier than in the squared formation. As far as control is concerned, this is obviously correct. With respect to wheeling actions, I understand that as meaning they did not need to make any true wheeling motion but could easily turn half-right or half-left by changing the rhomboid into a square.

28.“Istos in una et prima acie posuit et dixit illis: campus amplus est; extendite vos per campum directe, ne vos hostes intercludant. Non deceti ut unus miles scutum sibi de alio milite faciat; sed sic stetis, ut omnes quas, una fronte possitis pugnare.”（“He set them in one battle line and said to them: The field is big; extend yourselves across the field in a straight line so that the enemy may not cut you off. It is not proper that a knight make a shield for himself from another knight. But you should thus stand that all are able to fight on one front.”）

29.Köhler，2：226 and 3：2：253，believes that the formation in line first occurred in the fifteenth century. I see no basis for this assumption. Wherever mixed combat took place, the linear formation must have gained ground. Boutaric, p.297，makes the general statement: “The knights fought‘en haye，’that is to say, in a single line; the squires were drawn up behind them.”

30.Baltzer, p.106，cites two pieces of evidence for this.

31.Prutz, Quellenbeiträge, p.29:“acies ... beati Petri a dextris antecedens, cujus juris est antecedere et primum hostes percutere”（“the unit of the blessed Peter going ahead on the right, of whose privilege it is to go first and to strike the enemy first”）.

32.This valuable observation had already been made by Heermann, p.85，and Köhler has also agreed with him. Nevertheless, the battle finally ended in a serious defeat.

33.Liudprandus, Antapodosis，2.31.

34.Gesta Fridertci，1.32.

35.Köhler，3：1：95，has assembled a few passages, wherever they occur. Edward III of England, especially, formed in 1356 a guard of mounted archers. In the index volume, among the supplements, the author also added another passage from Wigalois. I would also add the treaty of alliance of the Lombards, Murat. Ant.，4.490. But even in England they never became a real arm. In the fifteenth century we do find many archers on horseback, but this was only a means of transportation for them; in battle, they dismounted.

The Saracens of Frederick II are considered by Köhler to have been exclusively dismounted archers. But it is expressly stated in Annales Parmenses majores（Greater Annals of Parma），SS.，18.673，that in 1248 before Parma the emperor had “balistarii tam equites quam pedites”（“crossbowmen on horseback as well as on foot”）.

36.Köhler，1：5 and 3：3：355.Up to the tenth century, he says, they had fought in a single echelon, but from the eleventh century on, in three echelons.

37.Köhler，2：35，assembled a few examples, but they show basically that such combat techniques were used less in actual practice than in the heroic accounts, and they succeeded still less often.

38.Köhler，1：468，and 2：13.

39.Köhler，2：42.

40.Daniel, Histoire de la milice française, p.82.

41.Only seldom do we find that a king remained behind the front, as, for example, at Ascalon in 1125，cited by Heermann, p.120. Or old King Iagiello of Poland at Tannenberg in 1410.

42.Viollet-le-Duc, Rational Dictionary of French Furniture from the Carolingian Period to the Renaissance（Dictionnaire raisonné du mobilier françµis de l’époque carlovingienne à la renaissance），6：372.

43.This is how I prefer to translate the Greek expression “sphodrõs kai akataschetõs hõs monotonoi”:“violent and unstoppable like obstinate men”）.（Tactics, para.87）. See Mauritius, p.269.

44.Before Ascalon，12 August 1099. Albert of Aachen，6.42，as cited in Röhricht, History of the First Crusade（Geschichte des ersten Kreuzzuges），p.200，Note 8.

45.Richer of Sens, M.G. SS.，25.294.

46.Orderich，12.18：“ferro enim undique vestiti erant et pro timore Dei notitiaque contubernii vicissim sibi parcebant nec tamen occidere fugientes quam comprehendere satagebant.”（“for they had been dressed completely in iron and mutually spared each other according to fear of God and acknowledgment of their brotherhood in arms; they did not endeavor so much to kill those in flight as to capture them.”）

Giraldus, Opera，5. 396：“ibi capiuntur milites, hie decapitantur; ibi redimuntur, hie perimuntur.”（“There knights are captured, here decapitated; there they are ransomed, here they are killed.”）

47.See p.221，Note 3，above.

48.The provisions of the Teutonic order, which followed the pattern of the Knights Templars, state in the “Customs，”Chap.46（Perlbach, p.111），that on the march the knight was to have his squire ride in front of him so that he could keep a close watch on his armor.

49.The provision in the Teutonic order was quite similar（Perlbach, p.117）:“Nullus frater insultum faciat, nisi prius vexillum viderit insilisse. Post insultum vexilli quilibet pro viribus corporis et animi, quidquid poterit exercebit et redibit ad vexillum, cum viderit oportunum.”（“No brother should make an attack, unless he will have seen the banner charge first. After the attack of the banner each will employ whatever he can according to the strength of his body and spirit, and he will return to the banner when he will have seen it opportune.”）

50.Meckel, Tactics，1：50.

51.“The weakest moment for the cavalry is immediately after carrying out an attack. This pause cannot be eliminated fast enough, and order, calm, and a closed formation cannot be restored quickly enough, in order that a unit be in a position to face any eventuality.”Instructions by Major General Carl von Schmidt, Berlin，1876，p.152.

52.I cannot remember reading in any medieval source anything about signals in battle. The Knights Templars gave signals in camp with a bell. According to Gautier（Prutz, p.27），before the battle of Athareb, Prince Roger ordered that at the first trumpet call everybody was to don his equipment（“audito primo sonitu gracilis”—that was a kind of trumpet），at the second trumpet call they were to assemble, and at the third they were to appear for service of worship. Afterwards, as they went into battle（p.29），the Christians moved forward “gracilibus, tibiis, tubisque clangentibus”（“while the trumpets, pipes, and horns were sounding”）. Duke John of Brabant, too, ordered before the battle of Worringen that the trumpets should blow to signal the manner in which they should attack or fight, in order to encourage his men. The “ministrere” stopped their blowing when they saw the ducal banner sink but started blowing the trumpets again when it was raised once more（Ian von Heelu, verses 5668，5694，pp.211-212）. From this passage, Köhler（3：2：340）concluded that this was a normal custom and that the trumpeters were near the banner in order to indicate where it was, even if it was obscured by dust. This conclusion goes too far in every respect. Ducange quotes from the Vita St. Pandulfi，n.15: “illam tubam, quam ad significandum proelium tubare significavi”（“that horn which I gave the sign to blow to indicate battle”）.

53.In his work on the conduct of battle of occidental armies in the period of the First Crusade, Heermann determined（p.103）that all the battlefields in that area whose terrain forms are recognizable（Dorylaeum, Lake of Antioch, Antioch, Ascalon, Ramleh（1101），Joppe, Ramleh（1105），Sarmin, Merdj-Sefer, Athareb, and Hab）are plains and that in all the source accounts there is hardly a trace of terrain difficulties or battles in towns or woods.

Emperor Leo, Tactics，18. 92，says that broken terrain was disadvantageous for the Franks in mounted combat, because they normally made a strong shock action with their lances. Of course, this strong blow is not to be understood in the modern sense.

54.This comes into consideration particularly against mounted archers, and therefore in the Crusades. Heermann（p.103）traces this back to the tactics of the Moslems, who, with their great numerical superiority, always tried to envelop the Christians. This great superiority of the infidels is to be dismissed as a Christian fable; the reason is to be sought, rather, in their differing armament.

55.Heermann says in his introduction that we can get to know the knightly method of warfare best and most accurately from the early period of the Crusades. In the later Crusades, the occidentals possibly had borrowed from the orientals, whereas they must have won their first victories with their original tactics. Furthermore, we also have broader source accounts of those events, accounts that are much more meager for events in the west. As logical as this idea may seem, it is nevertheless not correct. The peculiar new conditions of combat were present right from the beginning, at Dorylaeum, and the Crusaders had to try to adapt to them.

3　雇佣兵

1.Petrus Damiani, Vita Romualdi（The Life of Romualdus），SS.，4.848（written ca.1040）.

2.Richer, IV, Chap.82:“exercitum tam de suis, quam conducticiis congregabat.”（“He assembled an army from his own men as well as from hirelings.”）

3.Hermannus Contractus, SS.，V, for the year 1053.

4.Waitz，8：238，402，411.

5.Annales Hildesheimses（Annals of Hildesheim），SS.，3-110.

6.Mikulla，“The Mercenaries in the Armies of Emperor Frederick II”（“The Mercenaries in the Armies of Emperor Frederick II”（“Die Söldner in den Heeren Kaiser Friedrichs II.”Berlin dissertation，1885，P.5.

Ducange questions whether instead of “triaverdini” we should not read “triamellini，” a word supposedly derived from the name of a certain type of dagger.

7.Peschel，“On the Variations of Relative Values Between the Precious Metals and Other Commercial Goods”（“Ueber die Schwankungen der Wertrelationen zwischen den edlen Metallen und den übrigen Handelsgütern”），Deutsche Vierteljahresschrift，4（1853）：1.

Soetbeer，“Contributions to the History of the Monetary and Minting System in Germany”（“Beiträge zur Geschichte des Geld-und Münzwesens in Deutschland”），Forschungen zur Deutschen Geschichte, Vols. I to VI and 57th Supplementary Volume to Petermanns Mitteilungen，1879.

Lexis, article “Gold” and article “Silver” in the Dictionary of Political Science（Handwórterbuch der Staatswissenschaft）.

Waitz, Heinrich I.，Excurs 15，“On the Reported Discovery of Metals in the Harz under Henry I”（“Ueber die angebliche Entdeckung der Metalle im Harz unter Heinrich I”）. According to Waitz, mining in the Harz under Otto I is definitely confirmed by Widukind and Thietmar; it is still questionable as to whether it really went back to the time of Henry I.Inama-Sternegg, German Economic History from the Tenth to the Twelfth Century（Deutsche Wirtschaftsgeschichte des 10.bis 12. Jahrhundert），2：430 f.

The values for grains estimated by Peschel are obviously unreliable, and his opinion that a decrease of metal supplies can be observed in Europe from the fourteenth century on is certainly incorrect.

Soetbeer，2：306，thinks he has found indications that there was still much cash money on hand under the Merovingians. This opinion no doubt needs to be researched further.

The Florentine guilder was minted from 1252 on.

Helfferich, Money and Banks（Geld und Banken），1：87，says: “In the face of an almost complete cessation of production of precious metals and a heavy flow of such metals to the Byzantine Empire and the Far East, an unusual decrease in the supply of precious metal in Western Europe apparently took place in the fifth, sixth, and seventh centuries.”It does not seem to me to be proven that precious metal flowed away from the west specifically to the Byzantine Empire; at least, there was only a shortage and no superfluous amount there either. But the general decrease in the Roman Empire must have started much earlier, and in the third century A.D. it was already leading to the catastrophe. See Vol.II, p.212 ff.

8.Ruotger, vita Brunonis（Life of Bruno），Chap.30.

9.Delpech，2：43，believes the Brabantines were horsemen. Köhler，3：2：148 ff.，says they were foot soldiers, but he gives no basis for his opinion. When he expresses surprise on p.152 that they disappeared after the battle of Bouvines and we later find only national levies and soldiers of the cities in Germany as foot troops, this point is at odds with his opinion that the Brabantines were already such a highly developed infantry. Furthermore, on p.147，note, he himself cites an English source, Gervasius Dorobernesis, Chronica de rebus anglicis（Chronicles of English History）of the year 1138 to the effect that William of Ypres, the first of the historic mercenary leaders, commanded “milites et pedites multos”（“many knights and foot soldiers”）. Furthermore, in the treaty between Barbarossa and Louis VII of France of the year 1170（Martène, Veterum scriptorum ... amplissima collectio: Largest Collection of Ancient Writers ...，2：880），express mention is made of the “Brabantiones sive coterelli”（“Brabantines or coterelli”）as “equites seu pedites”（“horsemen or foot soldiers”）.

10.Gislebert, SS.，21.844. Baldwin presumably had “milites auxiliatores, qui quamvis non essent solidarii, tamen in expensis ejus erant”（“auxiliary knights, who, although they were not mercenaries, were nevertheless on his payroll”）.

11.15.100，cited by Roth von Schreckenstein, p.352.

12.Gervasius Dorobernesis, Chronica de rebus anglicis.

13.The first treaty is reproduced in Rymer, Foedera，1：7，and the second one on p.22. In the conditions governing the pay are provisions that do not seem to be consistent. In the obligation of the barons, it is stated that those who receive 30 marks “pro feodo”（as “fief”）were obligated to provide 10 milites, and so forth. But the total amount for 1，000 knights was only 400 marks. But in the renewed treaty of 1163，30 marks was the agreed amount for every ten knights.

This agreement forms an intermediate type between a treaty covering compensation and a political treaty, in that the count excludes in the first case service against his suzerain, but secondly, in case his lord himself should attack England, he obligated himself to serve him only to the extent of not forfeiting his fief.

“Tam parvam fortitudinem hominum secum adducet quam minorem poterit ita tamen ne inde feodum suum erga Regem Franciae forisfaciat.”（“He will bring with him so small a force as he can so that he may not, however, forfeit his fief to the king of France thereby.”）

14.Köhler，3：2：155，has assembled a number of these treaties.

15.Boutaric, p.1138.

16.M.G.LL.，IV Constitutiones I（Records of Germany, Laws IV, Ordinances I），331，and Martène and Durand, Veterum scriptorum ... amplissima collectio（Largest Collection of Ancient Writers），2：880. The rulers consented “inter cetera de expellendis maleficis hominibus, qui Brabantiones sive Coterelli dicuntur tale fecimus utrimque pactum et statutum. Nullos videlicet Brabantiones vel Coterellos equites seu pedites in totis terris aut imperii infra Rhenum et Alpes et civitatem Parisius [sic] aliqua occasione et uerra retinebimus.”（“We have made the following agreement and regulation among other things concerning the expulsion of criminals who are called Brabantines or Coterelli: we shall not keep on any occasion and in war anyone, namely, Brabantines and Coterelli, whether horse or foot, in all the lands of our empire within the Rhine, the Alps, and the city of Paris.”）

17.H.Géraud, The Highwaymen in the Twelfth Century（Les Routiers au douzième siècle），Bibliothèque de l’Ecole des Chartes，3（1841）：132.

4　战略

1.Annates Altahenses（Annals of Niederalteich）for the year 978:“relictis in alia ripa fluminis victualibus cum plaustris et carucis et pene omnibus utensilibus, quae exercitui erant necessaria.”（“After all the supplies had been left behind on the other bank of the river with the wagons, carts, and tools that are necessary for an army ...”）. The enemy took all of this from the Germans and inflicted many losses on them.

2.W.Weitzel, The German Imperial Castles from the Ninth to the Sixteenth Century（Die deutschen Kaiserpfalzen vom 9.bis 16. Jahrhundert），Halle an der Saale.

3.Heinemann, History of the Normans in Lower Italy（Geschichte der Normannen in Unteritalien），p.120.

4.Collection of the Historians of the Gauls（Recueil des historiens des Gaules），11.266：

melius est nos convenire et pugnare, quam nos a vobis separari et superari. In bellis mora modica est, sed vincentibus lucrum quam maximum est. Obsidiones multa consumunt tempora et vix obsessa subjugantur municipia: bella vobis subdent nationes et oppida, bello subacti evanescent tamquam fumus inimicis. Bello peracto et hoste devicto vastum imperium et Turonia patebit.

（It is better that we make an agreement and fight rather than be divided from you and overcome. In battles（wars）a delay is insignificant, but the conquerors have the greatest gain possible. Sieges take a lot of time, and besieged towns are conquered with difficulty: battles（wars）should put nations and towns under your sway and those subjugated by battle（war）vanish like smoke for their enemies. After the battle（war）has been finished and the enemy defeated, a great empire and Tours will lie open.）

In this context, the word “bellum” is to be translated as “battle.” The fact that the work from which we have extracted this passage is late and unreliable as a historic source does not make any difference for us, of course, since we are concerned not with the authenticity of the seneschal's speech but with the confirmation of the fact that such reflections did occur in the Middle Ages.

5.Vol.II, p.378.

5　意大利市镇与霍亨斯陶芬王朝

1.“cum consensu ... Canonicorum ejusdemque civitatis Militum ac populorum”（“with the agreement of the Canonici and of the knights and of the people of the same city”）.

An agreement drawn up in Modena in 1106 also distinguishes between “milites” and “cives”. Hegel, History of the City Organizations of Italy（Geschichte der Städteverfassungen von Italien），2：174.

2.Arnulph, Chap.18，SS.，8.16 ff.

3.Handloike, The Lombard Cities under the Hegemony of the Bishops and the Rise of the Communes（Die lombardischen Städte unter der Herrschaft der Bischöfe und die Entstehung der Kommunen），Berlin，1883.

4.Hegel，1：252. Hartmann, History of Italy in the Middle Ages（Geschichte Italiens im Mittelalter），2：2：80；2：2：117.

5.Relatio de Legatione Constantinopolitana（Report on the Embassy to Constantinople），Chap.12.

6.Hegel，2：31. In a charter of Henry III for Mantua, there appears the expression “cives videlicet Eremannos”（“inhabitants, namely warriors”），which Hegel，2：143，interprets as meaning that the burghers were declared to be warriors（“Eremannos”）.

As evidence from the other side of the narrowing of the distinction between the classes, we may cite Emperor Lambert's law of 898：“Ut nullus comitum arimannos in benefìcio suis hominibus tribuat.”（“That no count should grant to his own men warriors in a benefice.”）If the emperor had to take the “arimannos，” that is, the free warriors, under his protection in this manner, then they were under a pressure that necessarily lessened the distinction between them and the burghers and peasants.

7.According to the Gesta Friderici in Lombardia（Deeds of Frederick in Lombardy），p.30（M.G.，18.365），there were 15，000 knights（“milites fuerunt appretiati quindecim milia”）before Milan; according to Ragewin，3：32，there were about 100，000 men（“circiter 100 milia armatorum vel amplius”）. These two figures were then combined in the manner indicated above. The Annales Sancti Disibodi（Annals of St. Disibodus），M.G.，SS.，17.29，give only 50，000 men（“Teutunicorum seu etiam Longobardorum”（“of Germans and also Lombards”）. See Giesebrecht, History of the German Imperial Period（Geschichte der deutschen Kaiserzeit），6：259.

8.Ragewin，3.34.

9.Ragewin，4.58.

10.The accounts of the battle of Carcano in the narrative works of Raumer, Giesebrecht, Prutz, etc.are all inaccurate, especially since they did not eliminate the fables of the Codagnellus. The documentary basis for my account is given in the “Contributions to the Military History of the Hohenstaufen Period”（“Beiträge zur Kriegsgeschichte der staufischen Zeit”）by Benno Hanow. Berlin dissertation，1905. The account in Köhler，3：3：124，is mostly fantasy.

11.Otto Morena, M.G. SS.，18.631.

12.Annales Weingartenses Welfici（Welficius, Annals of Weingarten），M.G.，SS.，17.309. The duke of Bavaria and Saxony reportedly went to the emperor’s aid “in mille ducentis loricis”（“about 1，200 men in mail”）. Welf: “in trecentis loricis Deuthonicorum”（“about 300 mailed Germans”）.

13.The complete passage from Otto Morena reads as follows: The Romans flee “turn quia forte justitiam non habebant, turn etiam quia postquam in campo exeunt, non sicut sui majores fecere, faciunt, imo vilissimi sunt, turn etiam qui Teutonicos magis timebant quam alios”（“then because they did not, as it happened, have justice, then also because after they went out on the field they acted, not as their ancestors did; rather, they were most worthless. Then also they feared the Germans more greatly than others”）. What does the word “justitia” mean here? The “just thing”?Or “the correct way and manner，” that is, of fighting?

On this point I turned to the prominent scholar of medieval Latin, Paul von Winterfeld, who since then has been prematurely lost to the field of scholarship, but he did not know the answer either. He wrote to me:

From the purely philological viewpoint, it also seems quite unlikely to me that “justitia” should mean the “just thing”；for this is not a biblical expression. I have looked through the article on justitia in the concordance but have only found the expression “habeas justitiam coram deo”（“You should have justice in the presence of God”），in Deuteronomy，24，13.

But now can “the correct manner” be the right interpretation? That would, after all, be very colorless, but there is also an idea associated with it which seems to oppose this meaning: “turn quia forte iustitiam non habebant”，as well as because they are of no value（or rather: “or because”?）. What do you understand here by “the correct way”?In any case，“forte” means this “single instance” in contrast with the word “in general” of the other clause. I have the feeling that the word “justitia” is a corruption, but I do not know how to emend it.“Fiduciam” would fit here, but, of course, it is too extreme a change.

14.Dümmler, Sitzungsberichte der Berliner Akademie，1（1897）：112. Lucanus, de bello civili（On the Civil War），1.256. Annales Egmondani（Annals of Egmunda），SS.，16.453.

15.Gedr.Sudendorf, Registrum，2.146.

16.All of these various figures, arranged in numerical sequence, are clearly presented in Varrentrapp’s Christian von Mainz, p.38.

17.Liber pontificalis（The Papal Book），ed. Duchesne, p.415.

18.That is incorrect. The emperor did not go through Tuscia but penetrated into Romagna from the north.

19.This entire scene is pure fiction, since Christian was not with the emperor before Ancona but had moved from Genoa through Tuscany and was not far from Reinald. It was only afterward that the emperor heard of these events. See Varrentrapp, Christian von Mainz, p.28 ff.

20.Not a word of this is to be believed. See Varrentrapp, loc.cit.

21.Wyss, in the Allgemeine Deutsche Biographie，540：2，doubts whether Duke Berthold von Zähringen really participated in the battle and was taken prisoner, but his view seems to be contradicted by Giesebrecht，6：530. Giesebrecht，6：528，considers it possible that Margrave Dietrich von der Lausitz also took part in the battle. But we only know from an undated document which was probably not written until December 1176 that he was then at the emperor’s court, but that does not permit any conclusion as to his whereabouts in May.

22.According to the Gesta Friderici in Lombardia, ed. Holder-Egger（Annales Mediolanenses majores: Greater Annals of Milan），the army that had come across the Alps numbered 2，000 men, that is, knights. This number is not to be divided in half, as if only half of the men were knights（Giesebrecht），nor can it be multiplied as if there were naturally additional combatants of lower rank. According to the Gesta Friderici, the emperor himself had led 1，000 knights from Pavia, and according to Gottfried von Viterbo, this number was 500. In addition, there were the men of Como, who hardly numbered more than the 500 men who supposedly were killed or captured（Gesta Friderici and Continuatio Sanblasiana ad Ottonis Frisingensis chronicon[Sanblasianus'Continuation of the Chronicle of Otto of Freysingen]，SS.，20.316）.

23.The standard source study for Legnano is the previously cited dissertation by Hanow.

In the Deutsche Literaturzeitung, No. 26（1 July 1905），Güterbock reproached Hanow for not taking into account in his work the Chronicle of Tolosanus. In fact, this work should have been expressly mentioned, but only for the purpose of rejecting it as unimportant. It was written about a generation later and is either erroneous or confusing in all the figures that can be checked on. The other points for which Güterbock reproaches Hanow are either unsubstantiated or obviously false. See the “Entgegnung”（“Reply”）and “Antwort”（“Answer”）in the Deutsche Literaturzeitung, No.31. Also Historische Vierteljahresschrift，1911.

The account which Köhler，1：69 ff.，gives of the battle is based on uncritical contamination of the various source reports and especially on the completely unreliable Gottfried von Viterbo; much of this is also mere fantasy. Effectively opposed to these descriptions are the remarks of the same author in the note in his 3：3：122. Here it is not the critical scholar of the source documents who is speaking, but the practical, experienced soldier.

24.The standard study for Cortenuova is the dissertation by Karl Hadank, Berlin，1905. Publisher: Richard Hanow.63 pp.

25.“ultra decern milia sui exercitus secum trahens ... signa direcit victricia”（“taking with him over 10，000 of his own army ... he arranged the signals of victory”）.

26.Annales Placentini Guelfi（The Guelph Annals of Piacenza），M.G.，SS.，18.453. They promise one another help，“militum, peditum et balistariorum”（“of knights, foot soldiers, and crossbowmen”）.

27.According to the Ghibelline Annals of Piacenza, Piacenza alone had provided 1，000 knights. But if we accepted this figure and also estimated the other allied contingents correspondingly, it would not be understandable why the Lombards so anxiously avoided battle with the emperor. Perhaps those 1，000 men were Piacenza's total contingent.

28.The fact that Riccardus di San Germano speaks of 60，000 inhabitants has, of course, no validity as proof.

29.Annales Parmenses majores（Greater Annals of Parma），M.G.，SS.，18.673：“decern milia militum cum innummerabili populo diversarum gentium”（“10，000 knights with a countless crowd of different nations”）. The events indicate that the “milites” are to be understood not simply as “knights” in the narrower sense, but as combatants.

Earlier, scholars believed they had still another strength estimate worthy of consideration in the work of Salimbene, who was personally in Parma at the start of the siege, who gives the emperor 37，000 men. But it turns out that this number resulted from an error in reading. Salimbene only says that the emperor's army was huge, and he cites Chapter 37 of Ezekiel. This “37 Ezekiel” was interpreted as 37，000.M.G.，SS.，37.196.

Of course, sources that speak of 60，000 men（Schirrmacher，4：441）are not worth repeating.

30.Collenuccio, from Mainardino of Imola, as cited in Scheffer. Boichorst On the History of the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries（Zur Geschichte des XII.und XIII.Jahrhunderts），p.283，describes the camp: “This‘town'was 800 rods long and 600 rods wide, and the rod was of 9 yards; and it had 8 gates and deep, wide ditches all around.”The emperor himself had written to Mainardino: “civitatem（Parmensem）civitatis nostre, que vires obsistentium ab hyemalis temporis quantalibet tempestate tuebitur, nova constructione vel oppressione comprimimus.”（“We are now besieging the city（Parma）by depredation and by the recent construction of our own fortified camp, which will protect the strength of the besiegers from the adverse weather of winter, however great.”）

31.Arnulph, SS.，8.16.

32.The source passages concerning the carroccio have been assembled and discussed by Muratori in Antiquitates，2：489. See also Waitz，8：183；San Marte, Zur Waffenkunde, p.323；Köhler，1：185，2：147，190，3：2：344. The opinion that the idea for this originated in the Orient does not seem to me to be proven.

33.“The Battle of Tagliacozzo”（“Die Schlacht bei Tagliacozzo”），Neue Jahrbücher fur das Klassische Altertum, Geschichte und Deutsche Literatur，1903，Section I, Vol.XI, Book 1，p.31.

6　德意志城市

1.The Knightly Dignity and the Knightly Class（Die Ritterwürde und der Ritterstand），p.502.

2.Roth, p.470.

3.See Bremer Urkundenbuch, edited by Ehmk and Bippen, Vol.I, No.172. In 1233，Archbishop Gebhard promised the citizens of Bremen:

Cives Bremenses mercatores non tenebuntur ad archiepiscopi Bremensis expeditionem, ni voluerint, exceptis illis mercatoribus qui vel tamquam ministeriales vel tamquam homines ecclesiae ab ecclesia sunt feodati, quorum quilibet ad expeditionem ecclesiae evocatus servicium suum per unum hominem poterit redimere, competenter armis instructum.

（The merchant inhabitants of Bremen will not be obligated for the campaign of the archbishop of Bremen unless they will have desired to be, with the exception of those merchants who either as officials or as men of the Church have been enfeoffed by the Church, of which each one called out for the campaign of the Church will be able to fulfill his obligation through one man suitably equipped with arms.）

See Donandt, History of the Bremen Municipal Law（Geschichte des Bremer Stadtrechts），1：111.

4.H.Fischer，“The Participation of the Free Cities in the Imperial Campaign”（“Die Teilnahme der Reichsstädte an der Reichsheerfahrt”），Leipzig dissertation，1883，p.14. The first march to Rome in which they actually participated, of course, did not occur until 1310. P.29.

5.Lindt，“Contributions to the History of German Military Organization in the Hohenstaufen Period”（“Beiträge zur Geschichte der Deutschen Kriegsverfassung in der Staufischen Zeit”），Tübingen dissertation，1881，p.28，cites several passages for this point, the earliest being from the year 1114.

6.1204“collecta multitudine militum vel etiam civium, qui propter continuas bellorum exercitationes gladiis et sagittis et lanceis non parum praevalent”（“after a crowd of knights and even inhabitants had been assembled, who, on account of their continuous military exercises with swords, arrows, and lances, were sufficiently capable ...”）.

7.Arnold，2：241.

8.Ennen and Eckertz, Sources for the History of the City of Cologne（Quellen zur Geschichte der Stadt Köln），Vol.II, No.449，p.165，and Vol.IV, No.488，p.560. See also 3：232.Arnold, Constitutional History of the German Free Cities（Verfassungsgeschichte der deutschen Freistädte），1：443.

9.Arnold，2：243.

10.“Not many of the gentlemen joined me, since they were anxious to be able to return home again on the same day and could not remain out overnight.”Königshofen, Chronik deutscher Städte（Chronicle of German Cities），9.845. Vischer, Studies in German History（Forschungen der deutschen Geschichte）2：77. Köhler，3：2：381.

11.Master Godefrit Hagen, city clerk for the period, Rhymed Chronicle of the City of Cologne from the Thirteenth Century（Reimchronik der Stadt Köln aus dem dreizehnten Jahrhundert）. With notes and glossary in accordance with the only ancient manuscript. Edited completely for the first time by E.von Groote, city councilor, Cologne on the Rhine. Published and printed by M. Du Mont-Schauberg.1834.

12.This document is printed in the Fontes rerum Germanicarum（Sources of German History），by Böhmer, Vol.III, and recently edited by Jaffé in the SS.，17.105. See also Wiegand, Bellum Walterianum（Studies in Alsatian History[Studien zur Elsässischen Geschichte]，I），Strasbourg，1878. Roth von Schreckenstein, Herr Walter von Geroldseck, Tübingen，1857.

13.Roth, p.40，assumes that the bishop had distributed his men throughout the region up to about Schlettstadt, Rheinau, Zabern, and Hagenau. Some of these points are more than 18 miles distant from the assembly point at Molsheim.

According to Richer, the bishop's troops had not initially assembled but were concentrated at Dachenstein.

14.From Closener's translation. The Latin text reads: “Bene veniatis, dilectissime domine Zorn; nunquam in tantum desiderabam vos videre.”

7　条顿骑士团征服普鲁士

1.The best comprehensive account is that of Karl Lohmeyer, Geschichte von Ost-und Westpreussen，1st Section，2d ed.，1881. The work of A.L. Ewald, The Conquest of Prussia by the Germans（Die Eroberung Preussens durch die Deutschen），four volumes，1882-1886，is based on a variety of sources. The second great rebellion by the Prussians is treated thoroughly and well by Köhler in the second volume of his Development of Military Organization and Conduct of War in the Knightly Period（Entwickelung des Kriegswesens und der Kriegführung in der Ritterzeit）.

2.Whether the remark, from Dusburg or the chronicle of Oliva, that the order numbered 600 lay members in 1239 is reliable cannot be determined.

8　英格兰箭术与爱德华一世征服威尔士和苏格兰

1.Slingers, fundibularii, are mentioned in Continuatio Reginonis（Continuation of Regino）for the year 962. Casus Sancti Galli Continuatio（Continuation of the Chronicle of St. Gall），158.

2.See Jähns, History of the Development of Ancient Offensive Weapons（Entwickelungsgeschichte der alten Trutzwaffen），p.333 ff.

3.In Jaffé，Regesta pontificum Romanorum（Register of the Roman Popes），p.585，the decision（No.29）reads as follows: “artem ballistariorum et sagittariorum adversus Christianos et catholicos exerceri sub anathemate prohibent.”（“They prohibited, on pain of damnation, the skill of crossbowmen and archers to be exercised against Christians and Catholics.”）On the basis of this Regesta, we find it stated quite often（for example, in Demmin, Military Weapons [Kriegswaffen]，2d ed.，p.100，and also Waitz，8：190）that the council had forbidden the use of the crossbow among Christians as too deadly a weapon. Since the sagittarii（archers）are mentioned in a line with the ballistarii（crossbowmen），that cannot possibly have been the intent of the council. In Mansi, Tome 21，p.534，the decision reads as follows: “Artem autem illam mortiferam et Deo odibilem ballistariorum et sagittariorum adversus Christianos et catholicos exerceri de caetero sub anathemate prohibemus.”（“We prohibit, however, on pain of damnation, that deadly skill of crossbowmen and archers, odious to God, to be practiced by another against Christians and Catholics.”）Hefele, Concil. Geschichte, Vol.V，2d ed.，p.442，interprets this as referring to a kind of tournament of competitive shooting at persons. San Marte, p.188，claims that it refers to poisoned arrows and bolts. I prefer Hefele’s interpretation.

4.Guillemus Brito, Gesta Philippi regis（William the Briton, Deeds of Philip the King），Book II：

Francigenis nostris illis ignota diebus

Res erat omnino, quid Balestarius arcus

Quid Balista foret.

（In those days, what a Balestarius bow was

And what a Balista was

Were completely unknown to our Frenchmen.）

Has volo, non alia Ricardum morte perire

Ut qui Francigenis ballistae primitus usum

Tradidit, ipse suam rem primitus experiatur

Quamque alios docuit im se vim sentiat artis.

（I wish that Richard, who first related

The use of the crossbow to Frenchmen，

Die by no other death，

And he should feel the force against himself

Which he taught to others.）

5.Köchly and Rüstow, Greek Military Authors（Griechische Kriegsschriftsteller），2：2：37，201.（See Vol.II, p.346.）

6.The Welsh Wars of Edward I, A Contribution to Medieval Military History based on Original Documents, by John E. Morris, M.A.，formerly of Magdalen College, Oxford. With a map.Oxford at the Clarendon Press，1901.

7.Morris, p.34.

8.Morris, p.18.

9.Oman, p.558.

10.Morris, p.88.

11.Morris, p.74.

12.Morris, p.37.

13.Morris, p.95.

14.Morris, p.105.

15.Morris, p.115.

16.Morris, p.178.

17.Morris, p.155.

18.Morris, p.87.

19.Edward I also had a military retinue which received pay and rations as follows: bannerets，4 shillings per day; knights，2 shillings; sergeants（servientes, valetti, scutiferi），1 shilling.

In 1277 the number of knights amounted to some forty; later there were undoubtedly more. The sergeants numbered about sixty in 1277，but that was probably only a part of the group. Horses and weapons were provided for them. Each man had to maintain two soldiers and three horses. Quite a number of them were crossbowmen. In peacetime they formed small units as castle garrisons; in wartime their number was greatly increased.

20.Oman, p.558，is of the opinion that the longbow, which from the time of Edward I replaced the short bow in normal use, also surpassed the crossbow in penetrating power. Presumably, then, a great technical stride forward had been made with the introduction of the longbow. I cannot agree with this viewpoint. If it were correct, the continuing use of the crossbow into the sixteenth century would be incomprehensible.

George, too, in Battles of English History, p. 51 ff.，devoted himself to a thorough study of the remarkable phenomenon of the bow and its overpowering effectiveness. He, too, sees the longbow as a decisive factor. According to him, it was invented in South Wales. The earlier periods had known only the short bow.

George finds the advantages of the longbow and of the manner in which it was used in England in three factors. First, it was held vertically and not horizontally like the short bow, and it could therefore be pulled back much farther; second, in doing so, one could give the longbow greater tension; and third, the marksmen could aim better along the arrow that was thus pulled farther back. While the range of an arrow’s trajectory was 400 yards, the normal range in practice, according to George, was a furlong（one-eighth of an English mile, or approximately 200 yards）.

Why Richard the Lion-Hearted, in spite of these advantages, preferred the crossbow, and why the longbow actually remained peculiar to the English, appears to George to be a “mystery.”

21.The Welsh Wars of Edward I, pp.79，82，313.

9　战例介绍

1.“Studies on the Military History of England in the Twelfth Century”（“Studien zur Kriegsgeschichte Englands im 12. Jahrhundert”），by J. Douglas Drummond. Berlin dissertation，1905.

2.According to Drummond.

3.Aelredi Abbatis Rievallensis（Aelred, abbot of Rievaulx），Historia de bello Standardii（History of the Battle of the Standard），p.338.“strenuissimi milites in prima fronte locati lancearios et sagittarios ita sibi inseruerunt ut, militaribus armis protecti ... Scutis scuta junguntur”（“The most vigorous knights placed on the front line, so inserted spearmen and archers that, protected by the arms of the knights ... shields were joined to shields”）.

4.According to Drummond.

5.Radulf, Gesta Tancredi（Deeds of Tancred），Chap.22.

6.“Ut pedites castra servarent et milites hostibus obviam extra castra pergerent”（“so that the foot soldiers might guard the camp and the knights might proceed against the enemy outside the camp”）. Raimund. According to the Gesta，“pars peditum”（“part of the foot soldiers”）.

7.“Procedebamus ita spaciosi, sicut in processionibus clerici pergere solent et re vera nobis processio erat.”（“We were advancing in so loose a formation, just as clerics are accustomed to go in processions, and in fact we had a procession.”）

8.Letter from the princes to the pope.

9.Heermann, p.52，Note 2.

10.Furthermore, the character of this letter as an official document is not absolutely certain. Hagenmeier, Studies in German History（Forschung zur deutschen Geschichte），13：400，believed he could show that Raimund himself was the author of the letter. The difference in the figures for the army strengths would not stand in the way of this interpretation. These numbers are only very vague estimates, which the same man can have stated very differently at various times, after speaking with various people.

11.According to the ltinerarium Regis Ricardi（Itinerary of King Richard），VI, paras.21-24. Edited by Stubbs in the Rerum Britannicarum medii aevi Scriptores（Writers of British History of the Middle Ages），p.415. Oman, History of War, p.316.

12.Of course, we could base a conclusion on the worthlessness of the foot troops on the express testimony of Raimund of Agiles, who says that, when the knights moved out before Antioch for the battle by the lake（9 February 1098），the foot troops were left behind in front of the beleaguered city.“Dicebant enim, quod multi de exercitu nostro imbelles et pavidi, si viderent Turcorum multitudinem, timoris potius quam audaciae exempla monstrarent.”（“They said in fact that many of our army, cowardly and afraid if they saw a crowd of Turks, presented examples of fear rather than boldness.”）But these kinds of statements are not objective evidence. Furthermore, some of the foot troops did move out with the knights（according to the Gesta），and that same day the rest of them successfully repulsed a sortie of the besieged forces.

13.Köhler, p.156. Oman, p.477.

14.Morris, p.256. Oman, p.561.

15.Köhler，2：206-207. On the basis of the Regensburg Annals, M.G. SS.，17.418.

16.Köhler，2：210.

第四篇　中世纪晚期

1　中世纪晚期的研究路径　无

2　方阵会战、城市军队与征召民兵

1.Spiegel historiaal, IV, Chap.33：

Then he（Artois）wanted to surrender to them

And so he said: ...

The Flemish shouted: We do not know you.

The count called out in French:

I am the count of Artois.

They（the Flemish）said: Here is no nobleman

Who can understand you.

2.Oman, from whom I have also taken the terrain conditions, gives on p.570 a very clear and tactically correct presentation, but I cannot accept it, since the sources on which we must depend seem to me very unreliable. The principal source is a heroic poem by Archdeacon John Barbour of Aberdeen, The Bruce, or the Book of Robert de Broyss, King of Scots, written between 1375 and 1377，and consequently not until almost two generations after the battle. There is another poem written sooner after the event but not offering much information. The author was the Carmelite monk Baston, who accompanied King Edward in order to celebrate his deeds but who, when he became a prisoner of the Scottish king after the defeat, was then obliged to celebrate the battle on that king's behalf.（Lappenberg-Pauli, Geschichte von England，4：243）. The English sources, Geoffroy Baker of Swinbroke（died between 1358 and 1360）and the Chronicle of Lanercost, of which this part was probably the work of a Franciscan monk of Carlisle, contain only meager information.

3.The reason why the French knights in the center dismounted is not given directly in any source, but we may interpret the words used by the Monk of Saint Denis as we have done. He says: “The horses themselves were removed from the view of the combatants, so that each one, losing any hope of escaping the danger by fleeing, would show more courage.”

4.We can conclude from the sequence of the battle itself that this was the sense of the French formation. That this epoch was capable of such a tactical idea is shown in the report on the battle of Othée（1408），by Monstrelet, where the questionable maneuver is described with exact clarity: “When that other dismounted company, much larger ... intends to invade your land and fight you, those on horseback, experienced in battle and in good order, will move up quickly and attempt from the rear to separate you and break up your formation, while the others are assaulting you from the front.”

5.There are available quite exhaustive writings on this subject: Mojean, City Military Arrangements in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries（Städtische Kriegseinrichtungen im XIV.und XV. Jahrhundert），Program of the Gymnasium of Stralsund，1876. Von der Nahmer, The Military Organizations of the German Cities in the Second Half of the Fourteenth Century（Die Wehrverfassungen der deutschen Städte in der 2. Hälfte des 14. Jahrhunderts），Marburg dissertation，1888. Mendheim, The Mercenary System of the Free Cities, especially Nuremberg（Das reichsstädtische, besonders Nürnberger, Söldnerwesen），Leipzig dissertation，1889. Baltzer, From the History of the Danzig Military System（Aus der Geschichte des Danziger Kriegswesens），Program of the Danzig Gymnasium，1893.G. Liebe, The Military System of the City of Erfurt（Das Kriegswesen der Stadt Erfurt），1896.P. Sander, The Municipal Economy of Nuremberg（Die reichsstädtische Haushaltung Nürnbergs），1902，in which the second section of Part II treats the military organization in detail.

6.Froissart, Tome IV, p.270：“... that he no longer wished to wage war with men other than nobles and that it was a complete loss and a hindrance to lead into battle the men from the communities, for in the hand-to-hand combat those men melt like snow in the sun. This had happened at the battle of Crécy, at Blanquetagne, at Caen, and in every place where these men had been led. And so he did not want to have any more of them except the crossbowmen from the fortified cities and the good towns. As to their gold and their silver, he wanted much of both to pay the expenses and the compensation of the nobles, but that was all. The common men had only to stay at home to protect their wives and children, carry on their business and their trade, and that should be sufficient for them. It was up to the nobles alone to practice the profession of arms that they had learned and in which they had been trained since childhood.”（Extracted from Luce’s citation in Bertran du Guesclin，1：156）.

“What do we want with help from these shopkeepers?”Jean de Beaumont reportedly said in 1415，when the city of Paris offered reinforcements. Religieux de St. Denys, Book 35，Chap.5.

And Monstrelet writes in his chronicle: “The masses of the communes, even though they may be very numerous, can hardly offer resistance against a number of nobles accustomed to battle and proven in the profession of arms.”

7.Michelet, Histoire de France，3：299.

8.Guillaume, History of the Military Organization Under the Dukes of Burgundy（Histoire de lorganisation militaire sous les dues de Bourgogne），Mém.cour.de l’Académie Beige，22（1848）：94.

3　下马骑士与射手

1.The standard monograph on the battle of Crécy is the Berlin dissertation by Richard Czeppan, published by Georg Nauck in 1906. The other accounts by Rüstow, Jähns, Pauli, Köhler, and Oman vary remarkably from one another, depending on the extent to which they follow one source or another. But Czeppan may well have definitively clarified and decided all the significant questions. Several convincing observations on the effect of the bow and arrow are to be found in Köhler, Vol.III, foreword, p.xxxvi. Forerunners of the battle of Crécy are discussed by Tout, English Historical Review，19（1904）：711.

2.In a review of the book by Wrottesley, Crécy and Calais, which contains the source passages in question（English Historical Review，14 [1899]：767），Morris calls attention to the fact that the 32，000 men had been together only a very short time when King Philip threatened the English with his relief battle. Morris estimates that at Crécy Edward had 4，000 mounted men（knights and soldiers）and 10，000 archers.

3.“Ut sui videntes eum peditem, non relinquerent, sed cum eo tam equites quam pedites ad bellum animarentur.”（“So that his own men, seeing him on foot, might not desert, but horsemen as well as the foot soldiers might be inspired with him for battle.”）Gislebert, SS.，21. 519.

4.In the Hussite war, the foot soldiers once refused to attack, saying: “If we are hard pressed, you ride away, while all of us have to stay.”The knights had to dismount and fight on foot. According to Johann von Guben, p.64，cited by Wulf in The Hussite Wagon Barricade（Die hussitische Wagenburg），p.37.

5.See above, p.411，the formation of the English under Richard the Lion-Hearted at Jaffa in 1192.

6.Comines says concerning the battle of Montl'héry（ed.de Mandrot，1：31）:“The most important thing in the world for battles is the archers, but let them number in the thousands, for they are worth nothing in small numbers, and let them be men with poor mounts, so that they will have no regrets in losing their horses, or let them have no mounts at all.”

7.Both these battles are discussed excellently by Oman, History of the Art of War, p.581 ff. Dupplin is described on the basis of a study by Morris, English Historical Review，1897.Halidon Hill is thoroughly described in Tytler, History of Scotland，2：32 and 454，on the basis of a presumably ancient manuscript, whose credibility, however, is not proven.

8.Berlin dissertation，1908.

9.Berlin dissertation，1907.

10.The Englishman Walsingham believes the French had 140，000 men.

11.That is specifically attested to by Saint Rémy, who was present at the battle.

12.That is the opinion of Luce, for example, in Bertrand du Guesclin, I：147.

13.In the engagement at Termonde，1452. Olivier de la Marche, I Chap.25.

14.Monstrelet, II, Chap.108.

15.Luce, Bertrand du Guesclin et son époque, p.169. The knights vowed “that they would never flee in battle more than 4 arpents by their estimate, but they would rather die or have themselves taken prisoner.”

16.A certain survey of the decisive battles is provided by M.de la Chauvelays in Dismounted Combat of the Cavalry in the Middle Ages（Le combat à pied de la cavallerie au moyen-âge），Paris，1885. To be sure, the author is very uncritical, and the individual facts are in no way reliable.M.T. Lachauvelay, Guerres des Francais et des Anglais du Xlième au XVième siècle，1875，seems to be the same author, despite the different spelling of the name.

17.For example, Thwrocz, chronica Hungarorum（Chronicles of the Hungarians），reports erroneously that the French knights at Nikopol in 1396 attacked on foot.

4　奥斯曼土耳其

1.For a while it was even believed that the Mongols had to be credited for an outstanding role in the history of the art of war, particularly since there exist theoretical concepts that supposedly stem from Tamer lane. But in the final analysis their accomplishments were no different from those of other nomads, and Tamerlane’s principles were without real content. For a summary of these points and applicable references, see Jähns, Handbuch, p.698 ff. The battle of Liegnitz，1242，in view of the legendary nature of the source, gives us nothing new, as far as I can see, on the history of the art of war.

2.P.A. von Tischendorf, The Feudal System in the Moslem Nations, especially in the Ottoman Empire. With the Book of Laws of the Fiefs under Sultan Ahmed I（Das Lehnswesen in den moslimischen Staaten insbesondere im osmanischen Reiche. Mit dent Gesetzbuch der Lehen unter Sultan Ahmed I.），Leipzig，1872.

3.Heinrich Schurtz，“The Janissaries”（“Die Janitscharen”），Preussische Jahrbücher, Vol.112（1903）. Leopold von Schlözer, Origin and Development of the Ancient Turkish Army（Ursprung und Entwickelung des alttürkischen Heeres），1900. Ranke, The Ottomans and the Spanish Monarchy（Die Osmanen und die spanische Monarchie），Werke, Vol.35.

4.The Segban were supposedly formed from the sultan's hunting retinue. The report that this body was 7，000 men strong was, of course, a great exaggeration. And with this point there also collapses the idea that an oda numbered more than 200 men and the resulting ideas concerning the file and the tent group. Schurtz, p.459. Under Selim I，1512-1520，the janissaries are supposed to have been only 3，000 men strong, but in 1550 they were supposedly 16，000. Schurtz, p.454. In that case, the “3，000” would no doubt refer only to the original 66 oda. On p.459，Schurtz states that under Mohammed II the janissaries numbered 12，000.

5.The standard special study is the Berlin dissertation “The Battle of Nikopol”（“Die Schlacht bei Nikopolis”），by Gustav Kling. Published by Georg Nauck，1906.

6.Kling estimates the Turkish strength between 16，000 and 20，000 men. That would then be more than twice the strength of the Christians. Based on the numbers given by Schurtz, discussed in Note 4，above, he assumes a strength of only 3，000 men for the janissaries but believes that dismounted irregulars were also present, for whom the janissaries had formed the nucleus. I would prefer to eliminate completely these “dismounted irregulars”—Beyazid would hardly have brought along any troops other than quality warriors—but I would assume a greater strength for the janissaries.

7.Characteristic of the loose manner in which chroniclers treated army strengths is the fact that Königshofen gave the strength of the Christian army as 100，000 men but stated its losses as 200，000.

5　胡斯派

1.Handbuch, p.943.

2.Geschichte Böhmens（History of Bohemia），3：2：67.

3.“The Hussite Wagon Fort”（“Die hussitische Wagenburg”）by Max von Wulf, Berlin dissertation，1889.“Hussite Military System”（“Hussitisches Kriegswesen”），by Max von Wulf, Preussische Jahrbücher，69：673. May 1892.

4.Preussische Jahrbücher，69：674. Dissertation, p.21.

5.See Vol.I, pp.162，211，218，241.

6.Jähns, Kriegswissenschaften, p.943.

7.Loserth, p.489.

8.Palacky, Geschichte Böhmens，3：2：361.

9.That the Hussites had already won a great victory over the Germans on 14 June 1420 at the Witkoberg（Ziska Mountain），east of Prague, is but a fable. See Bezold, King Sigismund and the Wars of the Empire against the Hussites（König Sigmund und die Reichskriege gegen die Hussiten），1：41 ff. Loserth, History of the Later Middle Ages（Geschichte des späteren Mittelalters），p.490. This battle may very well be compared with the engagement at Valmy in 1792. They only repulsed an attack by the enemy. But that very success was sufficient and aroused belief in the future. Likewise the victory at Wischerad on 1 November 1420 does not yet show anything of the special Hussite combat methods. Since the German princes had returned home, Sigismund had only his own forces at hand, consisting principally of Moravians. He planned to relieve Wischerad, near Prague, and was definitely counting on a sortie by the garrison. But since the garrison had already agreed to an armistice, it could not act. We may therefore assume that the army of Prague, with its reinforcements from lords and other cities, had a large numerical superiority. Only a small mounted contingent of the Taborites was present.

10.The Mitteilungen des Vereins für Geschichte der Deutschen in Böhmen，31（1893）: 297，contains the description of the illustration of a Hussite battlewagon in a Munich manuscript by A. Wiedemann. Despite the very definite caption “This is the Hussite wagon fort on which the Hussites fight. It is good and straight，” the illustration does not seem to me to be very reliable.

The regulation that the wagons were to move in four columns and the two outer columns were somewhat longer than the inner ones, in order to form the forward and rear sides of the camp with the additional wagons, is, after all, only theory, or it refers only to the last formation before the deployment. Entire marches in the prescribed four columns could be carried out in only a very few places on this earth. See Wulf, pp.27，29.he two inner columns formed a small rectangle in the interior, with entry passages.

According to Wulf's dissertation, p. 43，in Hungary in 1423 Ziska made a bastion in front of the forward and rear gates of his wagon fort, surrounded them with a trench, and placed muskets in them.

11.Historia Bohemorum, Chap.40，as cited in Wulf, Dissertation, p.16.

12.Wulf, Dissertation, p.43；according to Köhler，3：1：303 ff.

13.As an example of how far an oral legend that is correct in itself can lead astray an author who no longer understands it, let us observe what Ludwig von Eyb has to say about the formation on a ridge. Eyb was a Brandenburg captain and wrote his Kriegsbuch around 1500. In the chapter on the wagon forts, he, too, points out the requirement that they were to deploy on a ridge, but as the reason for this he says that it was to prevent the possibility of their being placed under water.

14.Wulf, Dissertation, p.53.

15.Wulf, Preussische Jahrbücher, p.680.

16.A tabulation by von Wulf of the army strengths shown in the sources is to be found in the Mitteilungen des Vereins für die Geschichte der Deutschen in Böhmen，31：92. Prague，1893.

17.We owe this knowledge to an excellent treatment by Ernst Kroker，“Saxony and the Hussite Wars”（“Sachsen und die Hussitenkriege”），in the Neues Archiv für sächsische Geschichte，21（1900）：1. The following citations are also taken from this article and the book by Fr.von Bezold, König Sigmund und die Reichskriege gegen die Hussiten（1872-1877）.

18.Acts of the German Imperial Diet（Deutsche Reichstagsakten），VIII, No.93.

19.Palacky, Geschichte von Böhmen，3：2：250.

20.Deutsche Reichstagsakten, VIII, No.94.

21.Deutsche Reichstagsakten, VIII, No.390.

22.Bezold，2：78.

23.Riedel, Codex Diplomaticus Brandenburgensis（Documentary Codex of Brandenburg），4：1：210.

24.Bezold，2：110.

25.It is interesting to see from the discussions how confused they were on the decisive numerical relationships. It was proposed that the tenth man, the twentieth, and the thirtieth should be taken, but the men from Ulm thought that even if only one man in 100 was outfitted, that would still result in a large army. In 1428，however, they had planned to outfit every fourth man. Erben，“The Levy of Albrecht V against the Hussites”（“Der Aufgebot Albrechts V.gegen die Hussiten”），Mitteilungen des Oesterreichischen Instituts，23：264.

26.Bezold，3：144，assumes a strength of 100，000 men for this army，but without sufficient basis. Kroker did not discuss this campaign.

27.According to Bezold，2：153.

28.Sello, Zeitschrift für Preussische Geschichte，19（1882）：614，“The Incursions of the Hussites into the March Brandenburg”（“Die Einfälle der Hussiten in die Mark Brandenburg”）.An excellent article, which is also worth reading for all those who would like to know to what extent a patriotic attitude can lead to the exaggeration of historical events.

29.The actual course of the battle may have run about this way. Wulf, Dissertation, p.55 ff. Köhler, Kriegswesen，3：3：394.

6　意大利雇佣兵、敕令军团和免税射手

1.On the German knights in Italy, H. Niese has published a study with original documents in the “Sources and Studies from Italian Archives”（“Quellen und Forschungen aus italienischen Archiven”），published by the Historisches Institut，8（1905）：217.

2.R.Bott，“The Campaigns of the Anglo-French Mercenary Companies to Alsace and Switzerland”（“Die Kriegszüge der englischfranzösischen Soldkompagnien nach dem Elsass und der Schweiz”），alle dissertation，1891.

Luce, Histoire de Bertrand du Guesclin et de son époque, Paris，1876.

3.This reform in its entire context has been treated in an exemplary way by G. Roloff in an article “The French Army under Charles VII”（“Das französische Heer unter Karl VII.”），Historische Zeitschrift，93.427. Of the more recent French writings on which this study is based, especially valuable is E. Cosneau, Le Connétable de Richemont（Artur de Bretagne），Paris，1886.

4.Boutaric, p.214. The levées générales under Philip IV were nothing but “a pretext to establish taxes.”Likewise Luce, Bertrand du Guesclin, p.155，concerning the levies under Philip VI.

5.When William of Tyre speaks of centuriones and quinquagenarii as early as the battle of Dorylaeum in the First Crusade, that has no other significance than when Widukind speaks of legiones at the battle on the Lechfeld. Barbarossa, of course, sought on his Crusade to organize his army on a regular numerical basis.

6.According to the treaty of alliance of 1252，the pay was to be handed out to the milites by the capitanei. Muratori, Antiquitates Italicae Medii Aevi（Italian Antiquities of the Middle Ages），6.491.

7.Rosenhagen，“History of the Imperial Army Move into Italy from Henry VI to Rudolf”（“Geschichte der Reichsheerfahrt von Heinrich VI.bis Rudolph”），Leipzig dissertation，1885，p.65.

8.Morris, The Welsh Wars.

9.Archiv.storico Ital.，15.53-According to Köhler，3：2：167.

10.La Curne, Dictionnaire de I'ancien langage français.

11.As early as in the lex Salica, title 66，para.2，the word is used twice referring to the fraternity of warriors. This singular case, however, no doubt lies outside the history of language development. In the Latin sources and chronicles of the Valois period, the word is still translated by “societas” or “Comitiva.”Du Cange. Bott, p.4.

A proclamation by King John of 30 April 1351（cited by Guilhiermoz, Origine de la noblesse, p. 251，from Ordonnances des Rois de France，4.69）reads as follows:

With respect to whatever gens d'armes come in small groups, without master or chief, we desire and order that a worthy knight be sought out and selected by our constable, marshals, masters of crossbowmen, or others to whom he may belong, who is approved by them, to whom a unit of twenty-five or thirty such men at arms will be given and assigned ... and we desire that this knight who shall have such a company will have a pennon with his coat of arms and will receive the same pay as a banneret.

Froissart, ed. Kervyn de Lettenh.，7.80：“At this time the companies were so large in France that one did not know what to do with them.”

12.Köhler，3：2：116，118，considers that the basis for the formation of the gleves in 1364 was the fact that it was precisely at that time that the knights started the custom of fighting on foot.Consequently, he is surprised that the gleves were also adopted in Germany（1365），since the knights only seldom fought on foot there. His surprise is out of place, since there was no relationship at all between the dismounting of the knights and the formation of the gleves.

In 3：2：173，Köhler states that there were lances of two horses, three horses, four，five, six, eight, and ten horses.

Würdinger, Miliary History of Bavaria（Kriegsgeschichte von Bayern），1：102，states: “The number of men forming a gleve varied. In Swabia there were four horses（Jäger, Ulm，1：418），in Nuremberg two horses to one spear（Ulman Stromer，45），in Strasbourg five horses to one gleve（Schaab，2：277），in Ratisbon one spear and one marksman with three saddle horses（reg.boica，10.303）. It might almost seem that the spear first got the meaning of” lance “or gleve as a result of its combination with one marksman.”Other examples are to be found in Arnold, Constitutional History of the German Free Cities（Verfassungsgeschichte der deutschen freistädte），2：239. Vischer, Studies in German History（Forschungen zur deutschen Geschichte），2：77. Fischer, note, p.385. Köhler，3：2：117，173.

When the chronicles report, as, for example, Königshofen on Döffingen, that an army had 800 gleves and 2，000 foot soldiers, that gives the impression that the 800 gleves are nothing more than 800 heavy horsemen. But then we also find cases of counting by “helmets” and that there were three horsemen to each “helmet.”Chr. F. Stälin, Württembergische Geschichte，3：321.

In 1381 the cities formed a league army of 1，400 spears and 500 foot soldiers. For this force Augsburg provided forty-eight hastatos（spearmen），thirty sagittarios equites（mounted archers），and 300 pedites armatos（armed foot soldiers）. Würdinger，1：93. See also pp.96 and 98 of the same work.

Fischer states in Participation of the Free Cities in the Imperial Army March to Italy（Teilnahme der Reichsstädte an der Reichsheerfahrt），p.30，that in 1310 at the imperial diet in Speyer a roster was drawn up showing how many gleves each free city was to provide for the march to Rome, each gleve having three horses, that is, three horsemen. This would therefore indicate that the concept and name of the gleve already existed in Germany in 1310 . Nevertheless, this conclusion is subject to question, since the numbers are from a much later period, and the decision of 1310 may have been worded differently.

Morris, The Welsh Wars, p. 80，claims that in England the combining of the various combat arms into units was first seen at the siege of Dunbar in 1337. Previously, to include the reign of Edward I, the various combat arms appeared as separate units.

Cosneau, p. 358，note, states that the English had three marksmen in each lance. He gives an example in which two men-at-arms and two marksmen formed all together a group of nine men and nine horses.

13.Cosneau, p.357. The ordinance of Luppé-le-Chastel of 26 May 1445 is reproduced on p.610. This shows the lance as consisting of one knight, one coutillier, one page, two marksmen, one serving man, and six horses.

14.We find used very often the formula “‘ban et arrière-ban’（‘vassals and subvassals’）were levied.”

According to Guilhiermoz, p. 294，the “arrière-ban” in France was originally the same thing as the Landwehr（militia）in Germany, that is, the general levy of all men capable of bearing arms. He says that the feudal service was later limited to the “arrière-ban” and the “arrière-ban” was limited to men holding fiefs.

Boutaric, p. 140 f.，reports in detail on the conditions that were issued on the levy under Louis IX and were specified in numerous “coutumes”（customs）. They limited the rights of the lord to an extreme degree. He was allowed to levy his men only for defense, or only in the region governed by the lord, or only so far as to allow the man to return home on the same evening.

Luce, Bertrand du Guesclin, p. 159，recounts that, according to an unpublished ordinance, on 17 May 1355 King John called up “the ban et I'arrière-ban, that is to say, all physically qualified men between the ages of eighteen and sixty.” That can hardly have been the intention of the ordinance, and Luce himself believes that the French communes did not obey this order. When Luce adds that Edward III in England really gave the arrière-ban “a truly practical character” by having all his subjects carry out weapons training, that is also an error.

15.In addition to the references already cited, see Spont，“La Milice des francs-archers，”Revue des questions historiques, Vol.61.

16.Boutaric, Institutions militaires de la France, p.218. Jähns, Handbuch, p.759. According to Juvénal des Ursins and the Monk of Saint Denis. The latter author states that the people carried out the drills with great zeal.

17.The military system of Charles the Bold is treated excellently by M. Guillaume，“Histoire de l'organisation militaire sous les dues de Bourgogne，” in the Mémoires couronnés et mémoires des savants étrangers publiés par l’Académie de Belgique, Vol.22，Brussels，1848. Much valuable material is also to be found in La Chauvelays, La Composition des armées de Charles le Téméraire，1879. In the Mémoires de I’Académie de Dijon, Tome VI.（also published in Paris as a separate edition）. I have discussed it myself in my Perser-und Burgunderkriege.

18.In 1340 the count of Armagnac had only 300 fully equipped men-at-arms in a force of 800（Grande chronique de St. Denys，5：393，ed. Paulin）.

In 1429 the noblemen who reinforced Charles VII“did not have the means of arming themselves or providing themselves with mounts.”（Chronique de la Pucelle, Panthéon littéraire, p.442）.

In 1467 Charles the Bold selected, from the vassals who had been levied, those who had full equipment; they numbered 400 of the total group of 1，400. But it happened that the nobles took their pay and rode back home（according to Guillaume, p.89）.

19.Lachauvelays, p.170，estimates that the two Burgundies provided Charles the Bold with thirty-two companies of soudoyers à gages ménagers.

The thirty-two companies numbered 899 men-at-arms with three horses each（that is，899 pages and 899 valets），541 gens de trait à cheval（mounted marksmen），178 coutilliers à cheval（light horsemen），and 177 demi-lances.（A demi-lance is an individual knight who receives the samepay as two marksmen.）

The totals were therefore as follows:

20.A regulation for Hainaut appeared in 1470 and, according to Guillaume, p.113，stated the following: A fief-holder with more than 360 pounds of annual income had to provide one man-at-arms with a coutillier, a page, and six dismounted archers. A fief-holder with 240 pounds of income was to provide one man-at-arms. A fief-holder with 120 pounds was to provide three men on foot（dismounted archers, crossbowmen, or spearmen）. The smaller and larger groups were combined in accordance with the corresponding mission. Fiefs under 64 sous had no obligation. Anyone who could not serve personally was to provide an appropriate substitute, and if he could not do so, the commanders took over that responsibility for him. Every four months the items of equipment were to be inspected.

A similar regulation appeared in 1475 for Flanders.

Let us note that a certain progression upward occurred, that the smallest fief-holders were completely free, and that possessions of quite a significant extent called for providing one man on foot or even on horseback, and that the men in service were paid. Let us compare with this situation the concept that in the Carolingian Empire ownership of a few hides was burdened with providing one man at his own expense.

According to Lachauvelays, p. 258，the largest number of fiefs had an income of less than 50 francs, often only 10 francs.

The wording of the levy that Charles'governor for Burgundy issued on 3 May 1471 is very remarkable: “All types of men, both nobles and others, regardless of their class or profession, who are accustomed to bearing and using arms, whether or not they have fiefs and whether or not they have provided somebody for the present army”（quoted in Lachauvelays, p.187）. We might use this regulation as a paraphrase of the “cuncta generalitas populi”（“the whole mass of the people”）in the capitulary of Charlemagne（p.42，above）or the “universi”（“all”）in the levy of 817（p.36，above）.

21.This is specified in this way by the regulation of 31 July 1471. Olivier de la Marche, who commanded a company himself, states in his memoirs that the lance was composed of two archers, two men armed with the culverin, and two spearmen（according to Guillaume, p.121）.

7　坦嫩贝格会战、蒙莱里会战及同时期的其他若干战斗

1.While the special study by Karl Heveker，“The Battle of Tannenberg”（“Die Schlacht bei Tannenberg”），Berlin dissertation，1906，published by Georg Nauck, has greatly advanced the understanding of the battle and has eliminated many false ideas, it still leaves important points in the dark. If I attempt to arrive at a clear picture from it, I must add that a number of points in my account are based only on supposition. Among more recent works, I cite an article by S. Kujot in Die altpreussische Monatsschrift, Vol.48，Issue No.1，and Krollmann, Oberländische Geschichtsblätter, Issue No.13，1911. Also worthy of note is the study “The Knights’Grave of Tannenberg”（“Das Rittergrab von Tannenberg”），by E.Schnippel in the Oberländische Geschichtsblätter, Issue No.11，1909.

2.The valuable description of the terrain is to be found in Köhler, Warfare of the Knightly Period（Kriegswesen der Ritterzeit），2：717.

3.Kujot and Krollmann arrived at other conclusions on a number of points. Nevertheless, I have in general stood by my earlier account.

4.There is probably injected into this description an account of French knights from the battle of Nikopol, which took place fourteen years earlier. There were no Hungarians at Tannenberg.

第五篇　瑞士人

1　瑞士地方共同体的形成

1.That is the opinion of Oechsli, in The Beginnings of the Swiss Confederation（Die Anfänge der Schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft），p.121.

2.Oechsli, p.230. Durrer, The Unity of Unterwalden（Die Einheit Unterwaldens）Jahrbücher fur Schweizerische Geschichte，1910，p.96，confirms Oechsli’s assumption.

3.In 1252 the abbot of Saint Gall took them into his service in a feud with the bishop of Constance. Oechsli, p.229.

4.One of the captured monks composed a very interesting culturalhistorical poem in Latin on this subject. An old German translation of this poem with explanatory remarks has been edited by Leo Wirth, A Prelude to the Battle on the Morgarten（Ein Vorspiel der Morgartenschlacht），Aarau，1909.114 pages.

2　莫尔加滕会战

1.A.Nüscheler, in “The Letzinen in Switzerland”（“Die Letzinen in der Schweiz”），Mitteilungen der antiquarischen Gesellschaft in Zurich, Vol.18，Issue No.1，Zurich，1872.With respect to Näfels, see Dändliker, Geschichte der Schweiz，1：531，note.

2.This is expressly reported by Vitoduran.

3.Morgarten is the mountain east of the lake. Schorno is 1，100 meters south of the lake, and Sattel is somewhat farther south, where the road from Schorno meets the road from Altmatt.

4.One might ask why the Schwyzers later（1322）extended the letzi near Schorno, since its absence had, after all, done them the good service in 1315 of attracting the duke onto the dangerous route. The answer may be that they could in no case count on surprising the enemy a second time at the same place and therefore preferred to protect the land here also.

5.The fact that Vitoduran gives a strength of 20，000 men is, of course, meaningless.

6.Werner Stauffacher had led the Schwyzers in January 1314 in the raid on Einsiedeln and appears again in sources after the battle at the head of his country. Oechsli, p.352.

7.As we have already seen above, Oechsli estimates the population of Schwyz at that time at some 18，000. Even if it should have been a few thousand smaller, we must still assume that in the most extreme danger even the last available man was called up. We surely cannot go below a figure of 3，000. In addition, there were also the men of Arth, those of Uri, and perhaps also men of Unterwalden. But we must make a small deduction for the garrison of the letzi of Arth and perhaps also of Brunnen, to defend against an attack by water.

The numerical superiority of the confederates in the actual battle was even greater because part of the Hapsburg troops, for example, the Winterthur contingent, were still on the way.

8.In later accounts, the advance guard is designated as the “banished ones”（“Verbannten”），and this has given rise to the most varied interpretations. Nevertheless, this is simply a question of a misunderstood word. The misunderstanding is clarified by H. Herzog in the Schweizerische Monatshefte für Offiziere aller Waffen，1906.

9.All available accounts have been printed one after the other by Thomas von Liebenau in the Mitteilungen des historischen Vereins des Kantons Schwyz, Issue No.3，1884.

Of value in this analysis are the notes Dändliker added in the fourth edition of his Geschichte der Schweiz, after he changed his earlier account in favor of the Bürkli concept（p.700）.

Bürkli followed up his first work, The Creation of the Swiss Confederation and the Battle on the Morgarten（Die Entstehung der Schweizer Eidgenossenschaft und die Schlacht am Morgarten），1891，with a second treatment under the title “A Monument on the Morgarten”（“Ein Denkmal am Morgarten”），in the Zuger Neujahrsblatt für das Jahr 1895（published by W.Anderwert）. This article is also accompanied by a good special map.

3　劳彭会战

1.It is an unproven supposition that Austria stood behind the alliance against Bern. If the House of Hapsburg had really wanted to defeat Bern at that time, it would have acted very foolishly by keeping itself in reserve instead of immediately sending so many forces to join the allies that the victory would be assured. I mention this only so that it will not be concluded possibly from the presumed secret alliance of Austria with the enemies of Bern, that the forest cantons, too, because they were also enemies of Austria, would have had an interest in the war.

In 1383 Uri and Unterwalden received 4，445 pounds from Bern for military assistance given in the Kyburg war.

The letter of alliance of 1353 provided that the men of the forest cantons, when called by the Bernese for help, would move over the Brünig Pass to Unterseeen（Interlaken）without pay, but from there on they would receive one groschen Tournois for each man daily. Von Elgger, Military System and Military Skill of the Swiss Confederation in the Fourteenth, Fifteenth, and Sixteenth Centuries（Kriegswesen und Kriegskunst der schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft im 14.，15.und 16. Jahrhundert），Lucerne，1873，p.40.

Also, when the peasants of Appenzell, who certainly did not have much, called on the Schwyzers for help against their abbot（1403），they had to pay them. Dierauer, Geschichte der Schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft，1：400，Note 2.

2.Köhler, Ritterzeit，2：605.

3.All the more so in that it is confirmed by the Chronica de Berno, a short contemporary account. Edited by Studer as a supplement to Justinger, p.300.

4.Studer has also quite correctly pointed out in the Archiv des historischen Vereins Bern, Vol.IV，（1858-1860），Issue No.3，that, according to the contemporary report, Fribourg was the real enemy of Bern. Not until a later time, in keeping with the then existing animosities, was the war branded as a conflict against the nobility.

The bishop of Lausanne, too, had troops at Laupen as an ally of Fribourg, as is proven in the sources. Studer, p.27.

5.Rüstow, Geschichte der Infanterie，1：152，believes that the Bernese did not have any missile weapons. That is extremely improbable, in fact impossible. In any event, it is not to be concluded from the fact that they do not happen to be mentioned in the accounts of this battle.

6.Solothurn had provided eighteen helmets, and the baron of Weissenburg fought on the side of the Bernese. In the battle of Hutwil（1340）there is mention of a mounted banner of Bernese that moved out in front of the main banner with the skirmishers. Justinger, pp.97，99. Later, the Bernese mounted troops enjoyed a particularly high respect. Elgger, p.302.

7.Justinger, p.99.

4　森巴赫会战

1.The Swiss must have learned several days in advance that the duke's attack was imminent, for otherwise they could not have had their army on hand right on the day of his departure. The reinforcements from the original cantons, who were at Zurich, marched off from there on 7 July at the latest, as is to be concluded from a decision of the council of 7 July.Eidgenössische Abschrifte，1.72.

2.“Nam cum utraque pars in campo ante civitatem sito convenisset pars Bernensium stetit contra hostes conglobata in modum corone et compressa, cuspitibus suis pretensis. Quam dum de adversa parte nemo aggredi presumeret ... quidam cordatus miles ... in eos efferatus fuisset et in corum lanceas receptus, in frusta discerptus et concisus lamentabiliter periit.”（“Now when each side had assembled in the field lying in front of the city, the Bernese stood massed against the enemy in a circle and in close order, with the tips of their spears extended before them. When no one from the enemy side dared to attack them ... a courageous soldier ... was infuriated with them and penetrated up to their spears; lamentably, he died in vain, torn apart and cut to pieces.”）

3.Bürkli, p.90. Lorenz, Germany’s Historical Sources（Deutschlands Geschichtsquellen），p.46. Stössel, p.47.

4.Oechsli in the Allgemeine Deutsche Biographie，44.446.

5　多芬根会战

1.The sources are, of course, quite meager, and our principal source, Königshofen, is fable-like and unreliable. Christian Friedrich Stälin, Württembergische Geschichte，3：334.Paul Friedrich Stälin, Geschichte Württembergs，1：569. G.von der Au, Zur Kritik Königshofen, Tübingen，1881. The Annales Stuttgartenses, copied in the Württembergisches Jahrbuch，1849，contains nothing of importance.

2.According to Königshofen，800 gleves and 2，000 foot soldiers; according to the Constance Chronicle，700 lances on horseback and 1，100 on foot.

3.According to Königshofen（Städtische Chronik，9.839），550 gleves and 2，000 peasants; according to the Constance Chronicle，600 lances and 6，000 men on foot; according to Ulman Stromer，1，100 lances and some 6，000 foot soldiers; according to Justinger，800 lances and 2，000 mercenaries.

4.Augsburg Chronicle，1.87（see also 2.40）.

5.Rupp, in the “Battle of Döffingen”（“Die Schlacht bei Döffingen”），Vorschungen zur deutschen Geschichte，14：551，feels obliged to consider as correct the account of the treachery of von Henneberg, and he sees that as the reason for the defeat. Nevertheless, his reasons have not convinced me. Von der Au also rejects Rupp’s arguments.

6.Königshofen says: “and the first attack of the battle was won over the lords”；now the fresh gleves arrived—“then the attack was successful against the cities, so that they were defeated.”

6　瑞士联邦的军事组织

1.Em.von Rodt, History of the Bernese Military System（Geschichte des Bernerischen Kriegswesens），1831.

J. J.Blumer, Political and Legal History of the Swiss Democracies（Staatsund Rechtsgeschichte der schweizerischen Demokratien），1848.

K. von Elgger, Military System and Military Art of the Swiss Confederation in the Fourteenth, Fifteenth, and Sixteenth Centuries（Kriegswesen und Kriegskunst der schweizerischen Eidgenossen im 14.，15.，und 16. Jahrhundert），1873.

Johann Häne, On the Defensive and Military Systems in the High Period of the Ancient Confederation（Zum Wehr-und Kriegswesen in der Blütezeit der alten Eidgenossenschaft），Zurich, Schulthess and Co.，1900.

Hermann Escher，“The Swiss Infantry in the Fifteenth Century and at the Beginning of the Sixteenth Century”（“Das schweizerische Fussvolk im 15. und im Anfang des 16. Jahrhunderts”），Part I. Neujahrsblatt der Züricher Feuerwerksgesellschaft，1905.

2.Blumerj 1：373.

3.For example, in 1444 Bern demanded that Thun send fifty upright, capable soldiers, whose oath and honor could be trusted, without ...，who bring along spear and armor. This according to Elgger, p.118，as taken from the Schweizer Geschichtsforscher，6：354. I prefer to read “rations”（Speise）instead of “spears”（Spiesse）.

In 1389 the Entlebuchers promised that in case Lucerne had to take to the field, they would come to its aid with 600 armed men. Elgger, Kriegswesen, p.38. In noticeable contradiction is the report that in 1513 Lucerne on one occasion had to provide 1，300 men, including 150 from Entlebuch，300 from Willisau, and only 100 from Lucerne itself. Elgger, p.68.

Quite often there were quarrels over these allocations; for example, in 1448 the small community of Krattigen complained that, of the seven men to be provided by the region, it was to furnish two, since, after all, the community did not have more than twenty or twenty-one farms. For that reason, in 1499 and 1512 a census of all households was ordered. We cannot help wondering that this was not done until then, when we remember at what an early period Ancient Rome had similar statistics. Rodt, p.27.

4.According to Häne, p.23.

5.Häne, p.24.

6.Rodt，1：6.

7.Minutes of the Council of Bern，22 June 1476：

To Fribourg, Solothurn, and Biel, that, with respect to the proper conduct of the war, they allow goods for sale in the way of wine, grain, and other goods and necessities to go to the army.

The same applies to Nidau and Aarberg.

To my lords in the field, that they see to it that there be no kind of forceful haggling with those who provide you with goods for sale, and that they receive their just payment.

The decisive action is called for quickly，“for my lords cannot provide supplies for such an army over a long period.”

Ochsenbein, Documents on the Battle of Murten（Urkunden zur Schlacht von Murten），p. 301.

8.Escher, p.26，states that in the Zurich archives there is an explanation of the formation of the battle unit, indicating that it was fifty-six men wide and twenty men deep.Consequently, that would be a phalanx rather than a wedge. In a later period, where a unit formed a true square in space rather than a rectangle with an equal number of men in its width and depth, these approximate figures were to be found quite often. But at the time of the old Zurich war, the period to which Escher attributes his explanation, I can hardly imagine that it was applied from a practical viewpoint.

9.Häne, p.8，concludes from the military games of boys and other indications that maneuvers had actually taken place. I am not convinced of this. In particular, the fact that a knight once threatened that he would teach the soldiers（lansquenets）in such a way that one of them would be worth more than two men of the Confederation is no proof that he had Swiss drills in mind.

10.Elgger, p.253.

11.Paulus Jovius, in 1494.

12.The passages have been assembled by Studer in the Archiv des Historischen Vereins Bern, IV, Book 4，p.36.

13.Sempach letter of 1394. Blumer, p.374. Kriegsordnung of 1468 and 1490. Rodt, Berner Kriegswesen，1：250，253. Elgger, p.215.

14.Rodt, Campaigns of Charles the Bold（Feldzüge Karls des Kühnen），1：331.

15.According to the extract in Häne, p.29.

16.According to Thüring Frickhart’s Twingherrenstreit, edited by Studer, Quellen zur Schweizer Geschichte，1（1877）：137.

17.Studer, Quellen zur Schweizer Geschichte，1（1877）：145.

18.W.F.von Mülinen, History of the Swiss Mercenaries up to the Formation of the First Permanent Guard in 1497（Geschichte der Schweizer Sóldner bis zur Errichtung der ersten stehenden Garde，1497），Bern，1887.

19.Collection Petitot，10：245.

20.“Et jam Palatini cessurus equitatus fuerat, nisi prodeuntes a latebris pedites longis hastis Badensium equos confodere cepissent.”（“And the Palatine cavalry had already been about to yield, if the foot soldiers advancing from their hideouts had not undertaken to strike the horses of the Badensians with their long spears.”）Gobellinus, cited by Roder in Die Schlacht bei Seckenheim, Billingen，1877. The principal source is a poetic work by Michael Beheim.

7　勃艮第战争

1.To be sure, the Swiss, too, suffered defeats a few times, when they moved out of their mountains, as, for example, the Appenzellers in 1405 at Altstetten, and in 1408 at Bregenz, and the troops of Uri in 1422 at Arbedo. But those were not very important engagements.“Ueber Arbedo，” by Fr. Knorreck, Berlin dissertation，1910.

2.Dändliker, Geschichte der Schweiz, p.609.

3.Nicolaus Rüsch, the city scribe of Basel, even states that the Burgundians were 10，000 strong on horseback and 8，000 on foot. Busier Chroniken, Vol.Ill, p.304，1887.

4.Rodt，1：304.

5.According to the note in Tobler's Schilling，1：163，the Solothurners reported to their home town in 1635.

6.Basler Chroniken，3：305.

7.Witte, Zeitschrift fur Geschichte des Oberrheins，45：394.

8.Vol.I, p.326.Dierauer，1：197，also accepts the number 70.

9.Witte, Zeitschrift für Geschichte des Oberrheins，49（1895）：217.

10.F.de Gingins-la-Sarra, Dispatches from the Milanese Ambassadors on the Campaigns of Charles the Bold, from 1474 to 1477（Dépêches des ambassadeurs Milanais sur les campagnes de Charles le Hardi, de 1474 à 1477），Paris，1858.

11.Olivier de la Marche, who, as a confidant of the duke, was able to know his intentions, states in his memoirs（which, unfortunately, are very brief with respect to this war）that Vaumarcus was occupied as a lure in order to entice the troops of the Confederation to move forward. This reason is not very clear, since on the far side of the narrow pass the duke would never be able to find a battlefield as favorable as the one offered him by his fortified position at Grandson. In any case he could keep his army assembled and wait for a few weeks more easily than the Swiss. This point serves as factual confirmation of the impatience and underestimation of the enemy, outstanding characteristics attributed to the duke by many sources.

12.Principally the Baselers, whose strength is given as sixty men. But since the leader of the Austrian knights, Hermann von Eptingen, was also present（Meitinger's letter, cited by Knebel），at least a part of these Austrians must also have been present.

13.This point is stressed by the Burgundian court historian, Molinet.

14.Reported in Saint Gall's Part in the Burgundian Wars（St. Gallens Anteil an den Burgunderkriegen），published by the Historischer Verein in St. Galien, Saint Gall，1876.

15.In the minutes of the meeting of 15 May（Eidgenössische Abschrifte，2：593）there is stated only “and fifty men dead.”The same minutes, however, state that 1，500 or 1，600 slain Burgundians were found, and that the duke had 60，000 actual mounted men and still more of the other troops. Consequently, it is not very trustworthy. The men of Schwyz had seventy wounded and seven killed（Knebel states that they lost eighty men all together）. On the basis of the accounts for the care of the wounded, the total of wounded can be assumed to be about 700，and the figure for those killed may then be something between fifty and seventy.

Bernoulli, Baseler Neujahrsblatt，1899，p. 23，and Feldmann, Schlacht bei Granson, p.56，assume the losses to be only fifty dead and between 300 and 400 wounded.

16.Dändliker, in his Geschichte der Schweiz，2：224，explains the failure to exploit the victory at Grandson as completely due to the lack of military understanding on the part of the Confederation. He writes: “In their joy over the uplifting success at Grandson, the men of the Confederation were initially no longer concerned about Duke Charles. They considered their mission as accomplished. When Bern, which was not inclined to such a carefree and self-deceptive attitude and took the situation seriously, wanted to continue the war, the majority of the Confederation decided for the return home.”Such experienced warriors as the troops of Zurich, with their burgomaster Waldmann, and the other members of the Confederation are not supposed to have been capable of understanding the situation when Bern explained to them that they could best protect themselves against a renewed attack by a pursuit of the defeated army? We see here to what point a false basic concept finally leads. Dändliker is not willing to concede that the Swiss were the aggressors in this war, but he would like to explain the war as a kind of emergency defense, because the Swiss felt themselves threatened by the duke of Burgundy. If it were not absolutely clear from the original sources, then the conduct of the Swiss after the victory of Grandson would show how extremely far from the minds of the Swiss was the thought of feeling threatened by the Burgundian force.

17.My estimate of the strength of the Burgundians at Murten（20，000 men at most）has, of course, been disputed widely by the Swiss, but nothing tangible has been brought up to oppose my viewpoint. Dierauer, p.211，would like to go up to a number between 23，000 and 25，000 men, but only on the basis of reported reinforcements in the last days before the battle, reinforcements that have not been proven. In my estimate, the only correction to be made is the note in Perser-und Burgunderkriege, p.153，where, according to the latest critical edition of Comines by Mandrot，1：363，the number “18，000” means, after all，“18，000 dead，” that is, all together, whereas, according to him, of those “prenant gages”—that is, warriors—8，000 are supposed to have fallen.

18.Panigarola，10 June. Gingins，2：242.

19.Panigarola，13 June. Gingins，2：258. Panigarola's statements that Charles had his camp fortified are confirmed and clarified by the illustrations in Schilling's Chronik（one of which is reproduced in Ochsenbein's Urkundenbuch and in the treatment by Colonel Meister）and by the battle song by Zoller（printed in Ochsenbein, p.494）. There it reads as follows:

He inclosed his army all around

As he desired, from lake to higher ground.

A stream he dammed to make it swell.

The work continued night and day，

And soon Count Romont's camp completed lay.

Great trees he caused his men to fell.

Who has ever seen works so fine

Accomplished in but two weeks'time?

20.Panigarola，12 June，13 June.

21.On 16 June the duke had the following report written to the municipal council of Dijon:

Last night we were awake and on foot with the intention of marching with our whole army out toward our enemies, who are at a distance from us of two short leagues and who, as had been reported to us, had joined forces and assembled in order to move closer to us and fight, and we await them from hour to hour.

（Ochsenbein, p. 280）.

Wattelet, p. 29 ff.and notes 88 and 89，relates that to an idea of moving out against the Swiss. But it is apparent that only the idea of accepting battle on the Grünhag is meant. Wattelet has inadvertently interpreted the same report twice, on the sixteenth and the nineteenth. And his interpretation in Note 85，of Panigarola’s report of the eighteenth, to the effect that Charles intended to attack the Swiss near Gümmenen on the nineteenth, I consider to be incorrect. The words “dar la bataglia”（to give battle）refer to a planned attack on Murten, as Gingins has already interpreted it in his translation.

22.A number of scholars, especially Wattelet（see below），have disputed the fact that the Swiss formed the usual three units of foot soldiers at Murten. Schilling's positive statement on the point, however, cannot possibly be invalidated by the fact that a few sources speak only of two units, and least of all because Panigarola saw only two units or because only two units are mentioned in Schilling's later account of the battle. The third unit did not enter the fight itself but simply stormed into the camp on the heels of the other two, and there the formations broke up. Even if we did not have Schilling's testimony, it would be completely incomprehensible that the Swiss should have abandoned the normal formation in three units precisely here, with such a large army. They could not know in advance whether the entire Burgundian army was not in position at the palisade and whether there would develop a flanking counterattack from one side or another, defending against which would then have been the mission of the rear guard.

23.Herter's command position is definitely proven by the two mutually independent statements of Knebel and Etterlin. Schilling's silence on this point, as it occurred, may not be considered as counterproof. Of itself, it is not particularly important, since the top commander in such an army was not necessarily the general charged with the mission and the responsibility of strategic direction. In this case, the entire war council was the final authority; Herter had only to take care of the technical execution. This situation needs to be noted only because of the analogy to the mutual relationships of the Greek cantons in the Persian wars: in both cases, the great work succeeds only through constant surmounting of the strongest internal tensions, the reflection of which can also be detected throughout the sources.

Along with Dändliker，3d ed.，p.842，1，too, prefer to accept as certain that Waldmann was the leader of the main body.

24.Report of 8 July. Gingins，2：345.

25.Edlibach, p.157.

26.Baseler Chroniken，3：26.

27.Schilling wrote that, after the Grünhag was taken，“and all the formations were broken from that moment on.”The editors believe that this statement is unlikely，“or is it supposed to be the same maneuver that is indicated in the Lurlebatlied（one of the songs composed about this battle and recorded by Schilling）as’the point which spread out’”?Such is no doubt the case, except that it is not a question of a “maneuver，” but of the natural breaking up of a closed formation in the course of and following such an assault.

28.The reports in the Jahrzeitbuch von Schwyz in the Anzeiger für Schweizerische Geschichte，1895，p.160，are probably worthless.

29.In Ochsenbein, Urkunden, pp.339，341.

30.Two special studies have been devoted to the battle of Nancy: one by Robert Schoeber（Erlangen dissertation，1891）and one by Max Laux（Rostock dissertation，1895，Süssenguth Press, Berlin）. Laux’s work has a useful plan of the battle, a comprehensive basis in the sources, and corrects a number of the errors of his predecessors, but it is not without its own errors and oversights.

31.Laux, p.20，estimates Charles's strength at the end of July as 4，000 to 5，000 men, which he believes was not increased by significant reinforcements. Consequently, he believes that, for the battle, the scouting report that was made to the Confederation to the effect that the duke had only a small column, some 6，000 men, is the figure closest to the truth. But there were probably more than that; for when Laux bases his estimate on the fact that Panigarola reports nothing about reinforcements, it can be said in rebuttal that Panigarola had already left the duke when they marched into Lorraine, and his last report was dated 19 October. From then until January, the duke could have drawn many reinforcements from the Netherlands. Schoeber estimates a strength between 7，000 and 8，000，but without any real computation.

The sources with a Burgundian bias go as low as 2，000 or even 1，200（Rodt，2：392）. Rodt has assumed 14，000，of whom 4，000 guarded the camp against a possible sortie from Nancy, while 10，000 participated in the battle. But his estimate is based on statements by the duke himself, which can be proven to have been intentionally exaggerated. See Laux, p.20.Mémoires de Comines, ed. Mandrot，1：386.

Let us mention here Olivier de la Marche as an example of how little credence can be given to the figures of authors, even those who appear to have had the most reliable information at their disposal. He was majordomo of the duke of Burgundy and was taken prisoner at Nancy by the duke of Lorraine, buying his freedom for a high ransom. He was thus able to learn of the situation on both sides. His memoirs are printed in the Collection Petitot, Vols.IX and X. He states: “a good 12，000 combatants”（instead of almost 20，000），“and the duke of Burgundy went before them; and I swear that he did not have 2，000 combatants”（instead of 8，000 to 10，000）.

32.According to Comines's account（cited by Mandrot, p.386），he was, of course, supposedly directly informed of René’s great numerical superiority, but such later accounts have but little credibility.

33.Dispatches of the Milanese Ambassadors（Déþêches des ambassadeurs Milanais），ed.by Gingins，2：349.

34.von Rodt, Wars of Charles the Bold（Kriege Karls des Kühnen），2：315.

35.There is nothing of importance in the small variations in the interpretation of this passage. See Schoeber, p.33，note; Jähns, Manual of Military History（Handbuch der Geschichte des Kriegswesens），p.1009-See also pp.511 and 514，above.

36.The passage reads verbatim:

intendendo di questi 2 m（2000）lanze mettere mille a piedi quando si trovara con Svicerj, li quali habiano 14（10?）combatenti per uno, cive tri archieri, tri fanti con lanze longhe e tri schiopeteri e balestrieri, che venirano ad essere 10 m（10，000）combatenti in uno squadrone, poiche Sviceri li fanno cosi grossi. Li altri mille lanze a cavallo, con loro cinque millia archieri a cavallo, e lo resto, dil campo, in modo dice havera circa 30 m（30，000）combatenti.

Gingins La Sarra，2：361.

（intending, when he encountered the Swiss, to put on foot 1，000 of these 2，000 lances, each of which would have 14（10?）combatants, that is, three archers, three infantrymen with long lances and three musketeers and crossbowmen, which will amount to 10，000 combatants in a squadron, since the Swiss make them that large. The other 1，000 lances on horseback, with their 5，000 mounted archers, and the rest from the camp so that there will be about 30，000 combatants.）

37.In the “true declaration”（“vraye déclaration”），Comines, Lenglet，3：492，it is said that the rear guard consisted only of 8，000 musketeers, who marched along “one cannonball-ball range” behind the main body, to protect it from the rear. I cannot visualize this. What was such a large number of marksmen supposed to do behind the close-combat weapons during the march through the forest? They could not have repelled a real attack from this direction, in case such an attack was somehow to be suspected. The Lorraine Chronicle（Lothringer Chronik），p.293，speaks of a unit, but one apparently consisting of only 100 men, which was to skirmish along the meadows and keep the enemy occupied. Those 800[8，000]marksmen would have been so very appropriately employed there that we are perhaps justified in assuming an oversight or a lacuna in the “vraye déclaration.”

8　中世纪军事理论

1.On the theoretical aspect of this question, see the article “On the Importance of Discoveries in History”（“Ueber die Bedeutung der Erfindungen in der Geschichte”）in my Historische und politische Aufsätze（1887）.

2.Edited by Dümmler in the Zeitschrift fur Deutsches Altertum，15（1872）：433.

3.This part is also reprinted in Hahn, Collectio monumentorum, Vol.I, Braunschweig，1724.

4.Alwin Schultz, Courtly Life at the Time of the Minnesingers（Höfisches Leben zur Zeit der Minnesänger），2：160，believes on the basis of this statement that drill exercises took place in the Middle Ages. How that is supposed to have been possible seems unclear to the author himself, of course（p.162），since the peasants were forbidden to bear arms.

5.These regulations are copied in the original Spanish text and translated in Köhler，3：2：230. Some translation errors have been corrected by H. Escher, Neujahrsblatt der Züricher Feuerwerker-Gesellschaft auf das Jahr 1905，p.44.

6.Geschichte der Kriegswissenschaften，1：212.

7.“Life and Works of Christine de Pisan”（“Leben und Werke der Christine de Pizan”），by Friedrich Koch. Leipzig dissertation，1885. Ludwig Koch Press, Goslar.

8.Printed under the title L'art de chevalerie selon Végèce，1488.

9.Jähns passed over this in his Geschichte der Kriegswissenschaften. It was edited by C. Favre and L. Lecestre，2 volumes, Paris，1887，1889.

10.Le Jouvencel, Book I, Chap.17，Vol.II，63:“A combat unit on foot should not march at all but is always to await its enemies in place. For when they march, they are not all of the same strength and they cannot hold their formation. It takes no more than a bush to break them up.”

11.Geschichte der Kriegswissenschaften，1：248.

12.Published by Köhler in the Anzeiger für die Kunde der deutschen Vorzeit，1870.

13.Cited in Jähns，1：323.

9　结语

1.M.G.SS.，18.192.H. Escher, The Swiss Foot Troops（Das schw-eizerische Fussvolk），p.19，also states（without citing a source）that in 1202 a distinction was made in Italy between “lanceae longae”（“long spears”）and “lanceae de milite”（“soldiers'spears”），and that in 1327 the burghers of Turin were ordered to carry “spears of 18 feet.”Köhler，3：1：50，states that the knight’s lance was originally no longer than 10 feet, and that in the fourteenth century it was lengthened to 14 feet and became so heavy that a man on foot could no longer manipulate it（3：1：85）.

2.Bürkli believes that this is the meaning of the expression “Stangharnisch.”G. Escher, p.44，note to p.19，disputes this point, but he concedes that no other explanation of the word “Stangharnisch” has yet been found. Of course, Bürkli is in error when he says that by this word “Stange” we must necessarily understand the later, long spear. Escher, Feuerwerksblatt，102（1907）: 34，arrives at the solution that any kind of weapon with a staff, both the spear and the halberd, is meant to accompany the harness.

3.Report of the Milanese Ambassador Panigarola of 16 January 1476. Gingins, Dépêches Milanaises，1：266.“There is no doubt that, in keeping with their custom, they will offer battle; at the first penetration they will necessarily be broken, because every little defeat throws them off; from the start they will definitely be disheartened and lost.”

4.Volume I, p.145. Thucydides，6.68.

[1]莱茵河发源于瑞士，向北经过德国西部和荷兰注入北海。施瓦本和巴伐利亚在德国南部、莱茵河以东。斯海尔德河发源于法国，流经比利时，从荷兰南部入海。黑森位于德国中部偏西，东南与巴伐利亚接壤。美因河是莱茵河右岸的支流，流经巴伐利亚北部和黑森，沿岸主要城市有法兰克福与美因茨。

[2]萨克森人是日耳曼人的一部分，后来主要分为两部分：一部分移居不列颠岛，即中文语境中的“撒克逊人”；另一部分留在今天德国东部，即中文语境中的“萨克森人”。

[3]法兰克王国的奠基人，在位时间为481-509年。

[4]海得是古代日耳曼人的一种土地单位，意义是一户人家一年能耕种的土地。

[5]英格兰国王，在位时间为1327-1377年，延续英法百年战争并取得了克雷西会战（1346）、普瓦捷会战（1356）等重大胜利，但晚年开始失利。

[6]法兰克国王，查理曼之子，在位时间为814-840年。他去世后3年，3个儿子就以《凡尔登条约》瓜分了查理曼帝国。

[7]西斯拉夫人的一支，生活在波兰和德国交界处。

[8]巴伐利亚在今德国南部，阿基坦在法国西南部，直线距离在1000千米以上，从巴伐利亚的慕尼黑开车去阿基坦的波尔多要12个小时以上；阿勒曼尼人、东法兰克人都生活在德国；萨克森人、图林根人、弗里西亚人、利普里安人生活在荷兰、德国北部和中部；阿瓦尔人是古代欧亚大陆的一支少数民族，在今匈牙利和乌克兰一带建立汗国；勃艮第人生活在法国东部，波希米亚在今天的捷克；布列塔尼位于法国的西北角；伦巴底在意大利北部，帕德博恩在德国北部；奥尔良在巴黎附近，从伦巴底和巴伐利亚去都要跨过半个法国加半个德国。

[9]位于法国中部偏北的一座城市。

[10]19世纪德国历史学家，著有《墨洛温王朝与加洛林王朝时期王室城堡研究》（Die Koenigspfalzen Der Merowinger Und Karolinger）。

[11]德国中世纪历史学者（1848-1916）。

[12]德国东部城市，位于易北河畔，奥托一世的王宫所在地。

[13]位于法国东北边境地区，今称蒂永维尔（Thionville）。

[14]全名卡尔·舒赫哈特（1859-1943），德国考古学家，担任柏林人种志博物馆史前研究部主任，参与过欧洲和中东的许多发掘活动。

[15]西欧地区名，北起丹麦西南海岸，南至荷兰北部。

[16]“German”这个英文词同时对应汉语中的“日耳曼”和“德意志”，这里是译文中第一次出现“德意志”的用法。因为这里指的是加洛林帝国分裂后形成，后来演变为德国的东部王国，不同于先前作为包括法兰克人在内的众多古代民族泛称的日耳曼人。

[17]法兰克尼亚又称弗兰肯，德国中部偏东的历史区域，大体相当于今天的巴伐利亚州北部、图林根南部。

[18]又称巴巴罗萨，即德语“红胡子”的音译。

[19]意大利东南部区域，与意大利北部的帕维亚距离约为700千米。

[20]埃尔（ell）是中世纪的布匹长度单位。

[21]德国南部城市，与马格德堡的距离约为500千米。

[22]柯尼希格雷茨会战是1866年普奥战争中的一次重要战斗。尽管普鲁士大获全胜，但奥方的匈牙利裔将军贝内德克取得了相当不错的战绩。

[23]两条河都位于德国南部和奥地利境内。

[24]11世纪德意志地区编年史家。

[25]萨克森的一部分，位于今德国与捷克交界处。18世纪之后以瓷器工厂闻名。

[26]在位时间为871-899年。

[27]英格兰历史学家（1075-1142），记述了11世纪至12世纪诺曼征服时期的历史。

[28]布永伯爵戈德弗雷参加了第一次十字军东征，并成为耶路撒冷王国的首位国王。

[29]森拉克是一座山丘的名字，黑斯廷斯会战中哈罗德的布阵地点。

[30]诗体编年史，作者为瓦斯（Wace），成书于1175年前后，讲述了从罗洛公爵至1106年英格兰国王亨利一世入侵诺曼底，并被罗贝尔·科索斯公爵击败的坦什布赖会战（battle of Tinchebray）为止的历史。

[31]英格兰著名历史学家（约1095-1143），以博学著称。

[32]英格兰伍斯特修道院僧侣和编年史作者，死于1118年。

[33]土地面积单位。

[34]他们上阵时可以打着自己的旗帜，也就是“方旗”；更低级的骑士则只能在别人旗下作战。

[35]本章中提到的希腊帝国即拜占庭帝国。

[36]11世纪本笃会修士、历史学家，曾游历南意大利和西西里岛，记述了诺曼人在意大利的经历。

[37]11世纪后期希腊史学家，记载了从811年尼基弗鲁斯一世去世至1057年米海尔六世被废黜之间的拜占庭帝王史。

[38]西方历史名城，遗址位于土耳其南部与叙利亚交界处。公元前4世纪由亚历山大部将塞琉古建立，以纪念其父亲安提柯，之后先后由罗马帝国、波斯帝国和阿拉伯帝国统治，1098年被十字军攻占，建立安条克公国。

[39]率领尼德兰人反抗西班牙哈布斯堡王朝统治，尼德兰共和国首任执政（1559-1584），如今依然被荷兰人称为国父。

[40]全名为雷蒙德·蒙泰库克利（1609-1680），军事将领，出生于意大利，为哈布斯堡王朝服役。他为线列步兵战术的发展做出了重大贡献。

[41]全名为小尼基弗鲁斯·布林尼乌斯（1062-1137），拜占庭将领、政治家、历史学家。

[42]皇帝阿莱克修斯一世的女儿（1083-1153），她写的《阿莱克修斯传》是重要的拜占庭帝国史料。

[43]阿布·伯克尔是穆罕默德的岳父，也是穆罕默德去世后的首任哈里发（632-634年在位）。

[44]786-809年在位，开创了阿拔斯王朝的鼎盛时代，同时是王朝由盛转衰的起点。

[45]此处将“nobility”译为“大人”，一是为了体现古日耳曼的渊源，二是为了显示它与权势巨大的“aristocracy”（中文通常也译为“贵族”）的区分。但是，由于“nobility”在中文语境中的通行译法是“贵族”，因此在不涉及上面两个目的，且不会与其他相近概念混淆时，本书仍然会采用通行译法。

[46]13世纪的奥地利诗人，著有15本短篇诗集。

[47]意大利北部城镇，1155年腓特烈率军围攻此城。

[48]中世纪德意志骑士和诗人（1170-1220），著名的作品是《帕西瓦尔》。

[49]德意志诸侯（1129-1195），先后为萨克森公爵和巴伐利亚公爵，与红胡子相争但落败。

[50]中世纪德意志地区的著名抒情诗人（约1170-1230）。

[51]13世纪意大利历史学家，著有《西西里王国编年史》10卷。

[52]出身法国安茹家族，1266年于贝内文托会战中击败神圣罗马帝国皇帝，夺取那不勒斯与西西里王位。

[53]第三次十字军东征中的一次战斗，英格兰国王理查一世在今巴勒斯坦的阿苏夫击败了埃及苏丹萨拉丁。

[54]法国国王腓力二世在此战中击败了英国国王“无地王”约翰，后者损失惨重，次年即不得不接受《大宪章》。

[55]中世纪意大利教皇党与皇帝党之间的一场战斗，皇帝取得了胜利。

[56]全名为古斯塔夫·科勒（Gustav Köhler，1818-1896），1886年以少将军衔从普鲁士陆军退役后撰写了多部军事学和军事史研究，包括三卷本《骑士时代的军制与军事：从11世纪中期到胡斯战争》（Die Entwickelung des Kriegswesens und der Kriegführung in der Ritterzeit von Mitte des 11.Jahrhunderts bis zu den Hussitenkriegen）等。

[57]耶路撒冷国王鲍德温二世在此战中打败穆斯林军队，挽救了不久前遭受重创的安条克公国。

[58]瓦林根位于科隆以北。

[59]此战发生于1268年，支持教皇的西西里和那不勒斯国王安茹的查理一举击杀霍亨斯陶芬王朝末代国王康拉丁。

[60]此战发生于1278年，哈布斯堡王朝的德意志国王鲁道夫一世击败波希米亚国王，标志着哈布斯堡势力在中欧的崛起。

[61]鲁道夫一世战死后，他的儿子阿尔伯特本应继承王位，但众选帝侯不满其独眼相貌和粗鄙举止，遂另择一人为王，结果在1298年的格尔海姆会战中被阿尔伯特击败，只得承认王位属于阿尔伯特。

[62]此战中瑞士联邦凭借长枪兵打败并击杀了奥地利公爵利奥波德三世。

[63]来自法国纳博讷，参加十字军东征后在叙利亚当上了巴拉主教（bishop of Albara）。

[64]12世纪的德意志教士和编年史家，1138年起担任弗赖辛主教，故名。

[65]亨利时任巴伐利亚公爵，“亚索米尔格特”是他的绰号，意义不详，一种流行的说法是源于中世纪高地德语的誓词“joch sam mir got helfe”，意为“是的，所以请神帮帮我吧”。

[66]第一次十字军东征期间（1099年），来自法国南部的大诸侯雷蒙率军围困耶路撒冷并迫使其投降，但他急于巩固的黎波里的领地，于是率军北返。然而，他不愿意放弃城西的大卫堡，就将其交给了另一支部队守卫，最后被布永的戈弗雷花大力气才拿下。

[67]全名欧仁·埃玛纽埃尔·维奥莱-勒-杜克（1814-1879），法国建筑师与建筑理论家，主要成就是修复了巴黎圣母院等多座中世纪建筑。此处引言出自他的《理性的法国家装辞典：加洛林时代至文艺复兴》（Dictionnaire raisonné du mobilier françois de l’époque carlovingienne à la renaissance）。

[68]公元1世纪的犹太历史学家，曾随罗马军队征讨平定叛乱，并见证了70年提图斯皇帝摧毁耶路撒冷城。

[69]在位时间为1039-1056年。

[70]亨利三世的长子，在位时间为1056-1105年。

[71]阿拉贡位于今西班牙东北部，纳瓦拉位于西班牙西北部，巴斯克位于西班牙北部与法国接壤的山区。

[72]普瓦捷位于法国中部偏西。

[73]阿尔萨斯今属法国东部边境。黑森林位于德国西南部边境阿尔萨斯以南。

[74]蒂罗尔、施泰尔马克、卡林西亚都在今奥地利境内。波希米亚是今捷克的一部分。克鲁什内山又称厄尔士山，位于今德国与捷克的边界上。哈尔茨山区位于德国中部。

[75]萨尔茨堡在今天的奥地利境内；锡本布尔根是德语中对特兰西瓦尼亚的称呼，位于今罗马尼亚中西部地区。

[76]又名圣日耳曼的阿波（Abbo of Saint-Germain），法国本笃会（接下页）（接上页）修士，曾亲眼看见维京人围攻巴黎，并将见闻记于《巴黎城战火录》（De bellis Parisiacae urbis）。

[77]《卢西达留斯》是一部创作于12世纪末的德语普及读本，以基督教知识为主。《小卢西达留斯》则是一系列讽刺诗集，作者是前面提到过的赛弗里德·黑尔布林。

[78]帕西瓦尔是骑士加姆雷的遗腹子，出生时父亲远征东方，被绝口不提骑士之道的母亲带大。

[79]出生于约1090年，死于1165年。

[80]斯勒伊斯位于今荷兰西南部。

[81]德意志本笃会修士、学者（1013-1054）。

[82]利穆赞位于法国中部，首府是利摩日。

[83]阿德马尔是艾马尔（Aimar）的德语拼法，此处指的是利摩日伯爵艾马尔五世。

[84]沙朗通是法国中部城市。奥弗涅是法国中部偏南的一个地区，位于沙朗通以南。

[85]萨利安王朝是亨利一世建立的萨克森王朝的后继者，始于1024年，终于1125年，最著名的国王是在雪地中向教宗祈求宽恕的亨利四世。霍亨斯陶芬王朝始于1138年，终于1254年，最著名的国王是红胡子腓特烈一世。查理曼在位时间是768年至814年，800年加冕为皇帝。

[86]伦巴第人是一个日耳曼部落，自565年开始统治意大利，直到774年被查理曼击溃。

[87]查士丁尼再征服运动期间于拉文纳设立总督区，统管帝国在意大利的领地。

[88]通常来说，德意志国王要到罗马由教宗加冕后才能成为皇帝。

[89]中世纪意大利亲教宗的一派，与亲皇帝的吉伯林派（Ghibellines）对立。

[90]意大利古城，位于罗马城东南约25千米处。安科纳城位于罗马城东北方向，与图斯库鲁姆距离约280千米。

[91]德国本笃会编年史作者，出生于12世纪中期，死于1223年。

[92]全名为赫尔曼·罗伊特（Hermann Reuter，1817-1889），德国教会史学家。

[93]全名为费迪南德·格雷戈罗维乌斯（Ferdinand Gregorovius，1821-1891），德国历史学家。

[94]帕尔马河将城区分为两部分。帕尔马盛产美食，尤以火腿和奶酪著称。

[95]意为“胜利”，与英语中的victory同源。

[96]波河横贯意大利北部，位于帕尔马以北，最近处不过20千米左右。

[97]瓜斯塔拉位于帕尔马东北约30千米处。

[98]恩齐奥（约1218-1272），腓特烈二世的私生子，1238年被封为撒丁国王，1249年被俘囚禁致死。

[99]1018年至1045年担任米兰大主教。

[100]维拉尼全名乔瓦尼·维拉尼（1276或1280-1348），佛罗伦萨银行家、外交家和市政官，著有《新佛罗伦萨编年史》。劳默尔全名弗里德里希·路德维希·格奥尔格·冯·劳默尔（1781-1873），德国历史学家和专业历史科普先驱。席尔马赫尔全名弗里德里希·威廉·席尔马赫尔（1824-1904），德国历史学家，著有《腓特烈二世皇帝》。德尔佩什全名亨利·德尔佩什（1832-1887），法国历史学家。比松，19世纪法国历史学家，曾参与编辑《勒芒历代主教行纪》。汉佩全名卡尔·汉佩（1869-1936），德国历史学家，主攻中世纪和神圣罗马帝国史。奥曼全名查尔斯·奥曼（1860-1946），英国军事史学家，著有《中世纪战争艺术》等。

[101]全名恩斯特·奥古斯特·罗洛夫（1886-1955），德国历史学家。

[102]安茹的查理（1226-1285）是法国国王路易八世的儿子，后来成为两西西里王国的国王。

[103]普鲁士骑兵将领（1789-1858），曾担任战争部长。

[104]全名威廉·克里斯托弗·弗里德里希·阿诺德（1826-1883），德国法学家、历史学家和政治家。

[105]本笃会修士（1211-1214年去世），1177年起成为吕贝克圣约翰修道院的首任院长，故名。

[106]科隆市政府书记员（1230-1299），著有《韵体编年史》（Reimchronik）。

[107]全名为莱昂纳德·恩嫩（Leonhard Ennen，1820-1880），神学家，历史学家，编有6卷《科隆市历史资料集》（Quellen zur Geschichte der Stadt Köln）。

[108]又称杜伊斯堡的彼得，去世于1326年后，条顿骑士团成员，编年史作者。

[109]此处说的普鲁士主要位于今天波兰的东北部。利沃尼亚在今拉脱维亚东部和爱沙尼亚，库尔兰在今拉脱维亚西部。

[110]即法国国王腓力二世，1180年至1223年在位，1191年至1199年间与英格兰国王理查交战。

[111]全名西梅翁·吕斯（1833-1892），法国历史学家，曾任法国历史学会会长。

[112]法国神职人员，历史学家（1388-1473），著有《法王路易六世传》（Hi-stoire de Charles VI, Roy de France）。

[113]全名为詹姆斯·道格拉斯·德拉蒙德，该观点出自他在柏林大学（接下页）（接上页）的博士论文《12世纪英格兰军事史研究》。

[114]凯尔特人的一支，生活在爱尔兰和苏格兰。

[115]指阿吉莱拉的雷蒙德（Raimund of Aguiler），曾参与第一次十字军东征并留下了相关记载。

[116]指安条克国王博埃蒙一世（Boemund I of Antioch），本为诺曼佣兵，后来参与十字军东征成为国王。

[117]埃米尔是伊斯兰世界的一种领主和将领的头衔。

[118]全名海因里希·冯·济贝尔（Heinrich von Sybel，1817-1895），德国历史学家，曾任普鲁士档案馆馆长。

[119]全名伯恩哈德·冯·库格勒（Bernhard von Kugler，1837-1898），德国历史学家，以十字军研究著名。

[120]指耶路撒冷国王鲍德温一世（1100-1118年在位）。

[121]英格兰神职人员，1193年去世。

[122]阿尔比派又称清洁派、卡特里派，是中世纪法国南部的一个得到当地诸侯支持的教派。1209-1229年，以法国贵族为首的十字军在教廷号召下攻打阿尔比派，最终将其消灭。

[123]又名布列塔尼人威廉（William the Breton，约1165—约1225），法国诗人、编年史作者，著有《法王腓力行传》（Gesta Philippi H.regis Francorum）。

[124]全名为约翰·霍尔臣斯基（1722-1799），出身索布人的德意志教师和历史学家。

[125]德国佣兵头领、编年史作者（约1365-1438），为吕贝克城撰写了《新编年史》（Chronica novella）。

[126]全名为彼得·兰贝克（1628-1680），出生于汉堡的德国历史学家。

[127]全名保罗·哈塞，19世纪德国历史学家，该文发表于1877年。

[128]即腓力四世（1285-1314年在位），对外四处用兵，1305年强迫合并弗兰德斯，1309年迫使教廷迁到法国境内的阿维尼翁。

[129]“Leliaert”是法语“Fleur-de-lis”的转写，意为鸢尾花，是法国王室的标志。

[130]黑尔斯勋爵本名戴维·达尔林普尔（1726-1792），苏格兰法官，历史学家，著有两卷本《苏格兰年鉴》（Annals of Scotland）。林加德全名约翰·林加德（1771-1851），英格兰天主教神父，历史学家，著有8卷本《英格兰史：从罗马首次入侵至亨利八世继位》（The History of England, From the First Invasion by the Romans to the Accession of Henry VIII）。保利全名赖因霍尔德·保利（1823-1882），德国历史学家，研究方向为英国史，著有《英格兰史：从亨利二世继位至亨利七世去世》（History of England from the Accession of Henry II to the Death of Henry VII）。

[131]此处的“耙子”指的不是九齿钉耙那样只有一排齿的农具，而是由多排齿组成的。

[132]全名为托马斯·沃尔辛厄姆（Thomas Walsingham，约1422年去世），英格兰编年史作者。

[133]法国古代长度单位。

[134]“突厥”和“土耳其”在英语里都是“Turks”，采用“塞尔柱突厥”和“奥斯曼土耳其”的译法只是顺应中文语境习惯。

[135]源自使徒保罗的十字架信仰，认为十字架代表着人的救赎，所有人都要会合在十字架的真理之下。

[136]位于多瑙河上游，现在是罗马尼亚和塞尔维亚边界的一部分。

[137]即今天的土耳其首都安卡拉。

[138]通译为杰士卡，但与实际读音相差太大。胡斯战争起义军领袖，激进的塔博尔派将领，1360年出生于破落骑士家庭，1419年起兵后多次击败前来围剿的帝国军队，1424年在军中死于瘟疫。

[139]塔博尔派军事将领，1434年战死。

[140]捷克历史学家和政治家（1798-1876），捷克民族复兴运动中影响力最大的人物。

[141]全名约瑟夫·阿施巴赫（1801-1882），德国历史学家。

[142]全名赫尔曼·迈纳特，德国历史学家。

[143]凯尔特人的一支，恺撒入侵时生活在不列颠岛上。

[144]和合本中译为“他泊山”，是希伯来士师底波拉击败迦南大将军的地方。

[145]圣杯派是相对于塔博尔派的温和派。

[146]这份条约标志着百年战争第一阶段的结束，英格兰在欧洲大陆的影响力随之达到巅峰。

[147]出生于1220年之前，去世于1282年，著有《韵体编年史》（Chronique rimée）。

[148]即后来并入法国的弗朗什孔泰（Franche-Comté）地区，自由伯爵领为其意译。

[149]全名为卡尔·海威克，博士论文《坦嫩贝格会战》（“Die Schlacht bei Tan-nenberg”）于1906年在柏林大学通过。

[150]波兰外交官、历史学家（1415-1480），著有《波兰史》（Annales seu cronici incliti regni Poloniae）一书。

[151]全名昂盖朗·德·蒙斯特勒莱（Enguerrand de Monstrelet，约1400-1453），法国编年史作者。

[152]法国诸侯反对法国国王的联盟，成立于1465年，领袖为大胆查理。下一句中的“国王之弟”指的是前文提到过的贝里公爵。

[153]即大胆查理，他在两年后的1467年才成为勃艮第公爵。

[154]1803年，帝国议会通过决议，大部分自由市被周边领主吞并。

[155]原文为hour，相当于league（里格），本意就是1个小时的路程，因此各地标准各有不同。

[156]法国空想社会主义者（1808-1893），1855年前往得克萨斯州建立“联合村”，著有阐发傅立叶学说的《社会命运》。

[157]位于施维茨东南方向。

[158]Halm在德语中是“棍棒”的意思，barte是“斧子”的意思。

[159]15世纪至17世纪的德意志佣兵，主要用于国外作战。

[160]全名为维利巴尔德·皮克海默（Willibald Pickheimer），生于1470年，死于1530年，文艺复兴时期的德意志人文学者，是伊拉斯谟的密友，肖像曾出现于魏玛共和国时期的1000亿马克钞票上。

[161]上施瓦本公国相当于巴登-符腾堡州和巴伐利亚州一部，下施瓦本公国在其北部。

[162]全名为雅各布·柯尼希斯霍芬（1346-1420），德意志编年史作家，创作了最早的德语散文体通史之一。

[163]1757年，原本在围攻布拉格的普鲁士国王腓特烈二世得知奥地利元帅利奥波德·冯·道恩（Leopold von Daun）逼近，前往科林迎战并大破之。

[164]即滑铁卢会战。好友宾馆（La Belle Alliance）是布鲁塞尔南边几千米的一家旅舍，普鲁士元帅布吕歇尔和英军统帅威灵顿公爵在此地会师，于是德方以此地命名会战。

[165]荷兰历史学家（1535-1602），著有5卷本勃艮第史。

[166]14世纪的一位乌里州农夫，因不服奥地利总督欺压而被囚禁，人民于是揭竿而起并击败了前来镇压的奥地利军队。1829年，意大利作曲家罗西尼以他为主人公的歌剧，其中的《威廉·特尔序曲》（又称《威廉退尔序曲》）非常有名。

[167]选译自第一篇第3章。