注释

第一篇　希波战争

1　史籍记载中希腊军队的兵力

1.Beitzke, History of the German Wars of Liberation（Geschichte der deutschen Freiheitskriege），Vol.1，Appendix. Bernhardi, Memorable Events in the Life of Toll（Denkwürdigkeiten aus dem Leben Tolls），Vol.3，Appendix.

2.Pertz-Delbrück, Life of Gneisenau（Leben Gneisenaus），large ed.，Vol.4，Appendix; small ed.，2d printing，2：19.

3.Delbrück, Persian and Burgundian Wars（Perser-und Burgun-derkriege），p.157.

4.P.Bailleu in the Deutsche Rundschau, December 1899.

5.von Lettow. The War of 1806 and 1807（Der Krieg von 1806 und 1807）.

6.Compare “Mind and Mass in History”（“Geist und Masse in der Geschichte”），Preussische Jahrbücher 147（1912）：193.

7.R.Adam, in his dissertation “De Herodoti ratione historica quaestiones selectae sive de pugna Salaminia atque Plataeensi”（Berlin，1890），shows that the army strengths and number of ships given by Herodotus are based on an estimate table that removes from them any residual element of credibility.

2　希腊人的装备与战术

1.Adolf Bauer, Section 40，says three meters. On this point, see also below, the study on the sarissae.

2.H.Droysen, Army Organization（Heerwesen），p.24，cites several passages in which the harness is not named as a piece of equipment for the Spartans and considers it possible that they, in contrast to the other Greeks, did not wear any. That would be a far-reaching difference. Nevertheless, this opinion is certainly incorrect. Droysen himself cites a passage from Tyrtaeus in which armor is expressly named, and if one were inclined to conclude from the passage in Xenophon's Anabasis 1.2.16 that Cyrus' mercenaries wore no armor, that would also have to apply to all the Greeks represented among them.

3.H.Droysen, Heerwesen, p.171，footnote, recommends using the word phalanx only with respect to foot soldiers armed with the sarissa, whose particular combat position consisted in the “closeness of their formation in comparison with those in the rear.”* I believe in holding fast, however, to the expression that has become quite common, which I think I can best establish with the definition given above. The basis therefore will gradually emerge as our study progresses. Droysen himself shows that the Greek usage is very indefinite and has varied.

4. The account of Isocrates（Archidamus, p.99），which says the Spartans had conquered the Arcadians at Dipaea in one rank, which Duncker，8：134，accepted, has been justifiably rejected by Droysen, p.45，and Adolf Bauer, p.243（2d ed.，p.305），as rhetorical exaggeration. Droysen, with equal justification, also rejects the two ranks of Polyaenus 2.1.24.

5.Lysias, Mantitheus 16.15. The speaker, Mantitheus, boasts:“There was an expedition to Corinth, and everyone knew ahead of time that it would be a dangerous undertaking. Although some were shirking back, I arranged it so that I might fight our enemies in the front line. And our phyle had the worst luck and suffered the worst losses among its own men. I quit the field later than that excellent man from Steiria who has been accusing everyone of cowardice.”* For this fine quotation I am indebted to the book Warfare of Antiquity（Das Kriegswesen des Altertums），by Hugo Liers, p.46.

6.Concerning the combination of Spartiates and Perioeci in the same military formation, see Bauer, paras.18，19，and 23，and, now at the center of a lively controversy, Kromayer, Klio 3（1903）：177 ff, and Beloch, Klio 6：63. On this occasion the following splendid evidence of the importance of the first rank has come to light. Isocrates, Panathenaicus 180.271，writes: “For in the campaign that the king led, they arranged them man by man in rank with themselves, and they also stationed some men in the first rank.”*

7.Xenophon, Cyropaedia 6.3.25. For further information on this point, see below, Book II, Chapter V.

8.Xenophon, Hellenica 6.2.21.

9.Thucydides, too, reports that the Lacedaemonians, specifically, did not normally carry the pursuit far（5.73）. Helbig，“On the Original Period of the Closed Phalanx”（Uber die Einführungszeit der geschlossenen Phalanx”）Sitzungs-Bericht der Bayerischen Akademie 1911，believes, based on insufficient sources, that the Chalcidians formed the first phalanx.

3　希腊军队的实际兵力　无

4　波斯军队

1.Verse 25：“Those who subdue with the bow, and the horsemen”*

Verse 82：“He leads spear-subduing Ares against men famed for the spear.”*

Verse 133：“Whether it is the drawing of the bow or the strength of the spear-headed lance that has prevailed.”*

Verse 226：“Is it the bow-stretching arrow that is strong in their hands? Not at all: they have lances for close fights and shields to use as armor.”*

Verse 864：“Those who subdue with the bow.”*

Herodotus says the same thing in 9. 18 and 9.49. Also a consecration formula of Simonides（fragment 143，Bergk）states: “These bows which are now finished with tearful warfare lie under the roof of Athena’s temple; often, mournfully, in the melee, they were bathed in the blood of the man-destroying horsemen of Persia.”*

Likewise, fragment 97，Bergk, p. 452. Colonel Billerbeck in his study “Susa” calls attention to the fact that the reliefs show the principal weapon of the Iranians to have been not the bow, but the lance. Not only the specific statements of the Greeks, but also, as we shall see, the course of events, point indisputably to the bow. We must leave it to the specialists to clarify the reliefs.

2.Herodotus 7.61 and 9.22.

3. The nature of the Persian Empire as a feudal nation has recently been studied and described still further by Georg Husing in an essay “Porusatis and the Achamandish Feudal System”（“Porusatis und das achamanidische Lehenswesen”），Berichte des Forschungs-Instituts für Osten und Orient in Wien, Vol.2，1918.

4.“The Persians were not inferior in either courage or bodily strength, but being unarmed and untrained, they were not the equals of their enemies in respect to skill”*（Herodotus 9. 62，on the battle of Plataea）.

5　马拉松会战

1. The passage reads: “Sub montis radicibus acie regione instructa non apertissima proelium commiserunt, namque arbores multis locis erant rarae, hoc consilio, ut et montium altitudine tegerentur et arborum tractu equitatus hostium impediretur, ne multitudine clauderentur.”（“The line was drawn up at the base of a mountain, where the plain was not totally open—for there were trees here and there in many places—ana they joined battle. Their plan was to protect themselves by the height of the mountains, and to keep the enemy's cavalry back, impeded by the scattered trees, so that they themselves would not be overcome by the enemy's superior numbers.”）Instead of “arbores rarae，”A.Buchner（Corn. Hepotis vitae cum Augusti Buchneri commentario. Francof.a. Lipsiae，1721）has proposed that one should read “stratae，” which is actually more appropriate, but is no longer necessary, since one reads, instead of “nova arte, vi summa，”“non apertissima.”

2.Lieutenant General von Quistorp, Supplements to the Military Weekly（Beihefte zum Militär-Wochenblatt）1897，p.186.

3.Even a phalanx of professional soldiers, such as the mercenaries of Cyrus, is incapable of moving forward in orderly fashion for a considerable distance at a run.“They shouted to one another not to run headlong, but to pursue the enemy in order，”* Xenophon tells us in Anabasis 1.8.19.

Caesar, in Bell Gall. 2.18 ff.，recounts how the Nervii, suddenly attacking his soldiers, rushed 200 paces down a hill, across the 3-feet-deep Sambre, and then stormed up a hill. That is a very great accomplishment, but it does not permit a comparison with Marathon, since（1）the Gauls were not, under any circumstances, as heavily armored as the Athenian hoplites，（2）the run was broken up by the fording of the river，（3）the entire distance is not mentioned at all, and（4）the Gauls, falling on the Romans as they were digging in, did not need to rely on their own tactical alignment.

In Bell Gall. 3.19，the Gauls suddenly attack a Roman camp and cover 1，000 paces—8 stadia—with a great run（“magno cursu”）. They arrive so exhausted and breathless that they cannot cope with the Romans, who make a sally, and they immediately take flight. Of itself, however, this incident is not conclusive, since the run was uphill and the Gauls were carrying fascines. One might also well question whether the 1，000 paces were covered at an uninterrupted, actual run, since it was not a question of an ordered phalanx, in which all must move at the same tempo if no disorder is to occur, but rather of an unaligned mass, in which a man who runs short of breath can slow down for a while.

4.A brook divides the Vrana valley into two parts. Although it is not really deep even today, it nevertheless necessarily had a considerably disruptive effect on the advance of a closed and well-ordered phalanx. Possibly Miltiades did not have the valley narrowed on both sides by abatis, but blocked off one side completely, from the mountain to the brook.

5.Cyrus speaks as follows in the Cyropaedia 5.4.44.“To move forward and to move laterally are not the same. For the man moves forward who is of such a mind as to believe that he is best able to fight—on the other hand, one has to move by laterally with an extended column of wagons and a long-drawn-out pack train. The whole formation, however, must be covered by armed men and the pack train must never appear to the enemy to be unprotected. Necessarily, then, in such a movement the armed part of the formation is disposed thinly and weakly.”

6.In Polyaenus 2.2.3，there is a description of how Clearch led the Greeks into the attack at Cunaxa: “He led the phalanx at the march to a point opposite the troops, astonishing the barbarians with their good order. And when he was almost within range of the missiles, he gave orders for the men to run, so that they would not be hit by the missiles.”* And similarly Diodorus. The fact that this description is not at odds with that of Xenophon, according to which the phalanx spontaneously broke into a run, is effectively presented by G. Friedrich, Neue Jahrbücher fur Philologie 151：26. Paul Reichard, writing in Deutsche Rundschau 12（September 1890）：426，reports that Stanley claimed in his book to have shot far.beyond 200 meters with an African bow. Reichard goes on to say that that was, at the least, an exaggeration. He himself had once engaged in a contest with Watusis, the best bowmen of East Africa, in which the strongest one had shot only 120 meters, or 160 paces, while he, Reichard, had shot seven paces farther. In like manner, Lieutenant Morgen once reported, in a lecture about Cameroons, that the arrow shot from a bow reached in certain conditions a distance of 150 to 180 paces. Nevertheless, the Asiatic bows, according to the research of Luschan（“On the ancient bow” [Uber den an-tiken Bogen，”] Festschrift für Benndorf，1898，and in the Verhandlungen der Berliner anthropologischen Gesellschaft, Session of 18 February 1899），were much better than the African ones, and the very best ones, the making of which required many years, shot an unbelievably long distance. Strabo，14.1.23，reports that Mithri-dates shot an arrow from the roof of the temple of Ephesus and decreed that the free area of the temple, which up to that point extended a stadium, would extend thenceforth to the range of this shot, which, as Strabo says, went a little farther. At any rate, Mith-ridates had the best bow and was an excellent marksman, and if he did not considerably exceed a stadium in distant—that is, high-angle—shooting, then a low-trajectory shot certainly did not exceed 200 to 240 paces. A recently published epigram from Olbin praises the archer Anaxagoras for having been able to shoot 280 Master, or 521.6 meters（Literarisches Centralblatt[1901]，Column 887）. Naturally, for a large army only a performance of lesser quality comes into consideration. Vegetius estimates 600 feet; Jähns, History of the Development of Ancient Offensive Weapons（Entwicklungsgeschichte der alten Trutzwaffen），p.281，“up to 250 paces for low-trajectory shooting，400 for high-angle shooting.”More modern investigation by Paul Reimer，“The Bow”（“Der Pfeilbogen”），Prometheus, No.944，20 November 1907.

6　温泉关会战

1.Because of the most recent enlargement of armies, this thesis must be modified. With the gigantic masses of the standing armies that are now available, even long mountain ranges can be so closely occupied that they cannot easily be penetrated. In this way we succeeded for a long time in the winter of 1914-1915 in holding the Carpathians against the Russians.

2.Livy 36.30.

3.Diodorus，2.6，from Ctesias.

4.Plutarch, Themistocles, Chapter 7.

7　阿提米西安海战

1.Plato, Menexenus 11. Aristophanes, Lysistrata, verse 1250. Later they also placed on the foothill a victory monument whose inscription has come down to us through Plutarch.

2.Concerning the construction of the triremes, see Hauck Zeitschrift des Vereins deutscher Ingenieure，1895；A. Tenne（engineer），Warships in the Days of the Ancient Greeks and Romans（Kriegschiffe zu den Zeiten der alten Griechen und Römer），1916. Review by Voigt, Die Literarische Zeitung，29（1917）：932.

3.It is perhaps well to recall that not only large land armies but also large fleets are hard to maneuver. The complete fleet with which the Athenians moved to Sicily in 415 B.C.was 134 triremes and 2 penteremes strong, and had in addition 131 cargo ships and a number of volunteer trading vessels. This fleet did not sail as a single squadron, but was divided into three divisions，“so that they might not, by sailing together, be wanting water and ports and provisions when they landed, and so that they might, in other matters, be more orderly and easy to control, being assigned to a commander according to set divisions”*（Thucydides 6.42）.

8　萨拉米斯海战

1.Berlin dissertation，1914.R. Trenkel, publisher.

2.By the nature of Herodotus'account, it is naturally not impossible that a large portion of the overall account has been lost without leaving any trace. Nevertheless, it is very unusual that we hear nothing at all about why the large Persian army, during the fourteen days it camped in Attica before the battle, did not also occupy Megara, which, after all, lay in front of the isthmus and its wall. A logical explanation would be that the Spartiates, with the army of the Peloponnesians, to the extent that they were not digging in on the isthmus, were occupying the passes leading from Attica to Megara and that Xerxes, unlike his action at Thermopylae—precisely because of his experience at Thermopylae—did not attack because he wanted to do away with the fleet first. Under those circumstances, it is all the more likely that a part of the Greek fleet could have been on the beach at Megara. It is, of course, obvious that this construction is in direct contradiction to the historical narrative.

3.All kinds of conclusions have been proposed as a result of the fact that Xerxes returned by land, while sending his children home with the fleet. For such details, however, so many varied reasons are imaginable that there is little purpose in going deeply into the matter.

9　普拉提亚会战

1.Herodotus 9.32.

2.Berlin dissertation，1907.

第二篇　鼎盛时期的希腊军队

1　伯罗奔尼撒战争之前的希腊战术

1.Not until the Peloponnesian War did the Spartans create cavalry and archer units, in order to defend their land against the Athenians, who would quickly attack from the sea, now here and now there.（Thucydides 4.55.）

2.See Bauer, Section 52.

3.Wernicke, in Hermes 26（1891）：51，states the opinion that the Athenian citizens who served as “bowmen”* had come from the poorer classes.

4.Xenophon, Hellenica 1.2.1. Thrasylus is sent out with a fleet and equips five thousand of his sailors as peltasts.

2　伯利克里战略

1.Athens lost 4，450 hoplites and citizen-cavalrymen; in addition, on each trireme at least a few Athenian citizens as officers. The entire expedition, with all its logistical support, can be estimated at 60，000 men.

3　雇佣兵

1.Böckh, National Economy（Staatshaushalt），1：152，340（3d ed.）. The wages varied between 4 obols and 1 drachma（6 obols）per man; for the hoplites, therefore，2 drachmas，1 for the warrior and 1 for his servant, including ration money. When the humorist Theopomp says that a man could feed a wife on 2 obols and that he could be completely happy on 4，he probably means the base pay aside from the ration allowance, which was, where needed, provided by 2 additional obols. At the time of Aristotle the Athenian ephebi received 4 obols daily, their instructors 1 drachma. State of the Athenians（Staat der Athener），Chapter 42.

2.Nöthe, Federal Council, Federal Taxes, and Military Service of the Delhi League（Bundesrat, Bundessteuer und Kriegsdienst der delischen Bündner），Magdeburg Program，1880. Guide, Military Procedures of the First Athenian League（Kriegsverfahren des ersten athenischen Bundes），Neuhaldensleben Program，1888.

3.Speech of Nicias, Thucydides 6.68：“... Against men that meet us in a mob and are not picked men as we are, and even against Sicelots, who, on the one hand, despise us, but yet do not stand their ground against us, because their skill is less than their daring.”*

4.Xenophon, Hellenica 1.6.24. The Athenians decided to move out with 110 ships，“putting aboard every one of military age, whether they were slave or free. Even many of the knights went on board.”*

5.According to a report contained in Polyaenus 3.3，Tolmidas, when he was once supposed to move out with 1，000 hoplites, was joined by 3，000 volunteers. Two passages in Aristophanes seem to contradict this. In The Knights, verse 1369，Demos expresses the wish that men will no longer be excused from hoplite service by favoritism, and in Peace, verse 1179，an individual is very unhappy because he finds that he is suddenly once again called up for service, and he complains that in general the country people are oppressed in this regard, while the city dwellers are given the preference. It is clear, therefore, that at that time（424 and 421 B.C.）the army levy had not yet become a purely voluntary, reimbursed service.

6.In Aristotle, On the State of the Athenians, Chapter 24，where he explains that the mass of Athenians lived from the state（by virtue of the taxes of the allies），it is also said that the city maintained 2，500 hoplites. It is not easy to say how we should interpret this. There can be no thought of a standing army. The peripoloi, who had a strength of about 2，000，can hardly be meant here. Perhaps there existed an arrangement whereby 2，500 men were to keep themselves in a special degree of readiness at any given moment, were occasionally assembled, had to drill, and received a small reimbursement. It can hardly have been otherwise, at any rate, with the 1，200 cavalrymen and 1，600 archers whom Aristotle mentions in the same line. Beloch, in Klio 5：357，expressed the conjecture that it must simply have been 12，500 instead of 2，500，and, in the end, that seems to me to be the most logical solution.

4　公元前4世纪对原有战术体系的完善

1.Herodotus 1.61. The mercenaries of Pisistratus seem, in fact, to have been not Greeks but Scythians. Helbig, Sitzungs-Berichte der Münchner Akademie 2（1897）：259. A military review by Pisistratus or Hippias on a dark-figured bowl.

2.Herodotus 3.39.

3.Thucydides 5.57.2. Xenophon, Hellenica 3.5.24.

4.Hellenica 3.4.15：“... Unless he procured a sufficient cavalry force, he would not be able to campaign in the plains; he therefore took it to mind that one should be provided, so that he would not have to fight the war shirkingly.”*

5.Adolf Bauer, para.47.

6.Diodorus, Book 10.

7.“On Machines and Their Names”（“Ueber die Konstruktionen und Namen”），Bauer, para. 58.

5　色诺芬理论

1.Xenophon, Hellenica 4.2.13：The allied forces moving out against Sparta in the year 395 B.C.take counsel “into how many（ranks）one ought to order the army so that you do not have to move the hoplites too much while the cities（allies）are surrounding the enemy.”* From this it seems as if the individual contingents had the tendency to form up as deep as possible, in order to concentrate as much power as possible, without realizing that this could cause the entire battle line to be too short, or in the hope that the others would be so kind as to line up in a shallower formation.

2.For an exception, see p.56，above.

6　伊巴密浓达　无

第三篇　马其顿军队

1　马其顿军制

1.Thucydides does not mention here the superior protective armor of the Greeks, and perhaps the Illyrians were better equipped in this regard than the Macedonians, who were more accustomed to the agricultural life and therefore, in general, less warlike, although Arrian（1.1.12）again specifically characterizes the Illyrian and Thracian barbarians as “ill-equipped allies.”* Furthermore, in his speech Brasidas specifically calls the Illyrians the equals of the Macedonians, and we may therefore apply the description to the latter also.

2.“Concerning Horsemanship”*（12. 12），“in place of a spear made of cane.”* The meaning of the Greek word “kamakinon” is not certain, nor is even the manner of reading it, but judging from the whole context, it is almost impossible that anything but a long spear is meant here.

3.Xenophon's remark may be considered in connection with the cavalry combat in Hellenica 3.4.13. The account shows, however, that at that time the Greek cavalry carried not the short spear, but the long one.

Furthermore, it is not understandable without further explanation in this account, why the Persians had such a deep formation. They were not able to throw their spears from the rearmost ranks. The explanation lies perhaps in the fact that the Persians were counting on penetrating the Greek line with their deep column and, in doing so, throwing their spears to the right and left.

4.Diodorus 17.60. Arrian 1.15.

5.Adolf Bauer, para.313（2d ed.，para，433），concludes from Arrian 1.6.5 that the companions did not normally carry a shield.1 cannot find that the passage necessitates this conclusion; in fact, it hardly permits it.Cavalry shields were naturally much smaller than those of the infantry. Since in Plutarch, Alexander, Chapter 16，there is specific mention of the shield that the king carries into combat, and later, according to Polybius 6.25.7，the Macedonian cavalrymen undoubtedly had shields, it seems certain to me that such was also the case in earlier periods.

6.See also below, Vol.IV, Book III, Chapter III.

7.Concerning the discomfort of carrying and the difficulty of fighting with the long spear, see also Vol.IV, Book I, Chapter I.

8.Adolf Bauer, para.272，estimates 3 meters; among all the vase figures that I have looked through, however, I have never found such long hoplite spears, even where there is no limitation of space.

9.R.Wille, Text on Arms（Waffenlehre），p.79.

10.A.Krause, in Hermes，1890，para.66，proved quite conclusively that Alexander also had slingers in his army and that Arrian intends them to be included in the word “toxetai”（“archers”）.*

2　亚历山大与波斯：格拉尼卡斯河会战

1.That is the result of the careful examination of the sources in W. Dittberner, Issos（Berlin: George Nauck，1908）.

2.Bauer, para.314（2d ed.，434）even claims that the Macedonians represented not much more than a sixth of the entire army. That is too small under any circumstances. A. Krause, in the passage cited above（Hermes，1890），distinguishes among（1）a field army；（2）an army of occupation；（3）a satrap army, which was formed in the conquered areas by the appointed satraps.

That is fundamentally correct but much too sharply distinguished. Naturally, there were troops that were used primarily for operations and battles, others that were more often assigned to garrisons, and finally the appointed governors did indeed form new military organizations But according to the circumstances, all of these various troops were naturally used for the various purposes of the waging of war, sometimes in battle, sometimes as occupation forces.

3　伊苏斯会战

1.After having had to rework the presentation of this battle for the second edition, I have now once again had to make not unimportant changes. The reason was the same both times—that is, a more correct and more detailed understanding of the structure of the terrain. Even now, however, I have felt obliged to stand by the fundamental fact that the battle took place not on the Deli-Tschai, but on the Pajas. Accordingly, I continue to regard the dissertation of W. Dittberner（Berlin，1908）as the authoritative work and cannot find that it has been eliminated by Colonel Janke, to whom we are indebted in other respects for the topography（Klio 10：137，“Annex to Petermann’s Reports，”May 1911[“Beilage von Peter-manns Mitteilungen，”1911，Maiheft]）. See also the review of Dieulefoy’s study by Dittberner in the Deutsche Literarische Zeitung, No.24，（1912），Column 1525，and the article by Kromayer in the Historische Zeitschrift 112：348.

2.Arrian 2.2.1. Curtius 3.8.1.

3.An absolute proof for the moderate strength of the Persian army is not to be concluded from the march action, in that, according to Janke, a rather large number of more or less usable passes lead over the Amanus mountain chain into the plain of Issus. Nevertheless it can hardly be assumed that there was an elaborate allocation of forces to various approach roads, and since in the bat tle it was almost exclusively the Greeks who played a significant infantry role, then the other infantry contingents on hand cannot have been so very strong.

Kromayer, in the work cited above, believes that the Persian army can be estimated at 50，000 to 60，000 men, since the Seleucids had raised armies of similar strength. The Diadochi states differ, however, from the Achaemenidae Empire precisely in the fact that they had a completely different concept of war, and in any case no comparison is possible in view of the positive factors that exclude the possibility of an army of more than some 25，000 men.

4.Arrian 2.5.1 reports that Parmenio had been sent out in advance with the Greeks and other troops from Tarsus in order to secure the Cilician-Syrian passes. Now since the Greeks are not mentioned in the two sources specifying the battle formation at Issus, we can accept the account above with certainty. Köhler, in “The Conquest of Asia”（“Die Eroberung Asiens”），in Abhandlungen der Berliner Akademie，1898，p.130，believes that Alexander did not need to post troops to cover his rear, since the Persian army was, obviously, in front of him. The flimsiness of this conclusion is evident.

5.Arrian's description, that behind the Persian battle line, which he describes for us, there still stood in useless depth huge numbers of barbarian peoples, has been understood by recent historians as an echelon formation. Aside from the fact that an echeloned formation, as we shall see, means a refinement of tactics that did not occur until a later period, Arrian’s report is naturally only the complement of his estimate of the Persian army at a strength of 600，000 men. What the Greeks saw in front of them was only a moderate-sized army; the barbarians, however, were, once and for all, masses—consequently these masses were placed somewhere or other in the rear, drawn up “in unusable depth.”

6.Polybius 12.17.7，“... the peltasts in a line which stretched to the mountains，”* according to Callisthenes. These lightly armed men, who stretched out all the way to the mountains, were probably principally Persian archers. Arrian, in 2.10.6，reports specifically that the Macedonians, after moving forward slowly at first in order not to have their battle line become wavy，finally attacked on the run so that they would not suffer too much from the enemy archers.

That the front of the Persians did not extend the length of the river is shown expressly in Arrian 2. 9.4，where it is said that the Macedonians, after Alexander had drawn the troops from the flank guard positions to him, outflanked the Persian formation. The sen tence in 2.8.6，“The ground on which they were standing allowed this number of men to be contained in a straight phalanx，”* could be interpreted to mean that the width of the plain would not have contained any more than were formed up, so that the phalanx stretched out from the sea to the mountain. The citation above, however, excludes this interpretation.

7.According to Polybius, Callisthenes estimated that the plain of Pajas was not quite 14 stadia（254 kilometers）wide and that the Macedonian phalanx remained at a considerable distance from the mountains. Arrian reports that their left flank touched the sea. Now the plain is not 2½but 4 kilometers wide according to Janke，5 kilometers by Hossbach’s estimate—an error of estimation that is not abnormal（see Dittberner, p.122）；nevertheless, we may believe Callisthenes when he says the Macedonian front was considerably less than 2½kilometers wide. It therefore reached from the sea about the same distance—or perhaps not quite as far—as the river was more or less fordable for infantry.

8.Curtius 3.11.18：“Graeci ... abrupti a ceteris haud sane fugientibus similes evaserunt.”（“The Greeks, separated from the rest, had escaped, not at all in the way deserters do.”）

4　高加米拉会战

1.Graf York, A Brief Survey of the Campaigns of Alexander the Great（Kurze Uebersicht der Feldzüge Alexanders des Grossen），p.32.

2.Reported by Mandrot, Jahrbuch für Schweizerische Geschichte，6（1881）：263.

3.General von Verdy says，“Twenty-four squadrons（3，600 horses）must be considered as the maximum strength of a cavalry division, since with larger numbers the control of the battle succeeds only with very outstandingly talented leaders, and even with them only under conditions of thorough training of lower commanders and troops.”

4.See also Cyropaedia 7.1；also 6.2 and Book 8，conclusion.

5.Diodorus describes how terrible the wounds caused by these scythes were, but also makes it clear that the number of wounded or killed was only small, a point specifically emphasized by Arrian.

6.Arrian says，“of the men surrounding Alexander，”* at the most 100 men were killed; the expression is very indefinite. If one relates it to the total losses of the Macedonian army, as is usually the case, this small number would contradict Arrian’s own description of the battle. Niese claims that it applies only to the actual Macedonians.Still other interpretations are possible, but there is no purpose in accumulating speculations on the subject.

5　海达斯佩斯河会战

1.Curtius'figures are worthless. At no place in the Anabasis does Arrian give an overall number, but mentions only in the Indica, Chapter 19，that the King, when he started his withdrawal, was followed by 120，000 combatants（“fit for battle”*），including many barbarians. Huge levies of Indian princes, more or less fictitious, may have been included in the count. Even putting that point aside, it is not known what the origin of this number is and whether it is reliable. We may rely on the numbers Arrian gives in the Anabasis concerning the Macedonian army, since he is depending here significantly on Ptolemy, but what we find in the Indica may have been taken from almost any unclear source. Plutarch, Chapter 66，even puts the army that makes the march through Gadrosia at 120，000 men on foot and 150，000 horsemen.

The computation by Rüstow and Köchly（p.298）is not sufficiently supported; they claim to estimate the strength of the army concentrated on the Hydaspes at 69，000 men and 10，000 horses. The authors themselves characterize the advance guard force as the one “that really fights the battles.”And that is the way it actually is; and here I ask, Why should a commander like Alexander have complicated the conduct of the war by dragging along with him other large masses of troops for which there never appears any need throughout the course of the war?

2. The rest of the army—according to the positive statement of Arrian, which we have no reason to doubt—did not cross over\the Hydaspes until the battle was decided and therefore may not be counted as participating in the actual combat.

3.Cramer, Contributions to the History of Alexander the Great（Beiträge zur Geschichte Alexanders des Grossen），Marburg dissertation，1893.

4.In any event Rüstow and Köchly’s idea that this Indian prince, Abisares, moved up to Porus on the right bank of the Hydaspes, is false. There he would have run directly into the hands of the Macedonians and would have been intercepted without being able to receive help from Porus or himself helping Porus. Curtius（8.47）also says expressly that Porus expected the reinforcements on the left bank.

5.In his essay “The Use of the Elephant for Military Purposes in Antiquity”（“Die Verwendung des Elefanten zu kriegerischen Zwecken im Altertum”），Jahrbücher fur die deutsche Armee and Marine, Vol.49，December 1883，Major Ohlendorf states the belief that the infantry had the mission of preventing the elephants from turning around.It is difficult to know how the infantry was supposed to go about that. The concept is apparently founded on a translation error.

6.Alexander had also taken along to the crossing point two taxis of pezetairoi. Nevertheless, they do not appear in the battle formation; only hypaspists and light infantry were involved. The number, too—a total of 6，000 men on foot—eliminates them. Rüstow and Köchly（p.229）have assumed that they were left behind at the crossing point in order to oppose Abisares in case of need. That would have been an error, even if Abisares was expected here; primarily, it was a question of striking Porus with a combination of all one’s forces and of avoiding a fight with Abisares until that was accomplished. An isolated force of light infantry could easily have fallen a victim to him. The reason the pezetairoi were not in the battle is probably simply that they had not completed their crossing.To cross a broad river with inflated skins and just a few boats requires a great deal of time.

6　作为统帅的亚历山大

1.Against Philip*（Philippics）3.123.para.49.

2.H.Droysen, in Studies（Untersuchungen），p.66，assembled the accounts of Alexander's forced marches. I would, however, prefer not to repeat the detailed figures concerning time and space. The estimate of distances is very arbitrary, and it is also quite doubtful whether the time is always reported accurately. Schwarz, in his very worthwhile study Alexander’s Campaigns in Turkestan（Alexanders Feldzüge in Turkestan），1893，which is based on his personal knowledge of the land and the people, has established, probably correctly, that the march that, according to Arrian 4.6，Alexander made within three days was from Chodschent to Samarkand. Arrian estimates the distance at 1，500 stadia, which means 275 kilometers or 170 miles, and the latest measurements actually give 278 kilometers. Such a march in three days, however, exceeds the capabilities of even the best unit.

In 3. 15，Arrian recounts that Alexander reached the Lycus（Zab）on the same evening as the battle of Gaugamela, and Arbela on the following day, which is situated 600 stadia—i.e.，68 miles—from the battlefield. We may say with reasonable certainty that the distance was about half that great, but even that is still a tremendous performance.

3.Of course, it is not a completely new idea that a pursuit magnifies and completes a victory. After Plataea the Mantineans wished to pursue the Persians as far as Thessaly, according to Herodotus 9.77. After the victory at Delium the Boeotian cavalry and light infantry pursued the Athenians until darkness intervened（Thucydides 4.96）. Likewise Alcibiades pursued the beaten Persians with cavalry and hoplites（Hellenica 1.2.16）. Derdas pursued the defeated Olynthians a distance of 90 stadia（Hellenica 5.3.2）. See also other passages in Liers, p.184. These are nevertheless only exceptional cases and are not to be compared with Alexander’s pursuits. In theory, Xenophon, too, in the Cyropaedia（5.3，conclusion），had already recommended pursuit, with the addition that not all the troops should be committed to it but that some should always be kept at hand in good order.

7　继业者

1.H.Droysen Studies（Untersuchungen），p.155. Droysen incorrectly concludes, precisely from the fact of the energetic drilling, that there was a worsening of the soldier material.Rather, one may draw from the energy of the military training the opposite conclusion—i.e.，that a strong military spirit existed. The conclusion on p.132，too, that with the increasing size of the armies the material must have gotten continuously worse, is inadmissible. In the huge area of all the Diadochi empires the militarily qualified material was hardly exhausted even with a few hundred thousand men, and “pirates” can become very excellent soldiers.

2.Athenaeus reports（5.35.202-203）about a procession in Alexandria in about 275 or 274 B.C.in which 57，600 dismounted men and 23，210 mounted men had formed the rear units.

Appian reports in Preface, Chapter 10，that Ptolemy II had possessed, toward the end of his reign, an army of 200，000 dismounted men，40，000 cavalry，300 elephants，2，000 war chariots，1，500 warships and 2，000 transport ships.

Paul M. Meyer, in The Military System of the Ptolemies and the Romans in Egypt（Das Heerwesen der Ptolemäer und Römer in Aegypten），p.8，accepts these figures. Nevertheless, it is not hard to recognize that they are greatly exaggerated. One need only imagine what a parade of 57，600 dismounted men and 23，210 mounted men through the streets of a city means. Egypt may at that time have had 3 to 4 million inhabitants（Beloch, Population[Bevölkerung]，p.258）; or 7 million, as it was reported and apparently accepted by Ulrich Wilcken, Greek Potsherds from Egypt and Nubia（Griechische Os-traka aus Aegypten and Nubien），p.490. This would have made a standing army of 240，000 men amount to 3½ to 7 percent of the population. A fifth of the reported figures would still be quite a large number.

第四篇　古罗马

1　骑士与方阵

1.In spite of the contradiction that Eduard Meyer brought up in his History of Antiquity（Geschichte des Altertums），Vol.2，para.499，I still feel permitted and obliged to hold to this concept of “the continuity of the development of Rome in its constitutional history.”For it is completely clear that the basic principle of the Roman constitutional law, the official power of the magistrature, dates back to a very early time and was gradually divided up and weakened. It is completely impossible that such a strict concept of the power of the official position might not have been formed until the formal sovereign power was already in the hands of the general people’s assembly; it is astonishing enough that that strong concept was able to assert itself for so long within the framework of the sovereignty of the people.

Furthermore, it is fully clear that the voting organization of the historical period originally had a purely military and no political basis; consequently, this institution, too, goes back to the period of a very strong monarchy.

One may therefore truly speak of the “continuity of the development of Roman constitutional history，” without, of course, taking for more than they actually were the historical changes of outer form—against which, after all, really only the voice of Meyer has apparently been raised.

I can leave aside here all the doubt over the authenticity of the chronology and the historical account in detail. The material in which I am interested for this work is not affected by it.

2.See particularly Vol.III, Book III, Chapters I and II, especially p.251[of the German 2d ed.，1923].

3.Livy（23.46[215 B.C.]）says of the Capuans:“Sex milia ar-matorum habebant, peditem imbellem; equitatu plus poterant, ita-que equestribus proeliis lacessebant hostem.”（“They had 6，000 armed men; the infantry was not inclined to fight, but the cavalry was more capable and so they provoked the enemy into cavalry battles.”）

4. The theory that the original inhabitants had become the patricians by means of the income from their land is also opposed by Schmoller, Basic Outline...（Grundriss），2d ed.，1：497：“If one imagines that capital in itself and its unequal distribution produces big business; if one imagines that, because the heirs of fortunate entrepreneurs in the second and third generations appear primarily as possessors of capital, the possession of the capital had created the financial projects, that is completely false. It is always personal characteristics that create and sustain such ventures.”

5.In Gellius 16.10.1 there is contained a verse of Ennius，“pro-letarius publicitus scutisque feroque ornatus ferro.”（“The proletarian is armed with shield and sword; armed with sword at the public cost.”）Cited by Theodor Mommsen in Political Law（Staatsrecht），Vol.3，Part 1，p.29. See also Polybius 6.21.7：“They chose the youngest and poorest of the men to be fighters with the javelin.”*

6.For Attica we estimated, in the year 490 B.C.，120-145 inhabitants to the square mile; for Boeotia in the fifth century，110；for Lacedaemon and Messenia 75；for the Peloponnesus 95 to 110. Under the primitive conditions of agriculture, disturbed by the continual warfare with neighboring states, as we must imagine the situation in Italy 2，500 years ago, certainly 120 to 145 is the maximum number that could be fed, even for the fertile soil. As an old trading city, Rome may already have had some grain imports by sea as early as 510 B.C.，but surely not yet any great quantity, for if the city had already been large, it would have had a more important position politically. That the city was still small in comparison with the country area is further attested by the fact that only 4 of the 20 tribes were metropolitan ones. The so-called Servian wall, which enclosed a very large area, dates only from the period of the Samnite Wars.

7.A regular, official procedure for maintaining registration lists appears at first glance to be something quite simple, but if it is to be reliable, it actually is very difficult and demands an extremely careful and energetic control. The advantages and disadvantages that are at stake are very great and the work, by its very nature, is in the hands of clerks who, in addition to the question of carelessness, can also be subject to bribery. In 214 B.C. when every younger man who was not on active duty in the field could not help being noticed in the street, a check-up found 2，000 juniores who had avoided military duty.Livy 24.18.7.

8.If our assumption is correct, that at the start of the consular regime Rome had 21 tribes and about 8，400 service-qualified infantrymen, the origin of the normal number of 4，200 for the legion is probably to be explained in no other way than that each of the consuls was allocated half the number. If the entire army was assembled and both consuls present, then they each had the command in turn on a daily alternation.

9.Very informative on this point is Theodor Steinwender, Annual Program of the Marienburg Gymnaisum（Programm des Gymnasiums zu Marienburg），1879.

2　支队方阵

1.Thucydides（6.98）tells us how the Syracusans planned to wage a battle against the Athenians and were already drawn up in for mation when the commanders noticed that” the army was disordered and did not readily fall into line.”* As a result, they led the troops back into the city.

2.Polybius 11.22.10.

3.Vegetius, too（1.20），shows expressly that the number of light infantry who were active in front of the battle line was small and that they moved forward principally from the flanks.

4.In Livy's Chapter VIII of Book VIII, to be discussed in greater detail below（p.00）.

5.Each weapon has certain advantages and disadvantages, and the evaluation remains a subjective one. In Grupp, Cultural History of the Middle Ages（Kulturgeschichte des Mittelalters），1：109，it is said, for example:“The Norwegian Royal Code warns against throwing the spear too soon; in land battle the spear is better than two swords.”

6.Regulations for Drills with Cavalry Weapons（Vorschrift fur die Waffenübungen der Kavallerie），Berlin，1891.

7.It is not known how the original Roman sword was constructed; it was supposedly only a long, strong knife，“Bowie knife，” cutlass, or even only the same knife that the man used for cutting meat and wood. In the Second Punic War the gladius Hispanus（Spanish sword）was introduced, a straight, two-edged, pointed sword, short and very broad at the top, better suited for thrusting than for hacking.

A. Midler, Philologus 47：541. From Villenoisy's “On the Method of Using Ancient Swords”（“Du mode d'emploi des épées antiques”），Revue archéologique，1894，p.230，there is nothing important to be gleaned.

8. The pilum, which was initially, at any rate, a simple javelin with a very long, thin point, has its own history. For the best discussion of this now, see Dahm, Jahrbücher des Vereins von Altertumsfreunden im Rheinland，1896-1897，p.226. The surprisingly erroneous construction that Rüstow presented is a proof of how difficult critique is from the objective point of view of the ancient written accounts, even for the experts, and how easily it can go astray. The credit for having reconstructed the correct pilum goes to Lindenschmit, and the excavations that Napoleon III had carried out proved also to be very valuable in this matter.

（Added in the third edition.）A. Schulten, Rhein. Museum N.F.66（1911）：573，points out the probability that the actual pilum was perhaps taken over from the Iberians, as late as the Second Punic War. That would, of course, not eliminate the possibility that the Romans had already long before that adopted the method of throwing the spear ahead and carrying on the actual hand-to-hand fight with knife, dagger, or sword and were indebted to the Iberians only for the final technical improvement in the construction of the javelin. We have no positive testimony about when the Romans introduced the described combination of spear and sword combat, and by the nature of the thing we cannot have such evidence.

9.According to Polybius. In the period of the Empire we find that in the armories the weapons were divided into “arma antesignana” and “arma postsignana”（“before-the-standard” and “behind-the-standard” arms），which can hardly mean anything other than that the foremost ranks carried the pilum, the rear ranks the hasta. See also Domaszewski, Sitzungsberichte der Heidelberger Akademie，1910，p.9.

3　罗马人的操练、扎营和纪律

1.Xenophon, Hellenica 3.2.2；4.4.9；6.2.23. Plutarch, Phocion, Chapter 13.

2.Polyaenus 3.9.11：Iphicrates has a fixed point on the terrain in front of the camp occupied, in order to protect the camp. Of course, immediately thereafter it is recounted again（para.17）that Iphicrates, in enemy territory, also had a trench dug around the camp so that, as commander, he would perhaps not have to say:“I had not thought of that.”（“I did not think as befits a general.”*）Judging from that, it probably happened more often, after all, than appears in the sources, that at least a trench was dug for the protection of the camp.

3.Polybius calls it four-sided; the later camp description of Hyginus gives the shape as rectangular. The corners were rounded off in the later period, and presumably also from the start. To a certain extent the camp was naturally always laid out in conformity with the terrain, without eliminating the basic shape. Some of the camps of Caesar in Gaul are to this very day so well preserved that Napoleon III was able to have their size and shape very accurately established through excavations.

We cannot go into the details of the Roman camp here. I refer the reader, in addition to Marquardt, to Fröhlich, Caesar’s Military System（Kriegswesen Cäsars），pp.74 and 220 ff.

4.It is usually assumed（see Marquardt, p.426），on the basis of a description by Cicero in the Tusculanae Disputationes（2.16.37），that the legionaries regularly carried along the fortification stakes. Against this viewpoint, Liers（p.155）properly cited three passages from Livy（8.38.7；10.25.6；25.36.5），where it is related as the normal thing that the soldiers did not cut the stakes until reaching the camp site; and he gives a fourth citation（33.6.1），where the practice of carrying them along obviously appears as something exceptional.

（Added in the third edition.）Stolle, in The Roman Legionary and his Equipment（Der Römische Legionar und sein Gepäk）（1914），believes, after all, that he must go along with the account that the fortification stake also was included in the soldier’s regular equipment; that it was, however, only a rather thin pole, the weight of which he estimates at 1，310 grams. See below, excursus 6 to Book VI, Chapter II.

5.See also Adolf Bauer. Greek Military Antiquity（Griechisches Kriegsaltertum），para.39.

6.Gilbert, in Handbook of Greek National Antiquities（Handbuch der griechischen Staatsaltertümer）（2d ed.），1：356，note, states: “The commander has the power of the death sentence in the field” and cites as authority Lysias 13（“Against Agoratos”*），67. The passage reads: “He was caught while he was sending secret signals to the enemy and was executed on a plank by order of Lamachus.”* There was, consequently, one man who was beaten to death for treason under Lamachus before Syracuse. Under which form of judgment that took place we do not know. It is naturally to be assumed that crimes like treason could, in the field, be immediately punished by death, but how far in this procedure the disciplinary power of the commander came into the picture cannot be seen from the cited passage.

7.Aristotle, in Politics 3.14（9）.2，says that in combat the Spartan kings had the power of life and death; out of combat this was not the case. This base is too narrow for the formation of real military discipline.

8.Correctly pointed out by Beloch in Greek History（Griechische Geschichte），2：479.

9.For the earlier period this right of the centurions is not directly proved for us, and whoever sees in the Roman citizen army a levy of property owners could harbor the presumption that this kind of discipline was not introduced until the changeover to recruiting among the masses. As I conceive the history of the Roman military constitution, however, there can be no doubt that the discipline was based from the start on the same principles. Wherever in the highest position the death sentence is handled with such discretionary power, it lies in the nature of things that subordinate officials, too, have broad authority. On the other hand, it also lies in the nature of things that, as long as the centurion felt himself to be a citizen among fellow citizens, he made certain distinctions, and the respected head of a household was not really exposed to the danger of strokes in ordinary service.

Against my concept it would be possible to cite Polybius 6. 37.8，where tribunes are given the right to punish, to fine, and to lash（“fines, or sureties, or flogging”*），without mentioning the centurions. But Polybius is speaking here of punishment in the framework of formal proceedings, in addition to which there could very well have existed an additional beating by the captains, not specifically provided by the law, in order to maintain good order.

10.See also above, p.263，and below, p.292.

11.Livy 29.9.4. Valerius Maximus 2.7.4. Frontinus, Strategemetos 4.1.30-31.“Cotta consul P. Aurelium sanguine sibi junctum, quern obsidioni Lipararum, ipse ad auspicia repetenda Messanam transiturus, praefecerat, cum agger incensus et capta castra essent, virgis caesum in numerum gregalium peditum referri et muneribus fungi jussit.”（“When the consul Cotta was on the point of going to Messana to take the auspices again, he placed in command of the blockade of the Liparian Islands a certain Publius Aurelius who was related to him by blood. But when the latter's line of blockade was burned and his camp was captured, Cotta ordered him to be flogged, reduced to the ranks, and to perform the tasks of a common soldier.”）

4　皮洛士　无

5　第一次布匿战争

1.Unger, Rheinisches Museum 34：102.von Scala, Römische Studien（a complimentary greeting from Innsbruck to the 42d Assembly of German Philologues，1893），showed that it was probable that Naevius, too, who did not write until he had reached an advanced age, had already used Philinus.

2.Very enlightening on this point is W. Soltau in Neues Jahrbuch für Philologie 154（1896）：164.

第五篇　第二次布匿战争

1　第二次布匿战争的研究方法

1.This opinion has, moreover, already been expressed by another writer, Unger in Rheinisches Museum 34：97.

2　坎尼会战

1. The average depth was naturally considerably smaller, since the intervals, which had become irregular during the approach march, had to be filled up before the impact with the enemy by having rearward troops spring forward. In earlier editions I still admitted the possibility of a doubled length with correspondingly lesser depth. But I have now become convinced that a front of nearly 2 kilometers would no longer have been capable of forward movement in orderly fashion. One can grasp this more clearly by imagining a street like “Unter den Linden” in Berlin, which is almost 1 kilometer long and about 90 paces wide. The Roman infantry front at Cannae would therefore have reached about from the monument of Frederick the Great to the Wilhelmstrasse and would have overflowed to some extent in its depth the width of this street.

2.Polybius says that the Iberian and Gallic cavalry were on the left flank, the Numidians on the right, and he later characterizes the fighting of the latter as simple skirmishing.In the battle on the Trebia he makes a distinction between the heavy cavalry and the Numidians. By that account, then, the Iberian cavalry were the heavy units—a fact that does not necessarily eliminate the possibility of Hannibal’s also having had African cuirassiers, only a potiori may the light cavalry have been called the Numidian.

3　第二次布匿战争的基本战略问题

1.Polybius 3.89.9.

2.I am not adding any for the fleet, since at this time they would have left very few Roman citizens aboard ship. Since there was no real sea war taking place, they were able to provide the crews from allies and slaves（except for the one fleet legion）.

3.Livy 34.50.

4.Livy，37.60.

5.I do not see fit to agree with the idea that fear of the wild Gauls, who formed such a large percentage of the Punic army, caused the Italians to adhere to Rome; for the defections increased continuously in the years 210 and 211 B.C.，although that fear, to whatever extent it existed, must have been getting stronger and stronger.

6. The numerous victories that the Romans are supposed to have won from Hannibal from 216 to 203 B.C. according to Livy, were, as is so excellently explained by W. Streit in On the History of the Second Punic War in Italy after the Battle of Cannae（Zur Geschichte des zweiten punischen Krieges in Italien nach der Schlacht bei Canna, Berlin，1887），patriotic Roman fantasies—frankly, pure lies. Very nicely was Streit able to add up that Hannibal is supposed to have lost 120，000 killed in all these battles from Cannae on. Where it was a question of larger battles, as at Herdoniae and Numistro, victory still went to the Carthaginians. The alleged victories of Marcellus at Nola turn out to be very insignificant engagements.

7.It is precisely this way that Polybius describes the situation（9.3-4）.

4　战前战略态势回顾

1. The Second Punic War and its Historical Sources, Polybius and Livy, Explained from Strategic-Tactical Viewpoints. The years 219 and 218 B.C, exclusive of the Crossing of the Alps. An Essay by Joseph Fuchs, Imperial and Royal Professor in Wiener-Neustadt.（Der zweite punische Krieg und seine Quellen Polybius und Livius nach strategisch-taktischen Gesichtspunkten beleuchtet. Die Jahre 219 und 218，mit Aus-schluss des Alpenüberganges. Ein Versuch von Joseph Fuchs, k.k. Professor in Wiener-Neustadt.）Wiener-Neustadt，1894. In Rom-mission bei: Carl Blumrich, Wiener-Neustadt; M. Perles, Wien; T. Thomas, Leipzig.

Hannibal's Crossing of the Alps. Conclusions from Research and Travel, by Joseph Fuchs, Imperial and Royal Professor in Wiener-Neustadt. With two maps and one illustration.（Hannibal's Alpenübergang. Ein Studien-und Reiseergebnis von Joseph Fuchs, k.k. Professor in Wiener-Neustadt. Mit zwei Karten und einer Abbil-dung.）Vienna, Carl Konegen，1897.

The question of which pass Hannibal used for his crossing of the Alps does not belong in the framework of this book, since no important strategic or tactical conclusions result from the variety of routes. Fuchs has decided on the Mont Genevre Pass. Konrad Lehmann in The Attacks of the Three Barcas Against Italy（Die Angriffe der drei Barkiden auf Italien），1905，has once again, with a very thorough argument, pointed to the Little Saint Bernard. Subsequently, French Captain of Engineers Colin, too, has appeared in this arena with a work entitled Hannibal in Gaul（Annibal en Gaule），1904. To date, none of the various theories has been able to win general acceptance.

5　罗马占据上风

1.Raimund Oehler, The Last Campaign of Hasdrubal Barca and the Battle on the Metaurus. An historical-topographical Study.（Der letzte Feldzug des Barkiden Hasdrubal und die Schlacht am Metaurus.Eine historisch-topographische Studie.）1897. The significant aspects of its conclusions were rejected by Konrad Lehmann, Deutsche Literaturzeitung，1897，No.23，Column 902.

Lehmann himself later treated the battle in detail in his book The Attacks of the three Boreas（Die Angriffe der drei Barkiden），1905，and sought to reconstruct the battle, but the result remains subject to serious doubts. I doubt that, in view of the sources available, it will ever be possible to gain a positive insight into the battle. Even the army strengths are very uncertain. Lehmann estimates that Hannibal still had 15，000 men and Hasdrubal 12，000，whereas there were 150，000 Romans under arms in Italy. With numbers such as these, the Romans'conduct would be incomprehensible. See also the critique of Kromayer, Göttingische gelehrte Anzeigen，169，No.2（June 1907）：458. Beversdorff gives Hasdrubal 15，000 men on the Metaurus, whereas Kromayer estimates some 30，000.

2.Mommsen, Political Law（Staatsrecht），Vol.2，Part 1，p.652.

3.Livy 29.19.

4.Livy 30.1.10.

5.Livy 24.18.

6.Livy 27.7.

7. The Locrians made such a complaint on this score that the Senate conducted an investigation. Livy 29.8-22.

6　扎马-那拉加拉会战：梯队战术

1.Livy 27.49.

2.Why he did not go directly to Carthage is not reported. Perhaps he simply did not want to arrive in the capital with the few survivors of the battle and may have had in Hadrumet some troop reinforcements and supplies of weapons, which, if brought along with him, would still give him a position and the city a possibility to defend itself.

3.Livy 29.22.

4.See also p.276，above.

7　汉尼拔与西庇阿

1.In the speech that Livy has the elderly Quintus Fabius Max-imus and Scipio himself make in the Senate concerning the planned expedition, this motive does not appear with correct emphasis.If he pointed this out, Scipio would have been placing too much stress on the difficulty of the whole undertaking, whereas his speech was based, and necessarily so, on emphasizing the concept of the offensive with unconditional confidence.

2.We can assume that Hannibal returned to Africa in the fall of 203 B.C. and that the battle of Naraggara took place in about August of 202 B.C. Lehmann, p.555.

3.Proved by Konrad Lehmann in Jahrbücher fur klassische Philologie 153：573.

第六篇　作为世界征服者的罗马军队

1　罗马军队与马其顿军队

1.Polybius 18.28.

2.It was already understood in this way by Johann von Nassau and Montecucoli. Jähns I：573. Montecucoli, Writings（Schriften）2：225.

3.See also in this connection Livy 33.18.

4.Polybius 18.28.

5.In the second volume of his Antike Schlachtfelder, Kromayer has placed the battle somewhat differently than was earlier the case; nothing new has resulted from this change insofar as the actual events are concerned. Whether his account of the strategic relationships of the entire war, which are treated very thoroughly on the basis of specialized topographical research, is to the point, I have not verified in detail.

2　职业军队：大队战术

1.J.J.Müller, in Philologus 34（1876）：125，has already observed that the four regular legions could not possibly have absorbed the entire mass of service-obligated young men. He believes therefore that, depending on need, the youngest year-groups—e.g.，ten—were inducted. But even that would give much too large a number.

2.Fröhlich, in Caesar’s Method of Waging War（Kriegswesen Cäsars）pp.13-14，effectively raises doubts whether the definitive introduction of the cohort tactics should really be ascribed to Marius. Mad-wig believed that it did not occur until the War with the Allies. On the other hand, it is perhaps possible to prove its existence as early as the Jugurthine War.It is my opinion, however, that every probability points to the fact that Marius was the reformer. The cohorts that are referred to in the Jugurthine War（Sallust 51.3；100.4）need not be considered as tactical units but merely as parts of the legion, and if, according to a Sisenna fragment, there was still on one occasion in the War with the Allies a battle by maniples, there is little to be concluded from that, since, after all, there were maniples in existence both before and after that event.

3.Nitzsch, in History of the Roman Republic（Geschichte der römischen Republik）（published by Thouret），1：181，has already drawn attention to the fact that if, after Cannae, legions appeared formed up one behind the other, that was related to the fact that in the newly formed legions the differences of age did not play the same role as in earlier days.

4.When we read in Livy 7.34（for the year 340 B.C.）that the hastati and principes of a legion were detached, or in 10.14（for the year 297 B.C.）the hastati of a legion, that point has, of course, no historical value, but it may be cited here as a reflection of the experience of the second century B.C.

5.In the Livy Epitome, Book 67，it is stated that in the battle of Arausio 80，000 soldiers，40，000 supply train drivers and camp-followers（calones et lixae）were killed. These figures are certainly very exaggerated, but it is perhaps worthy of note that at this time a strength amounting to 50 percent of that of the combatants was attributed to the supply train. We could conclude from this that even before the time of Marius the veliti had disappeared for the most part, or at times perhaps completely, out of the legions, and the orderly and supply train system had been organized differently, on a practical basis.

6.Stolle, in The Romans'Camp and Army（Das Lager und Heer der Römer）（1912）opposes the idea that the number 6，000 is to be regarded as normal for the legion, and therefore 600 for the cohort, and we must agree with him that it is not as well founded as had been believed up to now. Nevertheless, it seems quite plausible to me, and the differences can, at least for our purposes, be ignored.

7.Of course, that has not been proved directly, but as Marquardt has remarked（2：339），it is very probable. See also Polybius 11.23，where it is stated that three maniples were called a cohort.

8. The passage where Polybius describes this quality of the Roman battle formation—that it was at the same time impenetrable（consequently in close order）and capable in all its individual units of turning in any desired direction（15.15.7）—is unfortunately somewhat obscure in its wording, but according to the sense quite clear and very valuable. The two characteristics of impenetrability and mobility can only be united by having intervals between the cohorts and keeping these intervals as small as possible. The large intervals that Veith（in Vol.3，Part 2，p.701）uses this passage to support are not only not proved by it, but are in fact contradicted, since a battle formation with intervals in its front is not impenetrable. The small intervals, as I conceive them, do not remove the quality of impenetrability, since they are closed up at the moment of impact by the press from the rear.

9.Livy 43.14. Polybius 35.4.

10.See the source citations in Mommsen, Roman History（Römische Geschichte）2：107 and 175；Marquardt, The Roman National Constitution（Römische Staatsverfassung），2：381.

11.Plutarch, Marius, Chapter 9.

3　百夫长

1.Correctly noted and solidly documented but expressed somewhat too strongly by Fröhlich in Caesar’s Method of Waging War（Kriegswesen Cäsars），p.19.

2.Polybius 6.34.One would expect that, corresponding to the 10 cohorts of the legion，10 tribunes would be assigned; however, even under the empire, there were only 6. Vegetius 2.12，states，“Cohortes a tribunis vel a praepositis regebantur”（“the cohorts ought to be commanded by tribunes or others set over them”）. The contradiction in the fact that the cohort appears as the basic tactical unit but the centurion is the key leader stems from the development of the army from a general citizen levy. For a long time already, the tribunes had had the character of magistrates, whereas the centurions had become soldiers pure and simple.

3.See also the passages in Marquardt，2：545；Festus, p.198，says that he had moved into the position of the old accensus（orderly）and on p.184 that the centurion had chosen him “rerum privatarum ministrum”（“the one who attends to private affairs”）.

4.Vegetius 2.7.

5.During the period of the Empire we see many titles of men with special functions who, in our system, would probably be designated as privates first-class or as noncommissioned officers with administrative functions. See I.H. Drake, The principalis of the Early Empire，1905，and Domaszewski, The Rank Structure of the Roman Army（Die Rangordnung des römischen Heeres）1908.

4　米特拉达梯

1.Memnon, who also says not a word about the second battle. Episodes of the History of Greece（Fragmenta historiae Graeciae）（ed. Carolus Müller），3.542.

2.Kromayer, Ancient Battlefields（Antike Schlachtfelder）Vol.2，has tried to reconstruct at Chaeronea a full-fledged battle, something that has just as little corroboration in the sources and is objectively just as impossible as the same author's battle of Magnesia. It would be superfluous to give detailed proof for this.

3.That the largest part of the army had spread out to plunder is not a sufficient reason, for if the remainder was much weaker than the Romans, we must ask ourselves again why Sulla did not take advantage of this opportunity to attack.

4.K.Eckhardt, Die armenischen Feldzüge des Lucullus, Berlin dissertation 1909，Klio, Vols.9 and 10. The military-objective analysis is not incisive enough. Nor does Gröbe, in Deutsche. Literaturzeitung, Vol.47，1910，agree with him.

5　罗马人与帕提亚人

1. The changes I have made in this chapter are based on the painstaking work of Francis Smith in the Historische Zeitschrift, Vol.115，1916.

2.Regling，“Crassus'War Against the Parthians”“Crassus'Parth-erkrieg，”Klio, Vol.7，1907.

3.According to Gardthausen, Vol.II, Part 1，p.150，footnote 6，the figures for the strength of the Roman army vary between 13 and 18 legions. The Armenian reinforcing troops should also be added to that number.

4.Dio Cassius 49.26.

5.Plutarch, Antonius, Chapter 49，conclusion. Dio 49.31.

6.This is how Frontinus, Stratagemetos 2.13.7，is to be understood.

第七篇　恺　撒

1　恺撒历次征战的批判性分析　无

2　赫尔维蒂战役

1.According to Beloch. Hubo, in Neue Jahrbücher fur Philologie 147（1893）：707，estimates 25，000 and seeks to justify Caesar’s own figure by eliminating a “C” from the latter’s number for the width.

2.Clausewitz, too, estimates in this way（10：66）. A useful comparison is provided by “The War Journal of Albrecht von Brandenburg”（“Das Kriegsbuch Albrechts v. Brandenburg”）in Jähns’s History of Warfare（Geschichte des Kriegswesens）1：521.

3. The trains that followed the Prussian army at Olmütz in 1758 were made up of almost 4，000 wagons, most of them drawn by 4 horses, and had a length of almost 2 days’march. General Staff Publication（Generalstabswerk）7：93.

4.Not by a full fourth, as is often said; the quarter of which Caesar speaks refers only to the Helvetii in the narrower sense. The allies were already across, and Caesar also does not say that the quarter was still there when he attacked, but rather, when his scouts observed it. See also Stoffel, The War between Caesar and Ariovistus（Guerre de Cesar et d'Arioviste）p.75.

5.If Maissiat should be right in distinguishing between the “Segusiavi” and the “Sebusiani，” placing the latter in the southern Jura, north of the Rhone, on the Ain, and thereby having Caesar not camp near Lyons but follow the Helvetii from Fort l'Ecluse through Bourg-en-Bresse, with the result that Labienus with his three legions was waiting one day's march to the east during the battle on the Sâone, then the Helvetii would indeed have had full freedom of movement from Montmerle, where they were attacked, to take the route either directly westward or southwestward.

6.Las Cases, Memoirs from Saint Helena（Memorial de Sainte-Hélene）2：445.

7.H.Bender, in “Caesar's Credibility on the War with Ariovistus”（“Cäsars Glaubwürdigkeit über den Krieg mit Ariovist，”）（Neue Korrespondenzblätter fur die Gelehrtenschulen Württembergs，1894），shows how very exaggerated Caesar’s account of the hegemony that Ariovistus exercised in Gaul actually is, but the fact itself that Ariovistus was master of a part of central Gaul is not to be doubted.

8.Caesar has this thought expressed specifically by Liscus（1.17）in the form that they would prefer to obey other Gauls rather than Romans—which presupposes that these other Gauls had first broken/the mastery of the Germans.

9. The fact that the Helvetii announced precisely this area as the goal of their migration has been explained very brilliantly by O. Hirschfeld in his study “Aquitania in the Roman Period”（“Aquita-nien in der römischen Zeit”）（Sitzungsberichte der Berliner Akademie，1896，p.453），where it is shown to be highly probable that the Helvetii, and perhaps also the Boii, who were accompanying them, were related to tribes already settled on the lower Garonne. In that connection Hirschfeld, too, makes the observation that such a migration was not so easy to imagine. With only one step farther along this train of thought we arrive at the hypothesis presented above in the text.

10. The long time they are supposed to have taken crossing the Sâone is no proof, since we cannot know to what extent Caesar exaggerated here also.

11.I consider it as impossible that, as is often assumed, Caesar had with him, in addition to cavalry, a considerable force of other Gallic allies, either from the province or from the Aedui or other tribes. His six legions were strong enough to oppose the Helvetii in battle, and allies whose reliability is questionable are of no use but only create problems through the difficulties they cause in the matter of rations. The auxilia of which Caesar speaks are mainly the Numid-ians, Balearics, and Cretans whom he has with him（2.7）.

12. The passage describing the formation has not been passed down very clearly in handwriting and has been read and corrected in a variety of ways by the different editors. All, however, have interpreted its meaning in the same way.

3　阿里奥维斯塔　无

4　征服比利其人

1.Dittenberger in the new edition of Kraner's publication of Caesar.

2.Konrad Lehmann, Neue Jahrbücher fur das klassische Altertum 7，No.6（1901）：506，and Klio 6，No.2（1906）：237.

3.Strictly speaking, Caesar does not say—and Konrad Lehmann has called attention to this point—that the 306，000 men were actually on hand, but he only says that the Romans had reported to him that they knew exactly how many each tribe at their assembly had promised to provide.

4.Concerning the maneuver that they carried out, see p.457，above.

5　维钦托利

1.Caesar himself says（7.34）there were 10 legions, that is, the Seventh to the Fifteenth, and the First. In addition, after the siege of Alesia, the Sixth appears. In this connection, see the comment by Napoleon III（in Uebersicht，2：282）. Göler, p.333，rejects the “Sixth Legion” and names instead the “Third.” Both Meusel and Kübler, however, have correctly accepted the “VI” version（8.4）. See also Domaszewski, Neue Heidelberger Jahrbücher 4（1894）：158. In this connection, see also Chapter VII, below，first paragraph.

2.Bell. Gall.7.65.

3.After careful examination of all the various hypotheses that have been advanced concerning the location of this battle, Holmes decided（p.780）that it was impossible to arrive at a definite answer but that the most likely possibility was the concept of Gouget, who seeks to place the battlefield near Dijon, on the Ouche. Under any circumstances, the place favored by Napoleon III, some 25 miles farther toward the northeast between the Vingeanne and the Badin, south of Langres, is incorrect.

4.See also Bell. Civ.3.47. It is not easy to imagine how an army that numbered all together surely 100，000 souls, and probably considerably more, could have fed itself and all its horses for almost six weeks in one location in the middle of enemy territory（see also Ilerda）. Great quantities of supplies necessarily had to be brought up over long distances. How did they manage to get through the enemy areas? My concept is that supplies were already stocked in Vienne and were transported up the Saône to a point only some 45 miles overland from Alesia. Later we find the Sixth Legion joined up with the main army; perhaps this legion, escorting the supply transport, pushed its way through during the siege. It may already have started on its march when Caesar moved down toward it from the north. In the period immediately following his victory, while the Gauls were still occupied with their preparations and the assembling of their army, this legion, marching along the left bank of the Saône, was undoubtedly able to bring up the supply train with relatively little danger, and on the final stretch Caesar may have sent out troops and vehicles to meet them. But of course it is still surprising that, even if the supply train was protected to a certain extent against the main force of the Gauls by the river, the Sequani in league with the Helvetii did not attempt to intercept the supplies. After all, up to that point the whole strategy of the Gauls had been directed toward cutting off the Romans’food supplies. Could it possibly be that the Sequani, contrary to what Caesar reported, did not take part in the rebellion at all? However that may be, no army as large as the Roman one before Alesia could feed itself simply from the immediately surrounding countryside. The execution of the siege of Alesia is inconceivable without envisaging that large supply trains of food and forage made their way through successfully, and these trains must have been accompanied by troops who protected them. The reader is reminded of the difficulty of supplying rations for the German army that was besieging Metz in 1870—despite the close proximity of the German border and the availability of the railroad net . This situation is presented in my lecture “Mind and Mass in History”（“Geist und Masse in der Geschichte”），Preussische Jahrbücher 174（1912）：193.

5.According to the manuscripts, Labienus carried out his sortie with 39 or 40 cohorts. As has long been recognized, this number is too large; it is impossible that more than one-third of the entire force of heavy infantry could have been available at one spot for a sortie. For this reason it has been conjectured that “XL” should read “XI，” and the more recent editors, Meusel as well as Kübler, have placed “XI” in the text. If this number were definite, we could conclude from it that the Gallic assault columns cannot have been as strong as Caesar reports; but since this number is based only on conjecture, we cannot go any further in evaluating it.

6.Veith, p.177，recounts that Vercingetorix spared neither time nor effort in continuously training his army according to the Roman pattern. Not only does Caesar make no mention of this, but also this report is based on a false concept of the nature of the training. Closely associated with training is a discipline that cannot be improvised, even by means of the most extreme strictness, but which can only be developed very gradually, through habit and tradition. What Caesar says（7.4）is that Vercingetorix assembled and dealt with his army with the most extreme severity and cruelty and（7.29-30）that he forced them, against their custom, to fortify their camp in the Roman manner.

6　罗马针对蛮族的战法

1. The description by Diodorus, in 5.28 ff.，is also colorful, to be sure, but it is nevertheless of no significance for us.

2.Theodor Reinach, Mithridates Eupator, trans, by Goetz, pp.355 and 358.

7　内战记：意大利与西班牙

1.See also pp.495 and 499 above. Even if these numbers have not been directly handed down to us in the sources, I believe that one can still give them with certainty. Domaszewski, in his valuable essay “The Armies of the Civil Wars in the Years 49 to 42 B.C.”（“Die Heere der Bügerkriege in den Jahren 49 bis 42 v. Chr.”），Neue Heidelberger Jahrbücher, Vol.4，1894，has pointed out that Caesar had 11 legions at the outbreak of the civil war. Since, however, only 10 are mentioned in the campaign against Vercingetorix and 11 in the following winter quarters, but Caesar had given up 2 legions, he could really only have had 9 remaining. Domaszewski explains the difference by saying that Caesar, as soon as he saw the conflict coming on, immediately formed 2 new legions as replacements for those he had given up. But it seems to me that there is a still better explanation. In the year 52 B.C, in addition to the above-mentioned 10 legions, Caesar also had 22 cohorts that were defending the province（7.65）and that had been levied in the province itself, so that they were not all composed of Roman citizens. The Fifth Legion, Alauda, was such a legion of noncitizens. According to Suetonius（Caesar, Chapter 24），Caesar had already formed it during the Gallic War and not, as Domaszewski believes, as late as the year 50 B.C. There is nothing more natural than for us to assume that it belonged to those 22 cohorts of the year 52 B.C.，and the same for the Sixth Legion, although of course Suetonius speaks of only one such barbarian legion. If we consider, however, that the Sixth Legion now appears in the Commentaries for the first time; that, as Napoleon III has already remarked, it arrived before Alesia as part of the main army; that Caesar cannot possibly have still had a veteran legion in Cisalpine Gaul at that time; that nothing would be more natural than for Caesar, after he had defeated Vercingetorix and the province was no longer in need of protection, to order up to his main force a part of the garrison there, in preparation for the decisive battle—under these circumstances we can hardly reach any other conclusion than that this legion was also a part of those 22 cohorts “praesidia ex ipsa coacta provincia”（“the garrisons drawn from the province itself）.

In opposition to this it could be argued that in the Bellum Alexandrinum, Chapter 69，it is said that the Sixth Legion had been reduced to 1，000 men as a result of hardships and battle losses（“crebritate bellorum”[“the frequency of the wars”]）and that it was deactivated in 45 B. C.as a veteran legion. Even if it was not formed, however, until the winter of 53-52 B.C.（but perhaps also earlier），it had still participated in the battles in defense of the province, the battle against the relief of Alesia, and later the entire civil war and therefore had at least six years of intensive battle experience behind it when it followed Caesar from Egypt against Phar-naces. In a footnote on his page 171 Domaszewski, even on the assumption that the Fifth, Alauda, Legion was not formed until 50 B.C.，cites it as a veteran legion in 48 B.C.

（Added in the second edition.）Gröbe（Festschrift fur Otto Hirschfeld，1903，reprinted in the 2d ed, of Drumann’s Römische Geschichte，3：702），in a study concerning Caesar’s legions, likewise came to the conclusion that the Fifth Legion had been formed from the cohorts that had been mentioned as being in the province in 52 B.C. But he fixes the organization of this unit as not occurring until 51 B.C. The Sixth Legion that participated in the civil war was supposedly not formed until 50 B.C, after the older Sixth Legion had been transferred to Pompey（and was designated as the First Legion in his army）.

The 8 cohorts that I assume to have been in Cisalpine Gaul are not considered by Gröbe.Consequently, he gives Caesar only 10 legions in the year 52 B.C. The difference, however, is smaller than it appears, since it is only a question of whether legions were formed from the 22 cohorts somewhat earlier or later and whether the 8 cohorts in Cisalpine Gaul were already in existence in 52 B.C. Cicero’s letter to Atticus in December 50 B.C.，cited by Gröbe, seems to point to the formation of a considerable number of new units in 50 B.C.：（7.7.6）“Imbecillo resistendum fuit et id erat facile; nunc legiones XI, equitatus tantus, quantum volet, Transpa-dani.”（“Resistance was weak, and the task was easy; now there were 11 legions and as much cavalry as he might wish, levied from the region north of the Po.”）But there is not really anything to be learned from this passage, since under any circumstances Caesar had had in 52 B.C.，in addition to his 10 legions, the 22 cohorts.

2. The cited dates are in accordance with Stoffel's calculations, based on the estimates of the astronomer Leverrier, which were requested by Napoleon III. According to Ideler, Mommsen, Matzat, Soltau, and Unger, the events occurred some three weeks earlier.

3.When Caesar moved out on the following day and initially took the route back toward Ilerda, the Pompeian soldiers naturally believed that a lack of provisions was forcing the enemy to retire. This does not contradict the sentence above, however.

8　希腊战役

1.Perhaps even a few more.Gröbe, in Drumann’s Roman History（Römische Geschichte），2d ed.，3：710.

2.28 November 49 B.C, according to Stoffel；5 November, according to Mommsen.

3.These observations and the confirmation of these points had already been made by a commission sent out by Napoleon III in 1861 in a work published by L. Heuzay, Julius Caesar's Military Operations, studied on the Terrain by the Macedonian Commission（Les operations militaires de Jules Cesar，étudiees sur le terrain par la mission de Macédoine）（Paris，1886），which was confirmed by Stoffel in Life of Caesar（Vie de Cesar）1：138.

4.Domaszewski, in Armies of the Civil Wars（Heere der Bürgerkriege）pp.171-172，considers it impossible for legions to have come from Italy to Illyria, since the Pompeians controlled the sea. This reason is not convincing, since the land route was open.

5.Up to the present this point has probably not been sufficiently emphasized. Ranke, in his World History（Weltgeschichte），even states the opinion that we have descriptions of the battle of Pharsalus that stem from supporters of the Senate and of Pompey. Such is the case only to the extent that Livy wrote from the Pompeian point of view and Lucanus, particularly, presented the civil war with this bias. But these two were already significantly dependent on written sources, and since, despite their bias, they have practically nothing that does not go back to either Caesar or Pollio, that is a sure proof that a truly Pompeian original source containing unique information either did not exist or had already disappeared at that time. Lucanus apparently did do his best to find such a source but it is downright astonishing how little of a positive nature his work contains which would not be known from other sources. Plathner, in On the Credibility of the History of the Civil War（Zur Glaubwürdigkeit der Geschichte des Bürgerkrieges）（Bernburg Pro-gramm，1882），has compiled these points very well and has shown that Lucanus used Livy as a source. And so the two of them were able to express their sympathy for Pompey’s cause only through the material handed down from the enemy side.

6.Appian and Dio Cassius write of important defeats suffered, in turn, by these detached corps. These reports probably have to stem from Asinius Pollio, but if they were true, there would have had to be in some way or other more significant consequences. We must therefore prefer Caesar’s report; Pollio must have been taken in by the exaggerated accounts of persons who took part in those battles.

7.Plutarch, Caesar, Chapter 43.

8.That is the sense of Bell. Civ.84.2 and 85.1.

9　法萨卢斯会战　无

10　内战末期诸战役　无

11　战　象

1.Polybius 3.14.

2.Livy 25.41.

3.Sallust, Jugurtha, Chapter 53.

4.According to the observation by Fröhlich in The Significance of the Second Punic War（Die Bedeutung des zweiten punischen Krieges），p.20.

5.Valerius Maximus 9.3. Appian, Iberia, Chapter 46.

6.Orosius 5.13. Florus 1.37.

7.Schubert, in Pyrrhus, p.222，calls attention to the fact that in the account of Pyrrhus'campaign in Sicily, which goes back to Timaeus, hardly any mention is made of the elephants.

8.J.Chr.D. Schreber, in The Mammals（Die Saugetiere）（Erlangen，1775），1：245，which is still today the authoritative work on descriptive zoology, strongly emphasizes this point and says that the elephant is even sensitive to the bite of a fly. In Volume 6 of the same work, by J.A. Wagner（1835），p.265，it is recounted how the javelins of hunters remain imbedded in the body and gradually kill the elephant. Baker, in The Albert Nyanza，1：284，tells how skilled hunters can kill an elephant directly by a stab with a spear from below.

9.Appian, Iberia, Chapter 46.

12　结论

1.Frontinus，4.7.1. Similarly, Bell. Afric, Chapter 31.

2.Vom Kriege, Book 7，Chapter 16.

3.Suetonius, Chapter 88.

4.Plutarch, Chapter 11.

5.In the preface to his treatment of the Commentaries of Folard on Polybius，1755.

6. The excellent bringing together of the three citations in the work of Adolf Bauer，“Thucydides'Views on the Conduct of War”（“Ansichten des Thucydides über Kriegführung”），Philologus 50：416.

7.In the oration “Pro lege Manilla” in the year 66 B.C.

[1]普鲁士军事改革家（1760—1831），组建总参谋部，实行征兵制，对普鲁士和德国军事制度产生了深远影响。本书所有的脚注均为译者所加。

[2]德国古典学家、历史学家、政治家、作家（1817—1903），其《罗马史》曾获得诺贝尔文学奖。对罗马法和债法的研究对《德国民法典》有着重大影响。

[3]全名为卡尔·尤利乌斯·贝洛赫（1854—1929），德国古典学家和经济史学家。著有四卷本《希腊史》（Griechische Geschichte）和《古希腊罗马人口问题研究》。

[4]全名为巴托尔德·格奥尔格·尼布尔（Barthold Georg Niebuhr，1776—1831），德国著名历史学家，是现代古罗马史研究的开拓者之一。

[5]普鲁士国王，1797年至1840年在位。

[6]波希米亚贵族和奥地利军事将领（1766—1858），曾于拿破仑战争和1848—1849年与意大利的战争中立下战功。《拉德茨基进行曲》就是老约翰·施特劳斯献给他的。

[7]全名为海因里希·拜茨克（Heinrich Beitzke，1798—1867），德国政治家和历史学家。

[8]德国历史学家（1769—1860），主要研究德意志民族史。

[9]勃艮第公爵，1467年至1477年间在位，领地北至尼德兰，南抵法国与瑞士交界地带，强盛一时，可惜战死后领地被法奥两国瓜分。

[10]胡斯战争（1419—1434）的起因是宗教改革家扬·胡斯被处死，于是波希米亚（今捷克）本地势力起而反抗天主教会和支持教会的神圣罗马帝国皇帝。

[11]又译希洛特人或希洛人，伯罗奔尼撒地区的原住民，后被斯巴达人征服和奴役。

[12]公元前7世纪前后的古希腊诗人。

[13]汉斯·德尔布吕克在本书的德文版中引用了大量的希腊语和拉丁语原文，但没有给出相应的译文，英译本译者沃尔特·J.伦弗罗（Walter J.Renfroe, jr）将其翻为英文，并加“*”，用直译的方式给出译文，以方便读者对应作者的讨论。

[14]拉西第梦社会分为斯巴达人、珀里俄基人和黑劳士。斯巴达人享有完整的公民权，负责作战。珀里俄基人享有自治权，但没有完整的权利，主要从事工商业。

[15]雅典海军将领和民主派领袖。伯罗奔尼撒战争结束后，战败的雅典被斯巴达扶持的三十寡头统治，色拉西布罗斯遂率众抵抗。

[16]雅典军事家、文学家和史学家（前427—前355）。他是苏格拉底的学生，著有《回忆苏格拉底》。他参加过波斯王子小居鲁士的政治和军事斗争，并以这段经历为基础撰写了《居鲁士的教育》和《长征记》。另外，他还写了一本《希腊史》。

[17]公元2世纪的希腊地理学家和旅行家，著有《希腊志》10卷。

[18]公元2世纪前后的马其顿作家，著有《战略》8卷。

[19]古希腊悲剧诗人（前525—前456），有“悲剧之父”的美誉。他参加过马拉松会战，著有《波斯人》《被缚的普罗米修斯》等剧。

[20]希波战争早期人物，曾煽动斯巴达人反抗波斯，但并未成功。

[21]俾路支今属巴基斯坦。

[22]即波斯国王。

[23]作为地理称谓，色雷斯指的是土耳其海峡以西以北的地区，今分属希腊、土耳其、保加利亚三国。

[24]古希腊神话中的月亮女神与狩猎女神，是奥林匹斯十二主神之一。

[25]基督教圣徒，以屠龙英雄闻名。

[26]今恰纳卡莱海峡。

[27]普鲁士历史学家（1799—1878）。

[28]优卑亚岛是仅次于克里特岛的希腊第二大岛，呈长条形，位于雅典和雅典以北的维奥蒂亚地区的东北方，与大陆隔着尤里普斯海峡。温泉关在大陆上，基本与优卑亚岛北端齐平。科林斯地峡则是南边的伯罗奔尼撒半岛与希腊其余部分的分界线。

[29]雅典所在的阿提卡半岛与伯罗奔尼撒半岛之间的一处港湾，内有众多岛屿，包括萨拉米斯岛。

[30]公元前1世纪的希腊历史学家，著有《历史丛书》（Bibliotheca histo-rica）。

[31]尼波斯全名为科利尼厄斯·尼波斯（约前110—前25），古罗马历史学家，拉丁文人物传记的先驱。查士丁是公元2世纪的古罗马历史学家，著有《〈腓利史〉概要》一书。弗龙蒂努斯（约40—103），古罗马著名作家、政治家和建筑师。

[32]位于土耳其西部，曾是被波斯征服的古国吕底亚的都城，如今已成遗址。

[33]位于希腊南部的伯罗奔尼撒半岛西端。

[34]位于希腊东北部海滨。

[35]位于希腊中部的维奥蒂亚海滨。

[36]位于西西里岛东岸，起初是科林斯的希腊人建立的一座海外城邦。

[37]雅典雄辩家和民主派政治家（前384—前322），极力反对马其顿入侵希腊，失败后自杀身亡。

[38]今格鲁吉亚西部沿海地区，希腊神话中的伊阿宋曾到这里寻找金羊毛。

[39]伯罗奔尼撒半岛中部地区，没有被斯巴达人征服，得以保持自治地位。日后成为田园牧歌式生活的代名词。

[40]科林斯附近的一处港口。

[41]达达尼尔海峡亚洲一侧的一处良港。

[42]古希腊地名，位于伯罗奔尼撒半岛西北，与其隔海相望。

[43]安菲特律翁是一名底比斯将军，也是赫拉克勒斯名义上的父亲（事实上，赫拉克勒斯是宙斯化身为安菲泰隆的样子与安菲泰隆妻子生下的儿子）。莱库斯是底比斯僭主，趁着赫拉克勒斯去活捉地狱三头犬刻耳柏洛斯的机会判处安菲特律翁死刑，后者不得不到神庙中避难。这段对话就是在神庙中发生的。

[44]曼提尼亚位于伯罗奔尼撒半岛东北部海滨。斯巴达取得伯罗奔尼撒战争胜利后不久，底比斯起而反对斯巴达霸权，并在曼提尼亚一举将其击败。可惜没过多久，马其顿就崛起为新的霸主。

[45]古希腊罗马时代的重量单位。

[46]此战发生于公元前371年，斯巴达人被底比斯人击败。

[47]古地区名，位于今巴尔干半岛西部，亚得里亚海东岸。

[48]此战发生于公元前333年的安纳托利亚半岛西南部，波斯王大流士三世大败于亚历山大大帝。

[49]位于希腊中部偏北，维奥蒂亚与马其顿之间。

[50]位于安纳托利亚半岛的西北方，靠近特洛伊。

[51]希腊史学家，生于公元86年，死于146年，著有记述亚历山大大帝功勋的《远征记》。

[52]波斯帝国的一支职业重装步兵部队，编成于亚历山大东征前不久。

[53]即叙利亚诸关。

[54]今哈塔伊，位于土耳其南部地中海沿岸，与叙利亚接壤。

[55]古地区名，位于土耳其东南沿海，亚历山大勒塔在它的南边。

[56]全名为昆图斯·库尔提乌斯·鲁弗斯（Quintus Curtius Rufus），公元1世纪的罗马历史学家，仅有《亚历山大大帝传》（Historiae Alexandri Magni）一书存世。

[57]古代民族，生活在欧洲东北部、东欧大草原至中亚一带。

[58]今杰赫勒姆河，是旁遮普地区（旁遮普意为“五河”，现在分属印巴两国）最西边的一条河流。

[59]伊哥斯波塔米海战属于伯罗奔尼撒战争，发生于公元前405年，雅典战败且次年即投降。

[60]伊庇鲁斯位于希腊西北部。

[61]第二次布匿战争是罗马与迦太基三次战争中最长也最有名的一场战争，前后共17年（前218年—前201年）。

[62]罗马王政时代的第六任君主，前578年—前534年在位，他按财产多寡将罗马人分为5个等级并对其进行了人口普查。

[63]古罗马著名史学家（前64或前59—17年），罗马史巨著《建城以来史》的作者。

[64]罗马建城始祖。

[65]辛辛纳图斯（前519—前430）临危受命出任独裁官，退敌后很快就回归农庄。库里乌斯·登塔图斯（去世于前270年）4次当选执政官，以粉碎反抗罗马统治的萨莫奈人起义而闻名。法布里修斯为人清正廉洁，与入侵罗马的伊庇鲁斯国王皮洛士谈判时令对手感佩。

[66]罗马共和国初期与东南方山区的萨莫奈人进行了3次战争（前343—前341；前326—前304；前298—前290），逐步将其征服同化。

[67]古希腊政治家和历史学家（前200—前118），有《通史》残篇传世。

[68]此战发生于公元前168年，执政官埃米利乌斯·保卢斯率领的罗马军队击败了马其顿国王珀尔修斯，灭亡了马其顿王国。

[69]雅典政治家和军事将领（前402—前318），致力于维护雅典独立，但最后不得不对马其顿妥协。

[70]公元4世纪时期的罗马作家，著有《罗马军制》。该书从中世纪后期开始广受重视。

[71]全名为卡尔·威廉·尼奇（1818—1880），德国史学家，以古罗马和中世纪德意志研究闻名。

[72]此战爆发于意大利北部，是第二次布匿战争的第一场大型会战（前218），汉尼拔取得了胜利。

[73]公元前217年，汉尼拔在罗马以北的山中湖泊特拉西梅诺湖几乎全歼了一支罗马军队。

[74]1884年英国的社会主义团体“费边社”（Fabian Society）就是以“法比乌斯”命名的，取中庸渐进之意。

[75]西班牙东部城市。

[76]即阿尔卑斯以南的高卢人生活区域，相当于今意大利北部。

[77]罗讷河发源于瑞士境内，向西注入日内瓦湖后转向西南，从普罗旺斯汇入地中海。

[78]埃布罗河位于西班牙东北部，波河位于意大利北部。

[79]从亚平宁山脉向东注入亚得里亚海，位于波河以南，罗马东北方。

[80]公元前301年的伊普苏斯会战是继业者战争中规模最大的一场战斗，统治马其顿本土的安提柯一世和他的儿子德米特里一世被亚历山大大帝的其他旧部将联合击败。

[81]217年，统治叙利亚的塞琉古王国与统治埃及的托勒密王国在拉菲亚（今巴勒斯坦拉法赫）爆发大战，安提柯麾下的塞琉古军大败。

[82]奥地利王位继承战争中的一场会战，发生于1741年，普鲁士国王腓特烈二世击败了前来救援尼斯堡的近两万名奥地利骑兵。

[83]古罗马作家和诗人（约卒于公元前169年），代表作为叙事诗《编年史》。

[84]古罗马历史学家（95—165），代表作为《罗马史》。

[85]古罗马政治家（前154—前121），两度担任保民官，推动全面改革，但被元老院逼迫而死。

[86]日耳曼民族的一支，可能起源于日德兰半岛北部。

[87]“Shanghai”在英语中是一个动词，一个人若被以欺骗、胁迫、暴力相向而到船上做工则称为被shanghai了，与大英帝国海军的强制入伍有关。

[88]第纳里（denarius），古罗马银币，最早铸造于第二次布匿战争时期，最后一次发行是在《沉思录》的作者奥勒留皇帝在位期间。起初1第纳里=10阿斯，但后来多次贬值。目前伊拉克、科威特等中东国家的货币“第纳尔”的词源就是第纳里。

[89]本都王国存在于公元前281年至公元前62年，以安纳托利亚东部为核心区域，势力在末代国王米特拉达梯六世（即这里所说的米特拉达梯）达到极盛，但随之被罗马击败灭国。

[90]雅典平原的一条河流。

[91]古罗马政治家与历史学家（150—235），仅有残篇存世。

[92]古代底格里斯河畔的一座大城，今为遗址。

[93]今尚勒乌尔法，位于土耳其南部边境地带。

[94]位于土耳其与叙利亚边境线的西侧。

[95]古代城市，位于今伊朗西部的哈马丹。

[96]古代区域名，位于今伊朗里海沿岸地带的东南部，在埃克巴坦那以东。

[97]赫尔维蒂人原本居住于今瑞士和德国西南部。

[98]埃杜伊人生活在萨恩河与卢瓦尔河之间，相当于今天法德边境地区的中部。塞夸尼人在埃杜伊人的东边，与更东边的赫尔维蒂人隔着汝拉山脉。

[99]布克拉特属于埃杜伊人的地盘。

[100]卢瓦尔河是法国最长的河流，发源于中央高原南部的塞文山脉，北流至奥尔良一带后转向西边，最后汇入比斯开湾。

[101]生活于今荷兰南部、比利时东部和德国的莱茵兰地区。

[102]位于希腊西北部。

[103]位于意大利的东南角，也就是鞋后跟处。

[104]萨洛尼卡位于希腊北部滨海。拜占庭就是今天的伊斯坦布尔，历史上也叫君士坦丁堡。

[105]法萨卢斯位于希腊中部内陆。

[106]选译自第一篇第1章。

[107]与“迈锡尼”（Mycenae）不同。麦西尼亚位于伯罗奔尼撒半岛西南角，拉西第梦（斯巴达）以西，迈锡尼则位于伯罗奔尼撒半岛东北部，拉西第梦以北。

[108]作为对比，2017年的中国人口密度约为每平方千米144人。

[109]《克里奥》（Klio）是德国最早的古希腊罗马史杂志之一，创刊于1901年。克里奥是古希腊神话中的历史之神。

[110]雅典位于爱琴海南端。利姆诺斯岛位于爱琴海北部，与雅典直线距离约250千米；伊姆罗兹岛今称格克切岛（Gökçeada），位于爱琴海东北部，属于土耳其，距雅典约300千米；斯基罗斯岛位于爱琴海中部偏南，距雅典约130千米。作为对比，福州至台北的距离约为250千米，大连至烟台的距离约为160千米。

[111]选译自第一篇第5章第7条。

[112]选译自第二篇第4章。

[113]选译自第五篇第2章。

[114]选译自第六篇第1章。

[115]克利图斯是亚历山大手下的一位将军，在一次酒宴上出言冲撞了亚历山大，于是被杀。

[116]古希腊贵族，公元前207年首次出任亚该亚同盟将军，采用马其顿方阵战术，于曼提尼亚会战中击败斯巴达。

[117]斯巴达（拉西第梦）国王，前235—前222在位，面对马其顿和亚该亚同盟的双重压力试图采取一系列措施挽救国家，但最终事败身死。

[118]选译自第六篇第2章第1条。

[119]德国历史学家（1817—1895），普鲁士历史学派的创始人之一，著有《1789—1800年革命时代史》等书。

[120]弗雷德里克·威廉一世，人称“士兵王”，1713年至1740年在位，他的儿子就是著名的弗雷德里克二世（又称“腓特烈二世”）。弗雷德里克·威廉三世于1797年至1840年在位。